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Previous research has distinguished self-conscious emotions (SCEs), such as 
shame, guilt and pride, from basic emotions due to the prerequisites of SCEs for self-
awareness, self-representations and self-evaluation. In addition, individualistic 
assumptions and understandings of SCEs have been considered to reflect a perception 
of the self as an independent self-construal, which contrasts with the collectivistic 
interdependent self-concept. Whether existing models of SCEs are generalizable to 
collectivistic cultures remains an open question. The present research applied both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies over a span of four studies to investigate 
cross-cultural differences in the experience of shame, adaptive and maladaptive guilt, 
and hubristic and authentic pride between Singaporean and Australian young adults. A 
cross-cultural exploration of SCEs and their relations with filial piety and psychological 
distress was also conducted. 
Study 1 was as an explorative pilot study, from which separation guilt emerged 
as a culturally relevant SCE that distinguished young Singaporean adults (n=65) from 
their Australian counterparts (n=64). Study 2 contributed qualitative data in relation to 
the modus operandi of SCEs within collectivistic and individualistic cultures, whereby 
young Singaporean adults were found to report more shame and hubristic pride, while 
their Australian counterparts reported experiencing more authentic pride. Study 2 also 
found young Singaporean adults to experience more familial guilt (similar to separation 
guilt), as influenced by attitudes towards filial piety. Study 3 sought to further explore 
these findings, and young Singaporean adults (n=182) were found to report stronger 
attitudes towards both reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety than their Australian 
counterparts (n=189). Finally, Study 4 examined the specific relations between 
separation guilt, hubristic pride, filial piety and psychological distress in a model for 
both young Singaporean and Australian adults. The overall findings indicated that 
shame appears to be a SCE that is strongly related to psychological distress for both 
Singaporeans and Australians. However, the hypothesized theoretical model indicated 
that attitudes towards filial piety appear to be particularly relevant for Singaporeans, 
with unique cultural relations existing between both authoritarian and reciprocal filial 
piety and hubristic pride, as well as symptoms of depression and anxiety. Theoretical 
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CHAPTER 1: CULTURE AND SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS
In this thesis, the term “culture” is used to refer to historically acquired and 
socially  conveyed ideas (e.g., symbols, language, values, and norms), and practices 
(e.g., rituals, mores, laws), as well as organisations (e.g., family structure) that are both 
products of human behaviour and generators of future action (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 
1952). For example, beliefs and practices of individuals in the past have shaped the 
behaviours and thoughts of individuals living today, just as current beliefs and practices 
created today will, in turn, influence the thoughts and behaviours of future generations. 
Anthropologists and cultural psychologists have applied the term “cultural model” to 
describe organised patterns of practices and ideas that are associated with specific 
social, physical, and psychological phenomena, which include the self and emotion 
(Strauss, 1992). This thesis will contribute to the literature a more complete 
understanding of self-conscious emotions by investigating how culture impacts on the 
individual experience of shame, guilt and pride, as well as the cultural relationships 
between self-conscious emotions and psychological distress.
An Exploration of the Universality of Emotions
One of the fundamental findings in the emotion literature is that a set of “basic” 
emotions – anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise – have distinctly 
unique, universally recognised, facial expressions. Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen 
(1969; see also Ekman & Friesen, 1971) found that individuals from two pre-literate 
tribal cultures in New Guinea agreed with individuals from the United States, Brazil, 
Japan, and Borneo about the emotions relayed by facial expressions of each basic 
emotion. This research has contradicted the prevailing view that all emotions are 
entirely culture specific, and has, in general, supported Darwin’s claim that emotion 
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expressions are universal aspects of human nature which have evolved to serve specific 
adaptive functions. 
With specific regard to the outward expression of self-conscious emotions, 
research has suggested that both pride and shame have nonverbal expressions that are 
recognised across cultures (Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Izard, 1977; Tracy & Robins, 
2004b). In a study conducted in a remote village in Burkina, Faso, Africa, individuals 
living in preliterate tribal cultures that are highly isolated from Westernised countries 
were found to recognise physical expressions of pride and shame that have been 
previously documented in Western cultures (Izard, 1977; Keltner, 1995; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004b). Given that participants were unlikely to have learnt the pride or shame 
expressions through cross-cultural interactions, their accurate recognition suggested that 
the physical expression of these two self-conscious emotions expressions, like the basic 
emotion expressions, might be universal in nature. In addition, Haidt and Keltner (1999) 
found that individuals from India, who had particularly limited access to Western 
culture and Western media, identified the physical expression of embarrassment 
previously found in Western cultures (Keltner, 1995).
The findings of the cross-cultural agreement about the nonverbal expressions of 
self-conscious emotions have evoked new theories and research regarding emotion and 
the self. Given that shame, guilt, and pride are believed to be elicited by complex self-
evaluative processes (Tracy & Robins, 2007b), the evidence of the universality of self-
conscious emotions implied that these complex self-processes were also universal. 
However, while research may have found evidence that supports the universal 
recognition of the physical expression of shame and guilt, it is argued that subtle 
differences in the cultural variances of self-conscious emotions may emerge in the 
intrapersonal experience of shame, guilt, and pride.
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Indeed, a growing body of research has suggested that culture has an extensive 
influence on how individuals define the self, which, in turn, is believed to impact upon 
the experience of self-conscious emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). For example, 
individuals from collectivistic cultures tend to hold an interdependent self-concept, 
viewing the self as rooted within, and reliant upon, a larger social context; whereas 
individuals from individualistic cultures are more likely to hold a more independent 
concept of the self, whereby the self is perceived as largely distinct from one’s social 
context (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
According to this perspective, these cultural differences in self-concepts are believed to 
impact upon cultural differences in emotion experiences. Specifically, “other-focused” 
emotions, such as shame, have been argued to be more commonly experienced and lead 
to greater positive outcomes in individuals with interdependent views of the self, 
whereas “ego-focused” emotions, such as pride, may be more commonly experienced 
and self-enhancing for those with independent views of the self (Eid & Diener, 2001; 
Menon & Shweder, 1994; Scherer & Walbott, 1994). 
The search for common ground between these findings and the concept of 
universal self-evaluations that elicit self-conscious emotions has been ongoing for 
decades, with researchers reaching some agreement that most emotions are likely to 
have both universal, as well as culture-specific components (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002; Goetz & Keltner, 2007; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). For example, although some 
researchers agree that overt expressions of emotions generalise across cultures, there is 
also some consensus that there are significant cultural differences in the ways in which 
individuals internally experience and regulate these expressions through display rules 
(Matsumoto, Yoo, Hirayama, & Petrova, 2005). This view suggests that the link 
between emotions and automatic nonverbal expressions is at least partly derived from 
human nature, but that the way in which individuals experience, perceive, suppress or 
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exaggerate these expressions is possibly largely determined by culture (Tracy & Robins, 
2007b).
Researchers have also suggested that the frequency of occurrence, as well as the 
intensity of specific emotions, has culture-specific factors (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990; 
Menon & Schweder, 1994; Wong & Tsai, 2007). For example, shame has been found to 
be perceived as a less negative emotion in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic 
cultures, due to the fact that it affirms the individual’s place and sense of belonging 
within the social group (Menon & Shweder, 1994; Wong & Tsai, 2007). Of particular 
interest, the antecedent appraisals that elicit these emotions have been found to 
generalise across cultures. Scherer and Walbott (1994) studied 37 cultures and found 
considerable cross-cultural similarities in the appraisal processes that generated and 
distinguished among emotions. Given that the generalisability of appraisals that elicit 
particular emotion across cultures occurs in spite of culturally distinct frequencies and 
valences, these cultural differences are likely to stem from the internal processes of the 
manner in which events are appraised and emotions are valued. For example, a person 
from a collectivistic culture may report feeling shame more frequently than a person 
from an individualistic culture, even though the same set of appraisals and attributions 
elicits shame in both people. This difference in reporting might occur because 
individuals in collectivistic cultures may be more likely to make the kinds of appraisals 
that universally elicit shame, and shame is more likely to be socially accepted in 
collectivistic cultures. Therefore, shame is less likely to be regulated and more likely to 
be self-reported (Tracy & Robins, 2007b).
There is also strong evidence that culture exerts a strong influence on the way 
that individuals appraise emotion-eliciting events (Mesquita, 2001). For example, an 
individual from a collectivistic culture who might hold an interdependent self-concept 
might not appraise a personal accomplishment as identity-goal congruent unless this 
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accomplishment reflects well on his family as well (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). As a 
result, the same antecedent event, such as a university lecturer highlighting an 
individual for attaining the highest score on a test that draws attention from others, 
might lead to divergent emotions depending on culture. For a person from an 
individualistic culture with an independent self-construal, this event will likely be 
evaluated as congruent with the culturally determined identity goal of appearing smart 
to those around him or her. If the individual also evaluates the event as internally 
caused, he or she will experience pride. In contrast, an individual with a more 
interdependent self-construal might feel shame instead of pride, because he or she might 
appraise this event as relevant to the culturally determined identity goal of fitting in 
with those around him or her, and, therefore, as incongruent with this goal. 
Other cultural differences in appraisal process – such as the tendency for people 
from individualistic cultures to make more self-serving attributions for success and 
failure than people from collectivistic cultures (Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama, Takagi, & 
Matsumoto, 1995) – will produce similar differences in the frequency of particular 
emotional occurrences. Therefore, culture may affect how often particular emotions are 
experienced by influencing individuals’ propensity to make certain appraisals (Mesquita 
& Frijda, 1992).
Concerns with general existing models of shame and guilt
Mainstream emotion research and theory posit that shame and guilt are 
experienced when standards or norms have been violated (Lewis, 1987; Tangney, 
1991). While shame occurs when one is negatively evaluated by others for behaving 
inappropriately, involves global and stable attributions for wrongdoings, and is 
associated with maladaptive consequences, guilt is suggested to occur when one has a 
negative appraisal of one’s own self for behaving inappropriately, involves specific and 
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temporary attributions for transgressions, and is associated with adaptive consequences 
(Wong & Tsai, 2007).
This general view of shame and guilt, however, is strongly reliant on certain 
assumptions that may not necessarily apply to other cultural contexts. For example, the 
concept that global, stable attributions result in shame and that specific, temporary 
attributions elicit guilt is based on the assumption that there is a stable self that can be 
differentiated from one’s temporary actions (Wong & Tsai, 2007). In a similar manner, 
the theory that shame has an external orientation, in that it is oriented to others’ 
standards or social norms, whereas guilt has an internal orientation, in that it is oriented 
to one’s own standards, assumes that internal and external orientation can be easily 
separated, and that internal orientation is somewhat more powerful and genuine than 
external orientation (Wong & Tsai, 2007). In essence, these assumptions reflect a view 
of the self that is conceptualised as predominantly independent in nature (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), which appears to be restricted and isolated from others, and largely 
defined by stable personal characteristics. 
Additionally, this conventional model has been criticised for its assumption that 
being negatively appraised, whether by oneself or others, is entirely negative and non-
beneficial to the individual, and that such experiences should be actively avoided. 
Researchers have suggested that this mainstream assumption may well reflect the value 
placed on positive feelings in many individualistic contexts (Heine et al., 1999; Wong & 
Tsai, 2007). Considering the significant research that has demonstrated that 
individualistic cultures promote an independent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Triandis, 1995), and considering that most models of shame and guilt have been based 
on Western samples, it is indeed likely that the conceptualisation of shame and guilt that 
has contributed to emotion research might be skewed towards an individualistic 
conceptualisation (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Exploring the experience of shame and guilt in 
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the context of other non-individualistic cultures that are rooted in other philosophical 
traditions and that have different views of the self might potentially reflect different 
views of shame and guilt (Camras & Fatani, 2004; Kitayama et al., 1995; Mesquita & 
Karasawa, 2004).
Collectivistic models of shame and guilt
Given the pivotal importance of the self in the emotions of shame, guilt and 
pride, having an interdependent self-concept has been argued to impact upon the 
appraisal, elicitors, and behavioural consequences of these self-conscious emotions 
(Wong & Tsai, 2007). In addition, having an interdependent sense of self may even blur 
the differentiation between shame and guilt in collectivistic cultures, as compared to 
individualistic cultures.
The differentiation between shame and guilt has been suggested to be less 
applicable in cultures that support an interdependent conceptualisation of the self 
(Wong & Tsai, 2007). Li, Wang, and Fischer (2004) produced a list of terms associated 
with shame in the Chinese language and requested participants to group the terms into 
different categories based on how similar or different the terms were to each other. 
Hierarchical cluster analyses revealed that participants perceived guilt as a component 
of shame, rather than as an independent construct of its own. Indeed, when translated 
into English, some Chinese terms that are related to shame are often translated as guilt 
(e.g., kui), or as a combination of shame and guilt (e.g., xiucan and xiukui) in English.
In many collectivistic cultures, the differences in the attributions associated with 
shame and guilt appear less salient than in individualistic cultures. In individualistic 
cultures, shame is associated with global and stable attributions, and guilt is associated 
with specific and temporary attributions. In contrast, Wikan (1984) found that shame 
was associated with temporary and specific actions in collectivistic cultures, rather than 
their global and stable characteristics. Swartz (1988) also argued that among the Swahili 
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of Mombasa in Africa, shame may result from the individual’s belief that others view 
his or her actions negatively. These findings have suggested that in some cultural 
contexts, shame is associated with the same attributions that are associated with guilt in 
Western individualistic contexts. 
There is other evidence that shame and guilt may be more similar than different 
in collectivistic contexts. Bedford (2004) interviewed Chinese individuals and found 
three subtypes of guilt and four subtypes of shame in Chinese that were not 
distinguishable from each other in English. Although most subtypes of shame involved 
violations of others’ expectations and being negatively evaluated by others, one subtype 
of shame did not involve others’ judgments, and therefore reflected the individualistic 
concept of guilt. In addition, many subtypes of collectivistic shame appeared to incite 
pro-social behaviour, making it more similar to, rather than different from, 
individualistic guilt. For example, Bedford argued that can kui, a form of Chinese 
shame, worked to prompt individuals to perform to the best of their ability, and the fear 
of xiu kui, another form of Chinese shame that an individual experiences when he or she 
discovers inadequacies in their selves, was usually enough to deter shame-inducing 
actions. 
Where shame has been distinguished from guilt within collectivistic contexts, 
the basis of the distinction also appears to be different from that of many individualistic 
cultures (Wong & Tsai, 2007). In describing shame and guilt in the Chinese culture, 
Bedford and Hwang (2003) argue that guilt is more effective as a regulatory emotion in 
individualistic cultures, as it is often related to more general standards that are held by 
the individual and others, but shame is more effective in collectivistic cultures, as it is 
associated with a code of standards that subjectively adapt to situations and 
relationships. Therefore, in collectivistic cultures, individuals might experience guilt 
when they feel an absolute standard is violated, whereas shame is experienced when a 
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situation-specific standard is violated (Wong & Tsai, 2007). This contrasts with the 
manner in which shame and guilt are distinguished in individualistic cultures and this 
cultural difference in the experience of shame and guilt has been argued to have its roots 
in Confucianism, a prominent practice and tradition in many East Asian cultures, which 
focuses heavily on situations and relations, contributing to the experience of shame in 
these contexts to be more socially appropriate than experiencing guilt (Bedford & 
Hwang, 2003; Cho, 2000).
Another problem in distinguishing shame from guilt in collectivistic cultures 
might also stem from the collectivist conceptualisation of the self, whereby individuals 
do not view themselves as independent of their relationships with others, their contexts, 
or their actions (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Consequentially, less emphasis is placed on 
having an internal orientation in collectivistic than in individualistic contexts (Morling, 
Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002). Therefore, the differences between shame and guilt in 
individualistic cultures, which predominantly rely on this distinction, may be less 
pronounced in collectivistic cultures. 
The positive appraisal of shame in collectivistic cultures
The ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius, has emphasised the positive value 
of shame in his statements, “To know the sense of shame is to draw close to courage” 
and “Guide them by example, subdue them by courtesy; they will learn shame, and 
come to be good”. In many collectivistic cultures, shame is understood as both a 
positive emotion and an appropriate emotional response to defeat or a wrongdoing 
(Wong & Tsai, 2007). As such, shame has a uniquely positive value in many non-
Western cultures that is consistent with the interdependent goals of adapting to group 
standards and norms, and self-improvement (Wong & Tsai, 2007). In a study by 
Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkit (1997), Japanese participants were 
found to view acts of failure that evoked self-criticism as more pertinent to their self-
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esteem than did their American counterparts, whereas Americans were found to 
perceive situations of success that enhanced their self-views as more relevant to their 
self-esteem than did the Japanese. These findings suggest that a negative appraisal of 
the self, which is an important element of shame, is not cross-culturally viewed as 
psychologically harmful. Indeed, negative perceptions of the self may have 
informational and motivational significance in collectivistic cultures. 
Shame has also been found to be viewed more positively in the collectivistic 
Indian culture than in individualistic American culture. Menon and Shweder (1994) 
presented Indian and American participants with a list of three emotions (shame, 
happiness, and anger), and asked them to identify the emotion that was the most 
different from the other two. While Americans viewed happiness as being the most 
different from shame and anger, the Indians viewed anger as being the most different 
from happiness and shame. Menon and Shweder suggested that Indians viewed shame 
in a more positive manner than their American counterparts. Rozin (2003) subsequently 
replicated these findings and found that Americans perceived shame and anger as more 
similar to each other due to the negative valence placed on the two emotions, whereas 
Indians viewed shame and happiness as more similar to each other due to the more 
positive, pro-social attributions placed on the two emotions. 
The positive appraisal of shame has also been found in Spanish individuals, who 
belong to a characteristically collectivistic culture. Fischer, Manstead, and Mosquera 
(1999) found that Spanish individuals, as compared to their Dutch counterparts, had 
more positive beliefs about shame and, therefore, were more prone to experiencing and 
expressing shame with other individuals. Another study comparing the semantic 
structure of emotions by Romney, Moore, and Rusch (1997) found that Japanese 
speakers perceived shame as more similar to other positive emotions, such as 
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excitement, love, and happiness, than for English speakers, for whom shame was 
perceived as more similar to negative emotions, such as anguish and fear. 
Methods of parenting may largely contribute to the positive perception of shame 
in collectivistic cultures. Parents in Chinese cultures have been found to more likely 
endorse shaming as a strategy to educate and socialise their children about proper ways 
to behave than parents in the American culture (Fung, 1999; Fung & Chen, 2001; Fung, 
Lieber, & Leung, 2003). Chinese parents have been found to openly and publicly 
disclose and discuss their children’s wrongdoings for the purpose of evoking a sense of 
shame and motivating socially desirable behaviour in their children. Therefore, Chinese 
children appear to learn the word “shame” at an earlier age than do children in the 
United States and England (Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). In addition to the influence 
of early socialisation, shame plays an important role in everyday life in many East 
Asian and other collectivistic contexts (Crystal, Parrott, Okazaki, & Watanabe, 2001). 
In comparison to American culture, Chinese culture has more elaborate models of 
shame and guilt. Li et al. (2004) found that 83 shame-related terms existed in a Chinese 
dictionary, and their Chinese participants were able to provide 113 terms and phrases 
that described shame. The multitude of shame terms suggests the complexity involved 
in the collectivistic conception of shame, such as in Chinese cultures, as compared to 
that of individualistic cultures (Wong & Tsai, 2007).  Additionally, Tinsley and Weldon 
(2003) found that Chinese managers in Hong Kong were more likely than U.S. 
managers to use shame to resolve conflicts.
Cultural differences in the elicitors of shame and guilt
Elicitors of shame and guilt may also differ in individualistic and collectivistic 
contexts. Because individualistic cultural contexts understand the self as primarily 
separate and independent from others, only the individual who committed the 
wrongdoing typically feels shame or guilt (Wong & Tsai, 2007). However, collectivistic 
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cultural contexts understand the self as embedded within, and connected to, 
relationships with others (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Hence, in collectivistic models of shame 
and guilt, these emotions may be evoked by the action of others (Camras & Fatani, 
2004). In a study where participants were presented with scenarios in which either they 
or a close family member was responsible for hypothetical misdeeds, Chinese 
individuals were found to be more likely to report feeling shame and guilt in response to 
a family member’s wrongdoing, as compared to their European American counterparts 
(Stipek, 1998). Likewise, in interviews with European American and Asian American 
college students, Liem (1997) found that when asked to describe a past shame event, 
Asian American students were more likely to talk about events experienced by close 
others than were European Americans. 
Researchers have suggested that group-based shame, or vicarious shame, has 
been strongly associated with shame deterrence, whereby group-based shame has been 
argued to function as an in-group correction or deterrent device that prevents group 
members, and consequently the group itself, from breaching social norms and harming 
the group’s social status (Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001; Welten, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2012). Shame, although often construed as a maladaptive experience, 
might serve as an internal deterrent that prevents individuals from engaging in wrongful 
behaviour (Heery, Keltner, & Capps, 2003; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). 
Researchers have proposed that while shame might function to motivate short-term 
avoidance of the wrongful act, it might even motivate a desire to change the self over 
time (Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007). Such behaviour may have the adaptive 
function of improving in-group interpersonal relationships, as well as preventing 
ostracism or aggression from others (Lickel et al., 2007). Given that vicarious shame 
has been found to be more likely to be experienced by individuals from a collectivistic 
culture, there may be a greater possibility that shame may not only be more valued in 
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collectivistic cultures (Fung, 1999), but may also be more actively avoided, or deterred 
from, by collectivistic individuals for the purposes of maintaining social harmony. 
Although the current literature has established that individuals from 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures differ in their proneness towards experiencing 
certain self-conscious emotions, such as shame, pride and guilt, there is a lack of 
research on the influence of cultural variations in shame, pride and guilt on the 
individual’s psychological well-being. The present study aims to contribute to the 
literature an understanding of how culture impacts on the individual’s experience of 
self-conscious emotions, and subsequently, how any associated psychological distress is 
managed by the individual within their cultural contexts. For example, individuals from 
collectivistic cultures may experience more guilt-proneness than individuals from 
individualistic cultures. However, owing to the way collectivistic cultures value 
interpersonal relationships, their greater levels of guilt-proneness may not actually 
manifest in greater psychological distress. It may be that collectivistic cultures might 
have existing social support systems that assist the individual with ways of regulating 
and diffusing negative self-conscious emotions.  Though few in number, some studies 
have investigated the impact of shame and guilt on psychological well-being between 
different ethnic groups within the same wider cultural context (Meehan, O’Connor, 
Berry, Morrison, & Acampora, 1996). However, not many studies have specifically 
assessed the impact of self-conscious emotions on psychological well-being between 
collectivistic and individualistic societies (e.g. Singaporeans in Singapore versus 
Australians in Australia). 
Cross-cultural perspectives on pride 
As compared to shame and guilt, cross-cultural exploration into the experience 
of pride has received much less attention, and is, in general, an area of emotion research 
that has yet to be well established in the literature. Studies have yet to investigate 
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specific cultural differences between the experience of different types of pride (i.e., 
hubristic and authentic pride; Tracy & Robins, 2007c) between individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures, as well as the culture-specific relationship of pride with 
psychological well-being. The present study aims to contribute to the literature by 
exploring and illuminating specific differences between individualistic and collectivistic 
cultures in the experience of authentic and hubristic pride, so as to attain an 
understanding of how pride, as a positive self-conscious emotion, operates cross-
culturally.
Although both the universal recognition of the expression of pride, as well as the 
two-facet structure of pride have been established in the literature, researchers have 
argued that there may be strong cultural differences in the experience and expression of 
pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007a, Yan et al., 2015). The situations that elicit pride, as well 
as the manner in which pride is perceived and appraised by the self and by others, have 
been suggested to differ between individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Eid & 
Diener, 2001; Heine, 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). 
Indeed, studies have found that pride is perceived more negatively in collectivistic 
cultures, as compared to individualistic cultures (Eid & Diener, 2001). Individuals from 
China and Taiwan, two collectivistic cultures, were found to consider the emotion of 
pride as undesirable, whereas individuals from individualistic cultures, such as the 
United States of America, were found to report a positive value toward the emotion of 
pride (Eid & Diener, 2001). Individuals belonging to an individualistic culture were also 
found to readily express more positive feelings when describing their experience of 
pride to others, as compared to individuals from a collectivistic culture (Mosquera, 
Manstead, & Fischer, 2000). 
In a study that assessed the emotion of pride in five cultures – Asian American, 
European American, Hispanic American, Indian, and Japanese – Hispanic individuals, 
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despite belonging to a collectivistic culture, were found to report the greatest levels of 
pride-proneness, and the three Asian cultures were found to report the least (Scollon, 
Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, 2004). In addition, the intriguing complexity of the 
cultural differences of pride were further highlighted when Scollon et al. (2004) found 
that individuals from India associated pride with negative emotions, while individuals 
from Japan associated pride with positive emotions. Indeed, while it appears that 
collectivistic Asian cultures may have reported lesser levels of pride-proneness, the 
perceived value and social function of pride may also greatly differ from that of 
individualistic cultures.
Researchers have attempted to theoretically untangle the cultural differences of 
the experience of pride through the application of the two distinct facets of pride. Tracy 
and Robins (2007b) have suggested that the primary conceptualisation of pride in 
collectivistic cultures may be skewed toward the hubristic element, which may account 
for the more negative view of pride found in many collectivistic cultures. In addition, 
pride may be socially valued in collectivistic cultures, as long as the pride relates to the 
individual’s social group, as opposed to the individual’s self (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). 
Stipek (1998) found that Chinese individuals, as compared to individuals from the 
United States of America, reported more positive views of pride that were associated 
with others’ accomplishments, rather than their own. 
In general, pride has been universally considered as a positive and adaptive 
emotion that functions to gain, maintain and enhance an individual’s social status 
(Tracy & Robins, 2007a). However, culture appears to be a factor that may strongly 
influence the manner in which the two distinct facets of the emotion are regulated, 
expressed, evaluated and valued. Researchers have suggested that future research on 
pride should explore the existence of both hubristic and authentic pride cross-culturally, 
as well as to further disentangle the potentially unique functions of the two separate 
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functions of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). To my knowledge, cross-cultural 
interactions between the experiences of the two distinct facets of pride with other self-
conscious emotions, or culturally salient variables, such as filial piety, have yet to be 
fully explored in the literature. 
The collectivistic self: The role of filial piety
Filial piety (xiao) is a prominent concept in Confucianism that relates to 
important ideas about how children should treat their parents. It comprises physical and 
emotional requirements, such as support, memorialising, attendance, deference, 
compliance, respect and love, and its structures are often generalised to apply to 
authority relationships beyond the family (Yeh & Bedford, 2003). Undoubtedly, 
Confucian values consistently form the core of most Asian cultures, and continue to 
penetrate different levels of social life, and also set the standards for most families, 
communities and political behaviour (Yeh, Yi, Tsao, & Wan, 2013; Yim, Lee, & 
Ebbeck, 2011). For example, the prevalence of Asian education systems incorporating 
the bridging of Confucian values with different aspects of early childhood education has 
been documented in the literature (Yim et al., 2011).
 Research on the role of filial piety in the context of modern Confucian societies 
has led to conflicting findings with regard to filial piety’s overall helpful or harmful 
impact on individual psychological development. For example, filial piety has been 
correlated with better intergenerational relationships (Lawrence, Bennett, & Markides, 
1992), lower levels of parent-child conflict (Yeh & Bedford, 2003) and greater 
financial, physical and emotional support for parents (Ishii-Kuntz, 1997). However, 
filial attitudes have also been found to positively correlate with parental emphasis on 
obedience, indebtedness to parents, impulse control, proper conduct, overprotection, 
harshness and inhibition of children’s self-expression, self-mastery and general personal 
development (Ho, 1994).
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Yeh (2003) developed a dual filial piety model that identified and integrated two 
focal concepts of filial piety - reciprocity and authoritarianism. Reciprocal filial piety is 
understood to encompass emotionally and spiritually attending to one’s parents out of 
gratitude for their efforts in having raised one, and physical and financial care for one’s 
parents as they age. The beneficial aspects of filial piety identified in previous research, 
such as enhanced interpersonal relationships, interpersonal skills, and psychosocial 
adjustment, reflect reciprocal filial piety (Yeh, 2009; Yeh & Bedford, 2003). In contrast, 
authoritarian filial piety entails the suppression of one’s own desires and compliance 
with one’s parents’ wishes because of their seniority in physical, financial or social 
terms, as well as continuing the family lineage and maintaining one’s parents’ 
reputation because of the force of role requirements. Authoritarian filial piety 
emphasises hierarchy and submission, and it reflects the generally negative findings on 
filial piety, such as neuroticism, depression and anxiety (Yeh, 2009; Yeh & Bedford, 
2003). Researchers have argued that filial piety cannot be understood unless its dual 
nature is recognised and applied in both theory and research (Yeh, 2003; Laidlaw, 
Wang, Coelho, & Power, 2010). The dual filial piety model has been empirically 
validated to reflect filial piety in modern Chinese Confucianistic societies (Yeh & 
Bedford, 2003; Yeh et al., 2013).
Teaching young people about filial concepts in daily life has traditionally been 
seen as a basic duty of teachers and parents in Confucianistic societies, such as 
Singapore. Since 1990, Singapore’s Ministry of Education has made Civics and Moral 
Education (CME) a compulsory part of its curriculum in both public and private 
education institutions, spanning from the primary to the pre-college levels of education 
(7 to 18 years old). The Singapore government has emphasised the focus of CME to be 
nurturing people of good character and useful citizens. The CME syllabus is founded on 
six core values that reflect the teachings of Confucianism - namely, Respect, Resilience, 
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Responsibility, Integrity, Care and Harmony. Through the use of stories, case studies 
and real life situations, the CME programme has focused on teaching students these 
values and guiding them towards putting the values into practice in the domains of self, 
family, community, nation and the world. 
Filial Piety in Western Cultures
In contrast to collectivistic Asian societies, Western cultures appear to 
encompass fewer philosophies of care that actively encourage sacrifice and care for 
older generations. When asked to report on age stereotype statements, younger people 
were found to hold negative attitudes towards ageing and older people (Slotterback & 
David, 1996). In addition, the education system in a Western culture, such as Australia, 
does not actively incorporate programmes, such as CME, as a part of its compulsory 
syllabus. Specifically, with regard to Australia, CME is more likely to be perceived as a 
valuable inclusion into the syllabus in private schools, as compared to their public 
school counterparts. This differing attitude towards filial piety in Western cultures, 
including the predominantly negative attributes that abound when talking about older 
people in a global, less personal way, has raised concerns about the increasing numbers 
of older people in society who are seen as burdens or drains on resources (WHO, 2002).
Culturally relevant concepts such as filial piety may be important to study in 
conjunction with self-conscious emotions and culture, as they may offer valuable 
insight into culturally-specific societal values. For example, reciprocal or authoritarian 
filial piety may relate to separation guilt, a form of maladaptive guilt that specifically 
relates to the belief that separating from, or differing from, one’s loved ones will cause 
them harm (O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, Bush, & Sampson, 1997). The distorted sense of 
disloyalty that characterises separation guilt, which has been found to result in 
behaviours that are motivated by the need to consistently protect and remain loyal to 
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parents and loved ones (Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997; Weiss & Sampson, 
1986), may have a specific relationship with authoritarian filial piety. 
The current thesis will attempt to gain an understanding of the cross-cultural 
operation of the relationship between separation guilt and authoritarian filial piety, as 
well as the impact of this relationship on psychological well-being. Likewise, by 
conducting more fine-grained analyses on the cross-cultural relationships between filial 
attitudes, self-conscious emotions and psychological distress, the current literature’s 
understanding of the complex nature of self-conscious emotions will be extended. 
20
CHAPTER 2: SHAME, GUILT AND PRIDE
Negative self-conscious emotions: Shame and guilt
The literature has established that, historically, the distinction between shame 
and guilt has been neglected by social emotion researchers (Tangney, 2001). One of the 
early attempts to differentiate shame from guilt (Ausubel, 1955) identified guilt as a 
private emotion, and shame as a public one. Empirical research, however, disconfirmed 
this distinction and suggested that the existence of an audience was not the key element 
that distinguished the two emotions (Tangney et al., 1996). Instead, a more 
metaphorical existence (Taylor, 1985), rather than an actual physical audience, was 
suggested to be one of the distinguishing features of guilt and shame (see also Crozier, 
1998; Martenz, 2005). However, Taylor (1985) argued that an actual or imaginary 
audience was not necessary for an individual to experience shame. According to Taylor 
(1985), shame requires a self-critical and sophisticated self-consciousness, which is 
dependent upon the concept of another, such that this sophisticated self-consciousness 
allows the individual to realise the discrepancy of his/her own assumptions about 
his/her actual action or state and a possible detached observer-description of that action 
or state.
In general, according to the prevailing emotion literature, people experience 
both shame and guilt when they have violated standards or norms (Lewis, 1987; 
Tangney, 1991). However, while shame occurs when one is negatively evaluated by 
others for behaving inappropriately, involves global and stable attributions for 
transgressions, and is associated with maladaptive consequences such as withdrawal of 
oneself from social support, guilt is experienced when one negatively evaluates one’s 
own self for behaving inappropriately, involves specific and temporary attributions for 
transgressions, and is associated with adaptive consequences (Wong & Tsai, 2007).
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The Social Function of Shame
Researchers have proposed that, according to the social self-preservation theory, 
(Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny, 2004; Kemeny, Gruenewald, & Dickerson, 2004), 
shame is experienced when the fundamental goal of maintaining a positive social self is 
threatened. Dickerson and colleagues (2004) have argued that situations that threaten 
the social self elicit a psychobiological response that is characterised by the experience 
of shame and physiological processes, which ultimately serve to signal and resource 
mobilisation functions to address the threat itself. Threats to the social self have been 
suggested to occur when there is an actual or potential loss of social status, esteem or 
acceptance (Gruenewald, Dickerson, & Kemeny, 2007). 
Shame has been proposed to arise as the central emotion that is experienced 
when one’s abilities, competencies, or characteristics that are associated with a positive 
social image are compromised, or when the individual is subject to exclusion and 
rejection (Gilbert, 1997). Researchers have proposed that the social self is vital for 
maintaining social relationships for the evolutionary purpose of survival and 
reproduction (Gruenewald et al., 2007). A positive social self is believed to impact upon 
how much others will invest in, and provide resources to, the individual. Consequently, 
a positive social self has been linked to the fostering of cordial and cooperative social 
relationships (Seeman, 2000). While ensuring that the social self is enhanced and 
preserved allows the individual to thrive and survive, effective communication of an 
inferior social self with others has also been highlighted as critical to survival 
(Gruenewald et al., 2007). For example, recognising one’s own inferior social status 
may result in a diminishment of conflict and a reduced chance of being aggressed 
against by superior others (Gruenewald et al., 2007).
Shame has been argued to exist as the “premier social emotion” that arises in 
situations through which the social self, or a social bond, is at risk of being harmed 
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(Gilbert, 1997; Gruenewald et al., 2007; Scheff, 2003). Shame has been highlighted as 
an emotion that is part of the signalling process of a damaged social status, which is 
characteristic of a diminished social self (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). 
Phenomenological research has found that shame experiences have been associated with 
a feeling of inferiority to others, social isolation, and a desire to withdraw from others 
(Tangney et al., 1996). Shame has also been found to be elicited in situations involving 
poor performance, causing emotional hurt to others, failure to meet one’s own or others’ 
expectations, and socially unacceptable behaviour (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). Izard 
(1977) has also highlighted the role of shame in promoting harmonious social 
relationships by sensitising individuals to the opinions of others. Indeed, empirical 
research has shown support for the link between shame and the threatened social self. 
For example, shame was found to increase to a greater degree when tasks were 
performed under social evaluation, which indicated that shame was more sensitive to 
social aspects of performance than other emotions (Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & 
Fahey, 2004). 
Characteristics of Shame 
The word ‘shame’ is believed to be derived from two Indo-European words, 
‘(s)kem-’ and ‘(s)kam-’, whereby the meaning of these words is to cover (Schneider, 
1980). Schneider (1980) associated shame with the particular desire to cover, or hide, 
something that has been exposed. The emotion of shame has been strongly associated 
with the quality of the entire self, as well as a painful and negative scrutinising of the 
self (Kaufman, 1989; Lewis, 1971). Although guilt also involves negative affect, the 
experience of guilt involves a specific action, or the absence of action, ultimately 
resulting in a self that is intact and preserved. In contrast, the experience of shame has 
the potential to be more devastating, as it has been strongly associated with a sense of 
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being exposed, feeling worthless, powerless, shrinking or wanting to hide, or sinking 
into the floor (Lewis, 1971). 
Researchers have argued that shame-prone individuals learn to disengage from 
many of their basic human needs, such as the need for relationships, non-sexual touch, 
to nurture and be nurtured, as a result of having these needs shamed (Young, 1991), 
resulting in difficulties with achieving an integrated self-concept (Kaufman, 1989). As a 
result of their beliefs about their selves and others, shame-prone individuals make an 
effort to deter themselves from shameful experiences with others by developing 
defensive scripts such as denial, withdrawal, arrogance, blaming, perfectionism, and 
rage (Kaufman, 1989; Tangney, 1990). Kaufman (1989) proposed that anger is used by 
shamed individuals to alter the field of interpersonal interaction, so that they can turn 
the tides of power back to themselves and away from the perceived shaming other. 
Establishing a sense of power and dominance is believed to enable the shamed 
individual to protect his or herself from the fundamental fear of abandonment, and to 
minimise the risk of damaging interpersonal social relationships. Kaufman (1989) has 
also argued that shame can be fixed to the very experience of self in the shame-based 
identity scripts, such that the defensive scripts work to protect the self from being 
perceived as inadequate and, therefore, unlovable (Wallace & Nosko, 1993).
Both research and theory have also linked shame to aggression via a relational 
devaluation that results in social pain and social threat (Elison, Garofalo, & Velotti, 
2014; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). From an evolutionary perspective, theorists have 
suggested that a psychobiological chain of events from shame to anger and aggression 
occur through the association between physical and social pain (Elison et al., 2014). 
MacDonald and Leary (2005) have proposed that the fight response is a common 
occurrence as evolution capitalised on the existence of physical pain, assimilating the 
physical pain mechanism and its related threat-defence strategies (MacDonald & Leary, 
24
2005). Therefore, individuals are suggested to have learnt to utilise the threat defence in 
response to the social pain that is involved in the experience of shame, even though the 
fight response is probably less adaptive in response to social threats than to physical 
threats (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). As such, shame and anger have been suggested to 
be psychobiologically linked as strategies for managing social and relational threats 
(Elison et al., 2014). Additionally, researchers have found that a tendency to externalise 
blame has been found to mediate the link between shame and aggression (Stuewig, 
Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010). Velotti, Elison and Garofalo (2014) have 
highlighted the importance of understanding the function of anger and aggression by 
acknowledging the role of shame as a trigger to aggression. In particular, the link 
between shame and aggression has been observed in partner violence, incarcerated 
violent offenders, and personality disorders (Narcissistic, Borderline, Antisocial), with 
shame as a common antecedent to violence (Velotti et al., 2014).
Researchers have also differentiated between shame and guilt in terms of the 
nature of their elicitors. Some researchers argue that the emotions differ in their 
orientation to self or others. While shame is believed to typically involve the perception 
that one is being negatively evaluated by others, guilt has been suggested to typically 
involve the perception that one is being negatively evaluated by one’s own self (Smith, 
Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). Specifically, while shame has an “external” orientation 
(i.e., being oriented to others), guilt has an “internal” orientation (i.e., being oriented to 
the self). Overall, shame has been associated with the fear of exposing one’s defective 
self to others, and guilt has been associated with the fear of not living up to one’s own 
standards (Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995). Consistent with this distinction, 
studies have found that compared to guilt, shame has been found to occur more 
frequently in the presence of others (Smith et al., 2002). Similarly, Lewis (1985) argued 
that people who experience shame are more sensitive to contextual cues and pay more 
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attention to others than those who experience guilt (Lewis, 1985; Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). 
Phenomenological research has focused on the position and role of the self in the 
experience of shame and guilt attributions. Lewis (1971) was among the first to explore 
the emotion of shame from a phenomenological perspective, where shame was viewed 
as focusing on the entire self and as an affective state that emerged upon the foundations 
of internal, global, stable and uncontrollable attributions. While shame has been 
conceived as a socially-derived affect, involving the self’s attempts to maintain 
emotional relationships with others, Lewis’s (1971) introduction of the concept of the 
internalised other was largely responsible for extending upon the concept of shame 
beyond that of an emotional reaction to others’ disapproval. Instead, shame was 
conceptualised as an emotion arising out of negative self-evaluation, which may not 
necessarily have been triggered by the actual presence of public condemnation (Lewis, 
1971). Shame has since been suggested by researchers to function as a means of 
inhibiting pride through diminishing the excitement that is associated with the fantasy 
of being admired or sought after by others (Lewis, 1971). 
Three pivotal characteristics of the phenomena of shame, proposed by Lewis 
(1971), were later supported by many other researchers over time. The first of these 
involves the difficulty of identifying shame. Lewis (1971) proposed that there existed an 
inherent connection between shame and mechanisms of denial, whereby shame is 
conceptualised as such an intensely painful experience that, despite its availability to 
consciousness, the individual will not, and cannot, identify the feeling till it is in the 
process of dissipating. The term, “overt shame”, has been used to describe occasions 
when shame is difficult to identify, largely due to its potential to occur simultaneously 
with guilt (Lewis, 1971). For example, while an individual may blame themselves for a 
wrongdoing, they may also blame themselves for failing to live up to expectations. 
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Similarly, “bypassed shame” has been proposed to be another form of denial or 
distancing that leads to difficulty with identifying shame. In experiencing bypassed 
shame, the individual is believed to separate the cognitive and affective content of 
shame-related events, so that they only possess an awareness of the cognitive content of 
shame-related events, without any true emotional connection to shame (Lewis, 1971). 
The focal point of evaluation – behaviour vs. self – is a widely established factor 
that determines the nature of shame and guilt. Most theories that distinguish guilt from 
shame agree that shame involves a sense that the entire self is bad, whereas guilt 
involves a focus on particular misdeeds (Barrett, 1995; Lewis, 1971 Tangney, 1991). 
Accordingly, guilt is experienced when an individual’s behaviour is the focus of 
evaluation, and shame is experienced when the individual targets his/her own self in the 
case of failure or wrongdoing (Tangney, 1998). Although both emotions occur when 
someone has committed a wrongdoing that results in being negatively evaluated by 
others, the emotions differ in the focal point of the misdeed. Specifically, when people 
attribute their transgression to their global and stable self (“I can’t believe I did that”), 
they are said to experience shame. In contrast, when people attribute their wrongdoings 
to behaviour or actions (“I can’t believe I did that”), they are said to experience guilt 
(Lewis, 1987; Tangney, 1991, 1998; Tracy & Robins, 2004a). It has been suggested that 
an individual who experiences guilt thinks that they committed a wrongdoing, by which 
the act of wrongdoing itself is separate to what he/she really is. In contrast, the 
experience of shame is associated with the belief that the misdeed is inextricably 
connected to the wrongdoer’s identity (Taylor, 1985; Tilghman-Osborne, Cole & 
Felton, 2010). Therefore, it is unsurprising that shame has been conceptualised as an 
emotion that is more devastating and detrimental to one’s self-concepts and self-esteem, 
as compared to guilt (Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
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The second characteristic of shame is the difficulty involved with dissipating the 
hostility of the emotion (Lewis, 1971). According to Lewis (1971), while both shame 
and guilt have been acknowledged as painful, negative self-appraisals, guilt is 
associated with a negative evaluation of a specific behaviour, and the self as the source 
of evaluation. In contrast, when experiencing shame, the self is proposed to be split, as 
it operates both as the object of evaluation, as well as the source of evaluation. The 
emotion of shame has been argued to cause a reduction of the self in both perceived size 
and functional efficacy, causing the individual to feel small, powerless, and wanting to 
withdraw or to crawl through a hole (Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991). Physical symptoms 
such as blushing and sweating have been reported to be accompanied by feelings of 
worthlessness, powerlessness and inaction (Tangney, 1990). What researchers have 
described as a powerless and ‘wordless’ blank state (Lewis, 1971) that accompanies 
shame has been associated with a temporary loss of self, likened to a dissociative 
reaction, that involves an interruption of cognitive processes. 
Shame is believed to interrupt the individual’s cognitive functioning in that it 
possesses a tendency to result in obsessive rumination (Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 
2006). Lewis (1971) argues that when experiencing shame, the self is divided, whereby 
the individual simultaneously experiences perceived intense condemnation by the other 
while in the activity of acute self-consciousness. Ironically, while in this state of 
heightened awareness, Lewis notes that the individual is actually not perceiving their 
self, nor the environment, accurately. Indeed, Lewis has proposed that it is this moment 
of split functioning that results in the difficulty for the individual to find an act of 
solution to the feeling of shame. Indeed, shame may render the individual incapable of 
and unable to take accurate and constructive action to repair the wrongful act, even 
when the emotion of shame is accurately acknowledged within the individual (Lewis, 
1971). The aspect of controllability of an action’s consequence has also been applied to 
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distinguishing between shame and guilt by Weiner (1985). While guilt has been 
proposed by Weiner to be experienced as a consequence of failure due to a lack of 
effort, shame has been argued to emerge in the event that failure is self-related and 
uncontrollable, such as in the lack of ability.
External and Internal Shame
Theories of shame have developed to distinguish between an internally focused 
(on self) and externally focused (on the other) attention upon the individual (Arndt & 
Goldenberg, 2004). Gilbert (1997, 1998) suggested that when the focus of shame is on 
what others are thinking about the self, this can be called external shame. When external 
shame is experienced, the attention and monitoring systems are focused externally and 
primarily on what others might be thinking of the individual. External shame has been 
likened to other threat defences, such as an approaching predator, where feelings and 
actions are highly coordinated to tracking the actions, signals, and intents from others. 
However, threats in the social domain are significantly modified by various 
competencies, such as theory of mind and metacognition, and the self-perception of 
one’s existence for the other. 
In contrast, internal shame has been linked to complex memory systems – for 
example, of scenes of previous episodes of being shamed (Kaufman, 1989), and self-
evaluation where attention turns inward to the self and self-feelings and judgements 
(Tracy & Robins, 2004a). When internal shame is experienced, researchers argue that 
self-evaluation is partly linked to our imaginary audiences that have been created 
through experiences with others (Baldwin, 1997). Internal shame has also been linked to 
a process of shaming where individuals can be self-critical and self-persecuting. This 
dynamic has been stated to succeed the notion of self-blame, as it involves emotions, 
such as anger and contempt, in self-to-self relationships (Gilbert & Irons, 2005; 
Whelton & Greenberg, 2005). Extreme cases of internal shame have been found to 
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result in severe self-hate and a potential drive towards intentionally hurting oneself 
(Gilbert, 2007). Internal shame has been strongly linked to a self-perception of one 
being “unattractive”, whereby it is not merely a failure to reach a standard, but a 
closeness to an undesired and unattractive self (Gilbert, 2007). 
If internal shame is linked to self-criticisms and having negative images of self 
in one’s own eyes, two factors may influence the degree of shame. One is the type of 
intensity of negative emotions directed at the self. The other is the ability to activate 
self-soothing systems when failing (Gilbert, 2007). Research has found that low self-
critics find it easier to activate self-soothing when confronted by their own failure and 
criticisms. Evidence for this has been found in a study showing that self-criticism and 
depressive symptoms were significantly related to the inability to be self-reassuring 
(Gilbert, Clark, Hempel, Miles, & Irons, 2004). In another study, self-criticism was 
associated with difficulties in forming images of supportive and compassionate aspects 
of oneself (Gilbert, Baldwin, Irons, Baccus, & Clark, 2005). In both studies, self-
criticism was reported to be highly associated with external shame, leading to the 
proposal that the experience of internal shame is linked to both the power of these 
emotions directed at the self and the inability to access self-soothing via positive images 
of, and feelings for, the self (Gilbert, 2007).
Clinicial implications of shame within psychotherapy
It is only in recent years that shame has begun to receive more attention within 
the clinical context of psychotherapy. In clinical settings, shame can be elicited by the 
client, the therapeutic process, and the therapist (Tangney & Dearing, 2011). 
Specifically, clients take into the therapeutic process shame evoked from experiencing 
psychological difficulties and the stigma of mental illness and past failures in resolving 
their problems (Tangney & Dearing, 2011). The therapeutic context, in itself, can be 
shame evoking, due to the expectation that clients expose their vulnerabilities and 
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weaknesses before the therapist, who is often portrayed as an infallible fixer of 
psychological health (Greenberg & Iwakabe, 2011). Additionally, therapists, being 
human with limitations and vulnerabilities, can also experience shame in the therapeutic 
context via the perceived pressure of having to provide effective therapy and through 
the process of transference (Herman, 2011; Ladany, Klinger, & Kulp, 2011).
With particular regard to the Western context, the negative connotation of shame 
has rendered the emotion both easily overlooked and intentionally avoided by both 
clients and therapists alike (Teyber, McClure, & Weathers, 2011). Processing the 
emotion of shame effectively and efficiently within a psychologically safe space, such 
as psychotherapy, can afford the client vital improvement and independence in the 
realms of emotional and behavioural regulation, self-esteem, and perceived control over 
psychological distress. Master clinicians have argued for the need for therapists to be 
able to recognise both the primary and secondary indicators of shame in clients, such as 
via the verbal, nonverbal and paralinguistic cues that may signal underlying shame, as 
well as shame manifesting through defensive mechanisms and secondary emotions of 
anger, avoidance, denial, envy and grandiosity (Herman, 2011). 
Therapists can assist clients to process the ubiquitous emotion of shame within 
psychotherapy by adopting a person-centred approach and motivational interviewing to 
reduce shame by validating and empowering clients, working on the basis of the client’s 
values (Tangey & Dearing, 2011). By gaining an understanding of the cross-cultural 
differences in the function of shame, clinicians will be better able to treat and tailor 
intervention of the individual’s shame-proneness within the context that the individual 
understands the emotion of shame. Self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, 
have been suggested to be normalised in the therapeutic context, so as to empower 
clients with the skills to acknowledge painful emotions (Herman, 2011; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2011). In line with research that has supported shame-proneness to be highly 
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associated with self-criticism, master clinicians have identified the development of self-
compassion as a vital method for shame regulation (Gilbert, 2011). Additionally, 
Greenberg and Iwakabe (2011) have suggested that inward-focused shame can be 
transformed into behaviour-focused guilt and other adaptive behaviour and emotions, 
which focuses on the client’s strengths, amending wrongdoings, and establishing or 
repairing social ties.  
Guilt: An Interpersonal Construct
Guilt and shame have different and profound implications for social behaviour. 
Guilt is believed to arise in relation to moral circumstances, leading to approach 
behaviours, such as compensating for a misdeed (Wolf, Cohen, Panter & Chester, 
2010). In contrast, shame may result from both moral transgressions, as well as non-
moral events, such as experiencing feelings of inferiority (Benetti-McQuoid & Bursik, 
2005), which may lead to avoidant behaviour, such as withdrawal or leaving the 
situation (Wolf et al., 2010). In general, guilt has been largely associated with moral 
behaviours, due to its focus on one’s own behaviour, whereas shame, which has been 
associated with a concern about the negative perspective of others on the individual, has 
been found to result in a sense of worthlessness. 
In essence, guilt is experienced when one fails to meet internalised social 
standards (Orth, Robins, & Soto, 2010), leading to regret that is expressed over these 
failures and attempts to relieve the guilt experience by taking reparative actions 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002). But, several discrepancies continue to cluster around the 
construct of guilt. When guilt has been conceptualised as an adaptive construct, 
negative correlations between guilt and psychological distress have been established 
(Tangney, 1994; Williams & Bybee, 1994). However, when conceptualised as a 
negative construct, positive correlations have been found to exist between guilt and 
psychological distress (Harder, 1995; Kugler & Jones, 1992). Therefore, the literature 
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has established that guilt, as an interpersonal construct, may have both adaptive and 
maladaptive qualities. 
Behavioural Correlates of Guilt and Shame
Researchers have investigated the adaptive and maladaptive conceptions of guilt 
and shame by investigating behavioural correlates of such self-conscious emotions. 
Since the 1990s, empirical research has defined guilt as an agitation-based emotion, 
which is often accompanied by feelings of regret, fear, worry, anxiety, and a desire to 
amend the wrongdoing that is perceived as violation of an internal moral standard. By 
contrast, shame has been defined as a dejection-based emotion, often accompanied by 
feelings of helplessness, incompetence, and a wish to withdraw and isolate the self from 
others (Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Burggraf, & 
Wagner, 1995). Hoffman (1982) asserts that guilt-related emotions promote reparative 
behaviour and motivational activation, while shame-related emotions elicit withdrawal 
behaviour and motivational inhibition.
Both guilt and shame have been widely established in the literature as two moral 
emotions that may promote socially desirable behaviour (Eisenberg, 2000). The socio-
functionality of guilt has been argued to contribute greatly to the development of 
morality, with specific regard to how the function of guilt in empathic arousal 
encourages prosocial behaviour (Hoffman, 1982). Studies have validated Hoffman’s 
theory of empathy-based guilt, whereby the experience of guilt has been found to lead 
to higher self-esteem, and an increase in prosocial behaviour, empathy and perspective 
taking (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Kochanska, De Vet, Goldman, 
Murray, & Putnam, 1994; Krevans & Gibbs, 1996; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 
1998), and reparative behaviours in children (Zahn-Waxler, 2000). 
Children who express more guilt after a wrongdoing have been found to be less 
likely to violate desirable behaviour standards, and early guilt-proneness has been found 
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to predict future morality in young children (Kochanska, Gross, Lin & Nichols, 2002). 
Thus, with respect to the adaptive nature of guilt in young children, the feeling of guilt 
is considered necessary for social development as it assists the inhibition of behaviour 
that violates social rules (Kochanska et al., 2002). Guilt has also been argued to play a 
positive role in relationship enhancement and efficacy in interpersonal problem solving 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Covert, Tangney, Maddux, & Heleno, 
2003; Konstam, Chernoff, & Deveney, 2001; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). In general, 
these studies have suggested that guilt is a feeling that is related to the development of 
conscience and pro-social behaviour in children, as well as conscientious behaviour in 
young adults.
In contrast, shame-proneness has been positively related to distressing and 
problematic behaviours and inversely related to empathic responsiveness (Dearing, 
Stuewig, & Tangney, 2005; Tangney, 1991). Indeed, shame has been argued to have a 
compounding effect upon itself, through which consequential rumination or physical 
effects such as blushing and perspiring, may act to further exacerbate the experience of 
shame (Lewis, 1971). This has led to the argument that the experience of shame not 
only warrants the desire to hide and withdraw from the immediate perceived shaming 
other, but also from similar future situations that may be perceived as having the 
potential to trigger a shame response (Tangney, 1991). In line with these findings, 
studies have reported that shame-prone individuals have been found to more likely 
engage in avoidance and withdrawal, to experience inward anger, and to blame others 
than are guilt-prone individuals (Lutwak, Panish, Ferrari, & Razzino, 2001; Tangney, 
1991; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). 
In the current literature, shame has been strongly linked to problematic 
psychological symptoms, such as anger, internalising and externalising behaviours, self-
condemnation, suspiciousness, resentment, irritability, obsessive-compulsive behaviour 
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disorder, psychoticism, depression and personal distress (Ferguson et al., 1999; Lewis, 
1987; Lutwak et al., 2001; Orth et al., 2006; Pineles, Street, & Koenen, 2006; Scheff, 
1998; Tangney et al., 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992; Tantam, 
1998; Tracy & Robins, 2004a) and to physiological stress (Dickerson et al., 2004; 
Gruenewald et a., 2004). In addition, shame has been empirically demonstrated to be 
positively related to hostility and anger (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 
1992), depression (Tangney et al., 1995), secret-keeping in therapy (Hill, Thompson, 
Cogar, & Denman III, 1993), eating disorders (Cleary, 1992), as well as chemical 
addictions (Young, 1991), as well as a myriad of psychological symptoms of distress 
(Tangney et al., 1992). In contrast, shame-free guilt (guilt controlling for shame) has 
remained unrelated to such problem behaviours and has been found to be positively 
linked to empathic responsiveness (Ferguson et al., 1999; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; 
Niendenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994).
Although the majority of the research in this area has converged in their findings 
regarding the maladaptive nature of shame, some researchers have found shame to be 
associated with empathy, motivations to repair, apologise and reform, at both the 
individual and group levels (De Hooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; DeHooge, 
Zeelenberg, & Bruegelmans, 2010; Fontaine, Luyten, De Boeck, & Corveleyn, 2001; 
Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, and Brown, 2012). Generally, the destructive nature of shame-
proneness has been widely accepted in the literature (Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney, 
2001). However, it should be noted that much of the research that has confirmed the 
maladaptive nature of shame has been conducted within Western contexts, and there 
exists much debate on the universal validity of shame as a destructive self-conscious 
emotion. Recent research has suggested the possibility that shame might prompt both 
defensive, as well as prosocial motives (Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez, 2014). 
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As much as the adaptive nature of guilt has been both theorised and empirically 
validated in the literature (Barrett, 1995; Bybee & Quiles, 1998; Campos, Mumme, 
Kermoian, & Campos, 1994; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Harder, 1995; Harder, Cutler, 
& Rockert, 1992; Kugler & Jones, 1992; Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995), 
there exists both theory and research that challenge the conceptualisation of guilt as an 
exclusively adaptive emotion (Tangney, 1991). From a functionalist perspective, 
emotions serve a purpose; whether they are adaptive or maladaptive is dependent upon 
the situation and on the function of the emotion in the context of the individual’s life 
(Barrett, 1995; Campos et al., 1994; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Ferguson, Stegge, & 
Damhius, 1991). Specifically, guilt may be adaptive in the event that it motivates the 
individual to be concerned with the well-being of others, and maladaptive when it 
causes the individual to focus on their own ego in the form of self-punishment and, 
eventually, excessively guilt-driven behaviours (Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Lindsay-Hartz et 
al., 1995). Likewise, shame can be maladaptive when the individual adopts others’ 
perspectives as the only means of approaching a particular issue, but can also be 
adaptive when the emotion causes the individual to commit towards change that 
ultimately drives the resolving of the experienced shame (Lindsay-Hartz et al., 1995). It 
has been proposed that such adaptive shame experiences can also assist the individual 
with acquiring self-knowledge through the others’ perspectives and foster deference to 
standards of group conduct (Barrett, 1995; Ferguson et al., 1991). In addition to the 
context in which self-conscious emotions are experienced, how the individual regulates 
the emotion can also contribute to how functional or dysfunction it is to the individual 
(Bybee & Quiles, 1998). 
A Multidimensional Construction of Guilt
The consideration that guilt can function both adaptively and maladaptively 
(Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000; Kugler 
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& Jones, 1992; Zahn-Waxler, Kochanska, Krupnick, & McKnew, 1990) and that degree 
of impact may vary as a function of cognition and affect (Kubany, Abueg, Kilauano, 
Manke, & Kaplan, 1997; Kubany & Watson, 2003) have led some researchers to 
conceptualise guilt as a multidimensional construct. Zahn-Waxler et al. (1990) proposed 
that action-oriented adaptive guilt is often accompanied by reparative behaviour and 
helping others, whereas maladaptive guilt encompasses an excessive, self-critical 
feeling that is often accompanied by a sense of responsibility for everything that goes 
wrong. This development of adaptive and maladaptive guilt has been widely assessed in 
children, whereby researchers have stated that maladaptive forms of guilt may develop 
during childhood years, during which the child is suggested to have formed an 
overgeneralised sense of responsibility and an unrealistic belief in the effect of their 
own behaviour on the adversity of others (Donenberg & Weisz, 1998; Kochanska et al., 
1994; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1990). 
Maladaptive guilt has been evidenced in the literature through research that has 
assessed the relationship between guilt, shame, and psychopathology in both clinical 
and non-clinical samples that have included children (Ferguson et al., 2000) and adults 
(Ghatavati, Nicolson, MacDonald, Osher, & Levitt, 2002; O’Connor et al., 1997). From 
a multidimensional perspective of guilt, O’Connor et al. (1997) investigated the 
relationship between interpersonal guilt, which comprises survivor guilt, separation 
guilt, omnipotent guilt, and self-hate guilt, shame and psychological problems that 
included depression, automatic self-related negative thoughts, optimism and pessimism. 
In both the clinical sample, which included only individuals suffering from drug 
addiction, and the non-clinical sample, a positive association was found between guilt 
and depression.
Researchers have argued for the consideration of the maladaptive component of 
guilt in studies of self-conscious emotions (O’Connor, Berry & Weiss, 1999). While the 
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positive aspects of guilt have been associated with positive consequences (Bruno, 
Lutwak, & Agin, 2009), the maladaptive component has been associated with distress, 
inhibitions and psychopathology (O’Connor et al., 1999, Tilghman-Osborne et al., 
2010). Guilt is maladaptive when irrational beliefs and thoughts are attached to it. This 
notion is founded on Weiss’ (1986, 1993) perspective of guilt, in which guilt is derived 
from a concern and empathy for others. Guilt becomes maladaptive when pathogenic 
beliefs, such as an exaggerated concern for others, arise and guilt of this type leads to 
the maintenance and furtherance of psychological illnesses and psychopathology. An 
example would be an exaggerated sense of responsibility towards family and loved ones 
(O’Connor et al, 1997; Tangney et al., 1992; Weiss, 1993).
In addition, with reference to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders Fifth Edition (DSM-V), excessive or inappropriate guilt has been shown to 
present itself as a persistent diagnostic criterion for Major Depressive Disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), providing clinical relevance of the 
relationship between maladaptive guilt and negative psychological well-being. Guilt has 
also been found to play a role in Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), due to the 
nature of OCD comprising the role of exaggerated personal responsibility (Esherick, 
O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, 1999). Additionally, guilt was also found to be a significant 
predictor of many obsessive-compulsive symptoms after controlling for the variable 
depression (Esherick et al, 1999). Indeed, excessive and irrational forms of guilt can 
lead to distress, contorted interpersonal ties and even psychopathology (O’Connor et al., 
1997). As such, the maladaptive aspect of guilt must be considered in any 
comprehensive study of guilt as a self-conscious emotion. The study of maladaptive 
guilt has divided guilt into distinct constructs, two of which are survivor guilt and 
separation guilt (O’Connor et al., 1997).
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While guilt can be generally broken down into reparative guilt and maladaptive 
guilt (Tilghman-Osborne et al., 2010), the study of guilt has reaped intriguing, yet 
confusing, results, largely due to the nature of constructs and the measures used to 
assess them. The positive relationships of guilt and empathy, guilt in relation to 
reparative action, and relationships between guilt and psychological distress appear to 
be heavily reliant on the type of instrument used to measure the relevant component of 
guilt (Bruno et al., 2009; Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; O’Connor et al., 1999). Research 
has shown that the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, 
Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000), a tool widely used to assess guilt, might only measure one 
specific component of guilt that involves taking reparative actions (Robins, Noftle, & 
Tracy, 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Scenario-based measures of self-conscious 
emotions, such as the TOSCA-3 scale, have generally failed to show positive 
relationships between guilt and psychological distress (O’Connor, Berry, Lewis, 
Mulherin, Crisostomo, Yi, 2007). However, measures using the Interpersonal Guilt 
Questionnaire – 67 (IGQ-67; O’Connor et al., 1997), which specifically assesses for 
maladaptive forms of guilt, have found guilt to be positively correlated with depression 
and other forms of psychological distress. As such, research has indicated that the 
TOSCA-3 measures the adaptive and reparative component of guilt, whereas the IGQ - 
67 measures the maladaptive component of guilt. Thus, if guilt, as a multi-faceted 
construct, is to be studied comprehensively, both adaptive and maladaptive measures 
should be acknowledged and utilised. 
Reparative guilt
Despite the negative portrayal of certain self-conscious emotions, such as shame 
and guilt, these emotions have occasionally been shown to positively correlate with 
prosocial or cooperative behaviours (Baumeister et al., 1995; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & 
Breugelmans, 2007). In the past, guilt, as a negative self-conscious emotion, has been 
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studied largely in relation to psychopathology and its positive relationships with 
negative emotional outcomes (O’Connor et al., 1997). Recent studies, however, have 
seen a shift in paradigm to an emphasis on guilt as a moral emotion and its positive 
relationships with empathy and positive social behaviour, suggesting a functional and 
positive role for the emotion of guilt.
The adaptive or reparative component in guilt has been argued to motivate the 
individual towards acknowledging the wrongful act, and to take responsibility and 
necessary action to rectify their wrongdoings (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Tangney et al., 
1996). Here, guilt is seen to have a constructive purpose, due to its concern for 
reparation of a transgression. Baumeister et al. (1994) have argued that guilt is an 
interpersonal emotion that may act as a mechanism to maintain and repair social 
relationships. Guilt can lead to apology (Baumeister et al., 1995), and can be seen as a 
major motivator with regard to the process of seeking forgiveness (Riek, 2010), thus 
mending any broken social relationships. Guilt has also been studied widely in 
conjunction with empathy and prosocial behaviour (Batson, 1998; Tangney, 1995). 
Guilt has also been known to motivate pro-social behaviour, as a way of amending hurt 
caused by an individual’s actions. (De Hooge et al., 2007; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 
2009). Indeed, guilt can facilitate and/or maintain relationships and even engage an 
individual in prosocial behaviour. 
In comprehending the adaptive and reparative nature of guilt, it is important to 
highlight the distinction between an inherent proneness to guilt and feeling 
appropriately guilty. A proneness to guilt can be acknowledged as adaptive in nature, as 
it leans towards being a personality trait that motivates individuals to engage in 
reparative behaviours to misdeeds (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However, this concept 
of guilt propensity does not indicate that it is always adaptive and psychologically 
healthy to feel perpetually guilty. While feeling guilty can indicate the need to repair 
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broken social relationships, when one feels perpetually guilty without any eliciting 
event, or when one experiences guilt over an act that he or she lacks the capacity to 
amend, maladaptive forms of guilt may certainly be experienced (Wolf et al., 2010).
Maladaptive Guilt: Survivor and Separation Guilt
Survivor guilt and separation guilt provide important representations of 
maladaptive guilt in terms of irrational beliefs (O’Connor et al., 1997). Both survivor 
and separation guilt consist of an overpowering and overbearing sense of responsibility 
for others, especially towards one’s family members or the closest people in terms of 
relationship (Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997; O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, 
Schweitzer, & Sevier, 2000). The term, survivor guilt, was coined based on a study of 
the severe depression found in survivors of the Nazi concentration camps. These 
survivors were found to feel guilty for surviving their loved ones (O’Connor et al., 
2000). The concept of survival guilt has also been applied by Modell (1971) to less 
disastrous traumas that were common to disturbed family life. For example, survivor 
guilt was used to describe the negative emotion associated with self-inhibition of 
success, or engagement in self-destructive behaviours in response to unconscious guilt 
felt towards a family member, whom the individual has perceived to be more 
unfortunate than themselves (Modell, 1965, 1971). Survivor guilt is experienced when 
one feels guilty for surviving in the event that others do not, even if it is not one’s own 
fault (Bruno et al., 2009; O’ Connor et al., 1997). A study by Brockner, Davy and 
Carter (1985) found survival guilt to be present among people who kept their jobs when 
their co-workers were fired. In another study, participants reported feeling guilty about 
being allowed to stay and receive credit for research participation while fellow random 
confederates were dismissed without receiving any credit for their participation 
(Brockner, Greenberg, Brockner, Bortz, Davy, & Carter, 1986). It appears that survivor 
guilt stems from a perception of unequal outcomes for oneself, as compared to family 
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members, peers and colleagues (Baumeister et al., 1994). In essence, survivor guilt is 
characterised by the pathogenic belief that pursuing normal goals and achieving success 
and happiness will cause others to suffer. 
Indirect experiences of survivor guilt have been documented in the literature, 
whereby individuals have been found to experience the emotion through witnessing the 
suffering of strangers, reading about victims of violence or even seeing homeless people 
on the streets (Baumeister et al., 1994). Research on survivor guilt has been found to be 
significantly associated with depression, pessimism and low self-esteem (Meehan et al., 
1996; O’Connor et al., 2000). Specifically in studies of depression, survivor guilt has 
been found to significantly predict depression, as well as mediating between depression 
and empathy (O’Connor et al., 2000). Survivor guilt has been found to be indicated and 
identified by submissive behaviour, such that the individual may put themselves down 
in front of a person whom they feel sorry for, described in the literature as an act 
performed with the intention to ‘level the playing field’ (O’Connor et al., 2000). 
Separation guilt, another form of maladaptive guilt, has been characterised by 
the exaggerated belief that to separate from, or be different from, loved ones will harm 
them. This distorted sense of disloyalty has been found to result in behaviours that are 
motivated by the need to protect and remain loyal to parents as well as loved ones 
(Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997; Weiss & Sampson, 1986). Separation guilt stems 
from the fear of harming others, especially parents, as a result of pursuing one’s goals 
(O’Connor et al., 1997). As such, dysfunctional ties are maintained and perpetuated due 
to feared repudiation, but not as a source of enjoyment and pleasure from the 
relationship (Erreich, 2011). At present, there is a lack of research on separation guilt, 
with specific regard to possible cross-cultural differences in the maladaptive form of 
guilt. Given separation guilt’s key focus on the individual’s relationships with family 
and loved ones, cultural differences of the experience of separation guilt between 
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individualistic and collectivistic cultures should be investigated. Additionally, a deeper 
understanding of cross-cultural experiences of maladaptive guilt, and its impact on 
psychological well-being within the context of the experienced emotion, may assist both 
researchers and clinicians.
Theorists have often referred to Weiss’ (1986, 1993) Control Mastery theory for 
explanations on the relationship between interpersonal guilt and psychological distress 
and inhibitions. Weiss’ (1986, 1993) Control Mastery theory states that 
psychopathology is derived from pathogenic beliefs that develop in response to difficult 
childhood experiences. These pathogenic beliefs signal potential harm either towards 
the individual, or to a loved one, if they attempt to pursue normal developmental goals 
(O’Connor et al., 1999). According to Weiss (1986), it is believed that pathogenic 
beliefs that involve, or predict, causing harm to others result in the experience of guilt 
within the individual, and that any attempt, or contemplation to attempt pursuing these 
normal developmental goals will result in the experience of guilt, shame, anxiety and 
fear. In an effort to minimise or avoid the experience of maladaptive guilt, these 
pathogenic beliefs are proposed to further develop into pathogenic inhibitions. For 
example, individuals who suffered punitive punishment and neglect by parents have 
been reported to form the cognitive belief that they are deserving of similar negative 
treatment, so as to preserve the authority of the parent (Weiss, 1993). These individuals 
are believed to suffer from feelings of shame and accept their parent’s negative feelings 
toward them. Above all, this submission and compliance with the dysfunctional 
relationship is believed to work towards protecting themselves from experiencing the 




For the purposes of distinguishing the effects of guilt on psychological well-
being, some researchers have controlled for the effects of shame, to assess for the 
relationship between both reparative and maladaptive guilt on psychological well-being 
(O’Connor et al., 1999; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Indeed, the concept of shame-free 
guilt has assisted in highlighting the distinct differences between the emotions of shame 
and guilt. For example, Tangney and Dearing (2002) found that when controlling for 
shame, shame-free guilt was found to be adaptive in nature, exhibiting an overall 
negative relationship between guilt and measures of psychological distress. However, 
when researchers specifically examined measures of maladaptive guilt that involved 
inappropriate attributions of responsibility, maladaptive guilt was consistently found to 
be positively associated with measures of psychological distress (O’Connor et al., 
1999). The understanding of shame-free guilt has greatly assisted in distinguishing 
between the two distinct emotions of shame and guilt, as well as between adaptive and 
maladaptive guilt.
Although the conceptualisation of shame-free guilt may have assisted in 
distinguishing between specific effects of guilt or shame on psychological well-being, 
controlling for the effects of specific self-conscious emotions may not be as relevant for 
larger-scale modelling pertaining to the relationships between two or more self-
conscious emotions with variables of psychological distress. It is suggested that the 
experience of self-conscious emotions do not occur in isolation, whereby two or more 
self-conscious emotions may often co-occur with other self-conscious emotions. Factors 
that mediate the effect that self-conscious emotions have on psychological distress have 
also recently been explored. For example, studies have assessed for the mediating 
effects of relevant variables, such as rumination, on the effect of shame and guilt on 
depression and anxiety (Orth et al., 2006). To my knowledge, the present study is the 
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first in the literature to assess, cross-culturally, mediating effects of filial piety on the 
effect of self-conscious emotions on psychological well-being. It is my intention to 
conduct analyses that are explorative in nature, and, for this reason, the concept of 
shame-free guilt will not be included in the larger-scale latent variable modelling of 
self-conscious emotions.
It must be emphasised that the prevailing conceptualisation of shame and guilt 
rests heavily on certain assumptions that may not necessarily apply to other cultural 
contexts. The mainstream model of shame and guilt has assumptions that reflect a view 
of the self that appears largely solitary and separate from others, and defined by stable 
personal characteristics, or what Markus and Kitayama (1991) refer to as an 
independent self-conceptualisation. Additionally, this conventional model assumes that 
being negatively evaluated by others or by one’s self is a negative experience that 
should be actively avoided. This assumption may well reflect the value placed on 
positive feelings in many individualistic contexts, but may not hold true for other 
cultural contexts (Heine et al., 1999). For the purpose of attaining an in depth cross-
cultural understanding of self-conscious emotions, it is of crucial importance for both 
researchers and clinicians to look to other cultures rooted in other philosophical 
traditions that have different views of the self, and hence, potentially different views of 
shame and guilt (Camras & Fatani, 2004; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004; Kitayama et al., 
1995). 
Pride
Unlike shame and guilt, the emotion of pride has been widely established in the 
literature as a positively appraised emotion (Carver, Sinclair, & Johnson, 2010; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004b; Weiner, 1985). Researchers have documented the relationship between 
the experience of pride with positive affect, with particular regard to self-esteem and the 
positive perception of pleasure that follows an achievement (Gruber & Johnson, 2009; 
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Takahashi et al., 2007). Pride has been found to be elicited when there is an internal 
appraisal and attribution of a positive event (Lewis, 2008). Specifically, the internal 
attribution of pride comprises the antecedent event being perceived as reflecting 
positively on the individual’s self, whereby the self has contributed, fully or partially, to 
the positive outcome of the event (Tracy & Robins, 2004b, Weiner, 1985). 
Pride has been found to display universally recognisable nonverbal expressions, 
with specific regard to a small smile, expanded posture and head inclined approximately 
15-20 degrees (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). The universality of pride has also been 
supported by studies that have highlighted the instinctive and spontaneous nature of 
pride, where congenitally blind athletes (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008) and 3-year-old 
children (Belsky & Domitrovich, 1997) have been found to display nonverbal 
expressions of pride when the self is recognised as the contributing cause of the positive 
event.
Pride is an important emotion that plays a critical role in many areas of 
psychological functioning. Pride is also likely to play a functional role in the 
maintenance and enhancement of social status, an essential component of social 
relationships and the individual’s survival (Tracy & Robins, 2008). Individuals 
experience pride after a socially valued achievement, and these feelings of pride may 
signal to them that their behaviour, or self, is valued by others and that they are, 
therefore, unlikely to be rejected by the group and may deserve an enhancement in their 
social status (Leary et al., 1995). These feelings may also positively reinforce the 
socially valued behaviours that produced the emotion (Hart & Matsuba, 2007; Herrald 
& Tomaka, 2002). The loss of pride is part of what provokes aggression and other 
antisocial behaviours in response to ego threats (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). 
The uniqueness of pride has been well established in the literature, in which not 
many other emotions have been subject to as much scorn and reverence as pride has. 
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Indeed, several researchers have argued that the extensive nature of the concept of pride 
is too broad for it to be considered as a unitary construct and it is better conceptualised 
as two or more distinct emotions (Ekman, 2003). Similarly, pride has been empirically 
and theoretically linked to highly divergent outcomes. While pride in one’s successes 
might promote positive behaviours in the achievement domain and contribute to the 
development of a genuine and secure sense of self-esteem (Herrald & Tomaka, 2002), 
the hubristic pride that has been theoretically associated with narcissism (Lewis, 2000) 
may contribute to aggression and hostility, interpersonal problems, relationship conflict, 
and various maladaptive behaviours (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Campbell, 1999; 
Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Wubben, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2012). This distinction has 
given rise to the suggestion of two different facets of pride, whereby the pro-social, 
achievement-oriented form of pride is separated from its self-aggrandising, hubristic 
form. 
Similar to the way research has indicated that shame and guilt are distinct, 
negative self-conscious emotions with disparate antecedents and behavioural outcomes 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002), pride has been conceptualised in a similar manner. 
Specifically, pride that results from a specific achievement or pro-social behaviour may 
be distinct from pride in one’s global self (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). This contrast 
resembles the conceptualisation of guilt as derived from a focus on negative aspects of 
one’s performed behaviour, and shame as derived from a focus on negative aspects of 
one’s inherent self (Lewis, 2000; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In the same way that 
Tangney and colleagues (2002) have demonstrated that this distinction characterises the 
key differences between shame and guilt, and might be the source of the wide range of 
divergent outcomes associated with the two emotions, distinct facets of pride have been 
theoretically and empirically validated in the literature (Tracy & Robins, 2007c; Tracy 
& Robins, 2014).
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Two Unique Facets of Pride
Empirical evidence has been found in favour of the existence of two distinct 
facets of pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007c, Tracy & Robins, 2014), with findings held 
across studies examining both individualistic and collectivistic cultures, suggesting that 
the two distinct facets of pride are not unique to the Western culture (Yan et al., 2013). 
Specifically, authentic, or beta, pride (“I’m proud of what I did) is believed to result 
from attributions to internal, unstable, and controllable causes (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). 
In contrast, hubristic, or alpha, pride (Lewis, 2000), referring to pride in the global self 
(I’m proud of who I am), might result from attributions to internal, stable, and 
uncontrollable causes (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). For example, authentic pride might be 
related to one’s belief that they performed well as a result of their diligence and hard 
work, whereas hubristic pride might include one’s belief that they performed well 
because they are always great. 
Authentic pride is based on specific accomplishments, and has been found to co-
exist with genuine feelings of self-worth. This label also expresses the range of 
academic, social, moral, and interpersonal accomplishments that might be important 
elicitors of the emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2004a). Hubristic pride, in contrast, has 
elicitors that might be more loosely associated with actual accomplishments, and might 
involve a self-evaluative process that reflects a less authentic sense of self, such as 
distorted and self-aggrandised views of the self (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Empirical 
evidence has been found to support the theoretical distinction between authentic pride 
and hubristic pride, whereby pride has been found to not be a unitary construct, and that 
the two facets are indeed related, yet distinct (Carver et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 
2007c; Wubben et al., 2012). Studies using photographs of the expression of pride and 
descriptions of the experience of pride have supported the robustness and conceptual 
validity of the distinction between the two facets (Carver et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 
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2007c). Both authentic pride and hubristic pride have also been found to be 
indiscernible by the antecedent events (achievement, personal, familial, relationship, 
and athletic) that elicit them (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Consistent with appraisal 
theories of emotion, it is not the specific event, but rather the way that the event is 
internally appraised that determines which facet of pride is experienced (Lazarus, 1991). 
In many ways, the relation between the two dimensions of pride have been 
argued to be similar to the relation between shame and guilt, the two major negative 
self-conscious emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2007c). Both hubristic and authentic prides 
tend to be inter-correlated, and yet, appear to have divergent correlations with other 
relevant variables, suggesting that each emotion has meaningful and unique variance. 
Similar to shame and guilt, there are reliable and measurable individual differences in 
the proneness to experience both authentic and hubristic pride. Both pairs of self-
conscious emotions are also distinguished by similar causal attributions. Specifically, 
shame and hubristic pride tend to be elicited by internal, stable, and uncontrollable 
attributions, whereas guilt and authentic pride tend to be evoked by internal, unstable, 
and controllable attributions (Tracy & Robins, 2006).
Function of Pride
Pride is believed to have evolved to aid two primary functions – to positively 
reinforce pro-social behaviours and to raise the individual’s social status by informing 
the individual and his or her social group of the individual’s success (Tracy & Robins, 
2007a). Researchers have argued that pride functions to motivate the individual to 
behave in ways that promote the achievement of social goals, as well as self-
representations that are socially valued (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). The positive affect 
associated with the experience of pride has been suggested to further reinforce pro-
social behaviour, and individuals have been found to execute tasks to a higher standard 
during and immediately after experiencing the emotion of pride (Herrald & Tomaka. 
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2002). The expression of pride has also been suggested to have an adaptive function, 
and researchers have proposed that expressing pride assists in signalling to others that 
the individual’s achievements have resulted in greater social acceptance and an 
enhanced social status (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Tracy and Robins (2008) have argued 
that the expanded posture associated with the expression of pride allows the individual 
to look physically larger, working to attract attention from others, as well as to relay to 
others a sense of authority and power. The small smile that is also associated with the 
expression of pride has been suggested to indicate to others a friendly relationship and 
association, and researchers have suggested that this allows pride to be expressed within 
a social context, without resulting in others trying to eliminate the dominant, prideful 
individual (Tracy & Robins, 2004b). 
 Both authentic and hubristic pride are believed to have evolved distinctly in 
order to address unique adaptive problems. For example, authentic pride may encourage 
behaviours aimed specifically at the long-term achievement and maintenance of status, 
whereas hubristic pride has been suggested to be a “shortcut” solution, promoting status 
enhancement that might be more immediate but temporary in nature (Tracy & Robins, 
2007a). Studies that have examined correlations between the two facets and the Big 
Five factors of personality also suggest that authentic pride might promote status 
through relationship-oriented, pro-social means, whereas hubristic pride might promote 
status more by obtaining the admiration, if not the liking, of others  (Carver et al., 2010; 
Tracy & Robins, 2007a). These patterns of correlations, as well as the associations with 
self-esteem and narcissism, suggest that hubristic pride might be associated with 
psychopathy or Machiavellianism – two personality dispositions that might have short-
term adaptive benefits despite causing long-term interpersonal problems (Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002; Tracy, Cheng, Robins, & Trzensniewski, 2009). The likely outcomes of 
hubristic pride, such as boastfulness and competitiveness, might be adaptive in 
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situations in which it is beneficial to demonstrate one’s relative superiority in order to 
intimidate an opponent (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). In contrast, authentic pride has been 
suggested to assist in the development and maintenance of long-term pro-social 
relationships (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). 
Pride has been found to play an important role in goal regulation, whereby the 
emotion has been shown to be a predictor of goal achievement that is related to both 
competence and mastery (Pekrun, Elliot, & Maier, 2006, 2009; Williams & DeSteno, 
2008, 2009). Because both authentic and hubristic pride are associated with the 
perception of an attained or achieved success, both facets of pride have been argued to 
relate to elevated levels of dispositional reward sensitivity, as well as proneness toward 
investing effort for the purpose of goal achievement (Carver et al., 2010). Authentic and 
hubristic prides have also been associated with unique motivational orientations (Tracy 
& Robins, 2007a). Specifically, authentic pride has been proposed to be associated with 
mastery goals, whereas hubristic pride has been linked to performance goals (Dweck, 
1999). Hubristic pride’s association with narcissism appears to be consistent with this 
assumption, given that narcissists have been found to appear more motivated by 
performance than the mastery aspects of a task (Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000). Indeed, 
narcissistic self-aggrandisers and hubristically proud individuals were found to be 
similar in that they scored consistently higher in measures of aggression, 
Machiavellianism, and deviant behaviours, as compared to authentically proud 
individuals (Tracy et al., 2009).
Behavioural correlates of authentic and hubristic pride
Pride has been argued to be a distinctly interpersonal and social emotion, 
whereby a particular behaviour that has been associated with the emotion has been 
noted as the individual’s act of establishing contact with others (Wubben et al., 2012). 
The pro-social nature of the two facets of pride has been studied intrapersonally, by 
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assessing whether proud individuals themselves behave in a pro-social manner, as well 
as interpersonally – whether others perceive proud individuals as pro-social and treat 
them likewise (Wubben et al., 2012).
The literature has indicated that, of the two distinguished facets of pride, 
authentic pride is the more pro-social emotion (Wubben et al., 2012). The mastery goals 
associated with authentic pride have been highlighted through authentic pride’s 
promoting of the gaining of skills, an authentic sense of self-esteem, as well as 
perseverance at difficult tasks (Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Indeed, authentic pride has 
been found to contribute to enhancing both the individual’s capacity and psychological 
resources to assist others, and studies have found that it has correlated positively with 
pro-social personality traits, such as conscientiousness and agreeableness (Tracy & 
Robins, 2007c). In addition, authentically proud individuals have been found to take 
greater pride in their volunteer work (Hart & Matsuba, 2007), and exhibit more 
organisational citizenship behaviour (Verbeke, Belschak, & Bagozzi, 2004). 
In contrast, hubristic pride has been associated more strongly with personal 
superiority, motivating narcissists’ self-enhancing drive for social status, control, and 
admiration from others, ultimately leading to immoral behaviour towards others 
(Campbell & Foster, 2007; Tracy et al., 2009). Hubristic pride has been found to 
correlate with various behaviours consistent with antisocial traits, such as aggression, 
antipathy, hostility, selfishness and greed (Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; 
Campbell, Bush, Brunell, & Shelton, 2005; Tracy et al., 2009). While hubristically 
proud individuals report a proneness toward a grandiose self-opinion and arrogance, 
such individuals have also been suggested to be socially uncomfortable, as well as to 
experience anxiety with regard to relationships and insecurity with regard to social 
relationships (Tracy et al., 2009). 
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The interpersonal repercussions that arise as a consequence of the intrapersonal 
experience of both authentic and hubristic pride have recently been examined in the 
literature. Authentically proud individuals have been found to earn social status through 
nobility and positive influence, whereby their authority stems from others’ appreciation 
of their capability, skilfulness and contribution towards the group. Hubristically proud 
individuals have been suggested to gain social status through dominance and 
superiority, through which others may follow them out of a fear of being threatened, 
coerced or intimidated (Tracy et al., 2009; Wubben et al., 2012). Not only has hubristic 
pride been found to be less pro-social than authentic pride, but others have been found 
to respond hesitantly with regard to behaving pro-socially around hubristically proud 
individuals, and more willingly toward authentically proud individuals (Wubben et al., 
2012). As compared to their hubristically proud counterparts, authentically proud 
individuals have been found to be perceived as more well-liked than hubristically proud 
individuals, perceived by subordinates as altruistic, and rated by peers as respectful and 
considerate (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Michie, 2009; Williams & DeSteno, 
2009). 
In accordance with the behavioural consequences and interpersonal effects of 
both hubristic and authentic pride that the literature has highlighted, cross-cultural 
differences in the experience of pride has been a topic of great interest in recent years. 
Within the therapeutic context, clinicians would benefit from gaining a cross-cultural 
understanding of pride and its impact on psychological distress, so that intervention can 
be individualised to distinguish between the relevant differences in the experience of 
pride within the individual’s specific cultural context. This thesis will attempt to 
illuminate the complex functions and differences of the experiences of shame, adaptive 
and maladaptive guilt, as well as authentic and hubristic pride, for individuals within 
both collectivistic and individualistic cultures.
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1: A CROSS-CULTURAL EXPLORATION OF SHAME, 
GUILT AND PRIDE IN EARLY ADULTHOOD ON PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS
Self-conscious Emotions and Culture
Core to the experience of self-conscious emotions is one’s self-
conceptualisation, which is inherently impacted by the culture in which one resides. 
Indeed, the literature has documented strong evidence that culture exerts a strong 
influence on the way that individuals appraise emotion-eliciting events (Mesquita, 
2001). The East-Asian culture’s promotion of a healthy dissatisfaction with one’s self 
has been suggested to act as a motivation to improve oneself (Heine et al., 1999). In 
contrast is the independent self-concept of individualistic cultures, where individuals 
have been found to be self-enhancing in a more individually-focused manner, 
attributing less emotional attachment to their interpersonal relationships (Sun, Horn, & 
Merritt, 2004; Triandis, 1995). 
Researchers have questioned the generalisability of existing models of self-
conscious emotions to collectivistic cultures (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Prevailing views of 
shame and guilt are highly dependent on certain assumptions that may not necessarily 
apply to other cultural contexts. For example, the conceptualisation that global, stable 
attributions result in shame and that specific, temporary attributions elicit guilt is based 
on the assumption that there is a stable self that can be differentiated from one’s 
temporary actions (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Likewise, the notion that shame has an 
external orientation (is oriented to others’ standards or social norms) whereas guilt has 
an internal orientation (is oriented to one’s own standards) assumes that internal and 
external orientation can be easily separated, and that internal orientation is more 
powerful and genuine than external orientation (Wong & Tsai, 2007). These 
assumptions reflect a view of the self as an independent self-construal (Markus & 
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Kitayama, 1991), which appears to be restricted and independent from others, and 
largely defined by stable personal characteristics. 
Additionally, the conventional model has been criticised for assuming that being 
negatively evaluated by others or by oneself is detrimental and non-beneficial to the 
individual, and that such experiences should be consciously avoided. Given the 
significant body of research that has demonstrated that individualistic cultures promote 
the independent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), and given that most 
models of shame and guilt have been based on Western samples, it is, indeed, likely that 
the perception of shame and guilt that has contributed to emotion research is an 
individualistic one (Wong & Tsai, 2007). To assist in a better cultural understanding of 
the experience of self-conscious emotions, it is important to look to other cultures 
rooted in other philosophical traditions that have different views of the self, and hence, 
potentially different views of shame and guilt (Camras & Fatani, 2004; Kitayama et al., 
1995; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004).
Individualist and collectivist societies are characterised by starkly different self-
systems (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The self in collectivist cultures, such as Asian 
countries, has been largely characterised as interdependent and heavily reliant on, and 
defined by, social ties (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 1994). In Singapore, three notions 
regarding such social ties exist - marriage, care of young children and filial piety (Quah, 
1994) – and these notions are intricately interlaced with the nation’s ideas on filial piety 
and the family as a fundamental building block of society. This emphasis on family 
relationships has been so deeply entrenched in the Singapore system that there may 
exist a hidden responsibility, or even an obligation, for young adults to care for their 
parents under any circumstance. This sense of responsibility to care for one’s family is 
emphasised further by the government in the formulation of ageing policies that are 
founded on Confucian ethics of filial piety that encourage young adults to take care of 
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their ageing parents (Liu, 2000). Indeed, Singaporean individuals are largely 
representative of a collectivistic culture. However, with the rise of modernism and 
individualism in East-Asian societies (Brinkmann, 2010), an exploration of the 
experience of self-conscious emotions in young Singaporean adults may assist with a 
more current understanding of self-conscious emotions within a collectivistic culture, 
such as Singapore.
Cultural Variations of Shame and Guilt
Individuals in collectivistic cultures of East-Asian countries with an 
interdependent self-concept have been found to experience a larger proportion of 
negative self-conscious emotions, as compared to people from an individualistic culture 
in Western countries (Kitayama et al., 1995). This finding has been extended to Asian 
immigrants living in individualistic societies, whereby Asian Americans have been 
found to be more prone to experiencing shame than Caucasians living in America 
(Bedford & Hwang, 2003). While collectivistic Japanese individuals have been found to 
experience more negative, but self-engaging, self-conscious emotions, such as guilt, 
their American counterparts were found to be more prone to experiencing more 
positive, but disengaging, emotions such as pride and anger (Kitayama, Mesquita & 
Karasawa, 2006). 
The desirability and functionality of self-conscious emotions are considered to 
be different in various cultures, due to innate cultural differences in the experience of 
these emotions. For example, self-criticism, which involves a reflection of one’s 
weakness and is associated with the emotion of shame, is highly encouraged in many 
Asian cultures and considered a necessity for self-improvement. Indeed, shame and 
guilt have been found to be perceived as more favourable in countries with a greater 
degree of collectivistic values (Campos, Keltner, Beck, Gonzaga & John, 2007; Heine 
et al., 1999). Examples of such countries with collectivist values are China and Taiwan, 
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versus those with individualistic values, such as Australia and the USA (Eid & Diener, 
2001). The values that define and lie at the heart of collectivistic and individualistic 
cultures strongly contribute to, and inevitably affect, the experience of self-conscious 
emotions.
The current literature is sparse with regard to cross-cultural research on 
maladaptive guilt, with particular regard to survivor and separation guilt. Indeed, a 
cross-cultural exploration of maladaptive guilt, which focuses on emotions that are 
elicited by concerns over interpersonal relationships, may contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of how such emotions are experienced across 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures. With regard to maladaptive guilt, the cultural 
operation of separation and survival guilt may be attributed to the differences in the 
conceptualisation of one’s self and the self in relation to others. Specifically, the 
different experiences of guilt may be partly accounted for by differences in various 
cultural backgrounds in shaping conceptualisations of the self (Bedford & Hwang, 
2003; Tangey & Dearing, 2002). Bedford and Hwang (2003) found that the identity of a 
Chinese person of a Confucian culture was largely dependent on relationships with 
family and close friends, whereas the identity of an American from an individualistic 
western culture functioned as an independent individual, with a focus on being self-
contained and self-sufficient. Given that guilt, when conceptualised as a negative 
construct, has been found to positively correlate with depressive symptoms (Harder, 
1995; Kugler & Jones, 1992), the present study aims to explore how maladaptive guilt, 
namely separation and survivor guilt, might operate within both individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures to impact on psychological distress.  
Cultural Variations of Pride
A few studies have investigated cultural differences in the experience of pride 
between cultures. Orth et al. (2010) found that Asians reported experiencing more 
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hubristic pride than European-Americans and African-Americans, which may be due to 
strong cultural differences in the experience and expression of pride. However, other 
studies have documented lesser levels of pride-proneness, as well as the negative 
perception of pride, in collectivistic Asian cultures, as compared to individualistic 
cultures (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001). When pride has been conceptualised as a unitary 
construct, complex and conflicting results in relation to its frequency and desirability 
have emerged within collectivistic cultures (Scollon et al., 2004). 
In general, a clearer understanding of cultural variances in pride has been 
attained when pride has been conceptualised as having two distinct facets – authentic 
and hubristic (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Ultimately, Tracy and Robins (2007a) 
suggested that it is the differences in the manner in which pride is understood and 
conceptualised between cultures that result in variations in how frequently pride is 
experienced, and how desirable it is within cultures. Indeed, collectivistic cultures have 
been suggested to understand the emotion of pride as predominantly hubristic in nature, 
which might impact on its negative view within collectivistic cultures (Tracy & Robins, 
2007a). Furthermore, it has been posited that collectivistic pride has a social element, by 
which pride can be desirable for a collectivistic individual when the pride is related to 
other’s accomplishments, or a social group’s achievement, rather than the individual’s 
self (Tracy & Robins, 2007a, Stipek, 1998). 
While pride has been generally considered as a positive emotion that functions, 
universally, to preserve and increase social status (Tracy & Robins, 2007a), it is likely 
that culture may shape the way that authentic and hubristic pride are regulated, 
expressed, appraised and valued. Researchers have called for the need to better 
understand cultural variances in both authentic and hubristic pride (Tracy & Robins, 
2007a). To my knowledge, cross-cultural interactions between the experiences of the 
58
two facets of pride and psychological distress have yet to be fully explored in the 
literature. 
Cultural Variations of Self-conscious Emotions and their Implications for 
Psychological Well-being
Although the current literature has established that individuals from 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures differ in their proneness towards experiencing 
certain self-conscious emotions, there currently lacks research on cultural variations of 
shame, pride and guilt and their impact on the individual’s psychological well-being. 
Yet, an understanding of how culture impacts on the individual’s experience of self-
conscious emotions is likely to impact on understanding how any related psychological 
distress is managed by the individual. For example, individuals from collectivistic 
cultures may experience more guilt-proneness than individuals from individualistic 
cultures. However, owing to the way collectivistic cultures value interpersonal 
relationships, their higher amount of guilt-proneness may not actually manifest as 
higher scores in depression. It may be that collectivistic cultures have social support 
systems already existing in such a way that they assist the individual with ways of 
managing negative emotions.  Though few in numbers, some studies have investigated 
the impact of shame and guilt on psychological well-being between different ethnic 
groups within the same society (Meehan et al., 1996). However, very few studies have 
assessed the impact of self-conscious emotions on psychological well-being between 
collectivistic and individualistic societies, and none have specifically examined such 
relationships within the young adult population.
Young Adults
Young adulthood presents itself as a period of transitions that involve life-
changing decisions. Identified as having the highest incidence of mental disorders of 
any age cohort (Rowling, Weber & Scanion, 2005), young adults remain a cohort 
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worth investigating with regard to understanding the experience of self-conscious 
emotions and their relationships with mental well-being. The urbanisation of societies, 
coupled with vast improvements in lifestyles and education, has drastically changed the 
markers of development for this cohort of young adults. Arnett (2004) has argued that 
the road to adulthood is now much longer than before, with the inclusion of longer 
markers that are attained over a long period of time, instead of distinct, discrete 
markers, specifically for transiting into adulthood. These markers include values, such 
as taking responsibility for oneself, achieving financial independence and making 
independent decisions.  Research on the psychological well-being of this cohort has 
identified some of their specific problems, which include work, financial difficulties and 
issues related to relationships (White & Wyn, 2004). In a study conducted by Janoff-
Bulman and Frantz (1997), students in this transition period were found to perceive 
themselves as vulnerable, less confident and as lacking a sense of control. Within the 
transition from school to university, from home to college/shared accommodation and 
from school student to university student, from university student to a working 
individual, gains and losses were encountered, which resulted in a consequential 
negative impact on the mental health of the young adult as an individual (Rowling et al., 
2005).
A recent study by Orth et al. (2010) that tracked the trajectories of shame, pride 
and guilt over the lifespan found that the largest age differences in self-conscious 
emotions occurred in adolescence, young adulthood and old age. Their research has 
attributed the dramatic trends in self-conscious emotions to crucial transitions in social 
roles and relationships during these life periods, and suggested that adolescence, young 
adulthood and old age are critical periods in the development of such emotions. 
Furthermore, the young adulthood age group was particularly distinctive, in that it was 
the only period during which large differences (steepest gradient) in the trajectories of 
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shame, guilt and pride were observed (see Figure 1, adapted from Orth et al., 2010). 
Given Orth et al.’s assertion that more research was needed to examine more closely the 
period of young adulthood, the present study aims to conduct more fine-grained 
analyses on the experience of self-conscious emotions during the period of young 
adulthood, across two different cultures.
Figure 1. Trajectories of self-conscious emotions from age 13 years to age 89 years. 
Emotions were converted to Z-scores in this study by Orth et al. (2010) for the analyses. 
Gradient was the steepest from 18-35 years old (Orth et al., 2010).
Clinical Implications of Self-conscious Emotions
While shame has been found to be associated with feelings of worthlessness and 
a sense of being exposed, guilt has been associated with feelings of regret and remorse 
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Although both shame and guilt have been construed as 
negative emotions, shame has predominantly been considered the more intense and 
painful of the two. In accordance with attributional theories of depression (Gotlib & 
Abramson, 1999), shame would be more likely to cause symptoms of depression than 
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guilt, as the attributional pattern implied within the self-criticised, defective and flawed 
shamed individual is more maladaptive than guilt’s focus on amending the wrongdoing. 
However, empirical evidence has shown that shame explains substantial incremental 
variance in depression, even when attributional style is controlled for (Tangney et al., 
1992). 
When guilt has been conceptualised as adaptive in nature, research has found 
shame-proneness to be more strongly associated with symptoms of psychopathology, as 
compared to guilt-proneness (Tangney et al., 1992). Importantly, Tangney et al. found 
that the relationship between adaptive guilt and psychopathology symptoms was 
attributable to the shared variance between shame and guilt. Subsequent studies have 
supported Tangney et al.’s findings, showing that shame has been found to share 
specific relations with psychopathology symptoms, whereas the relationship between 
adaptive guilt and symptoms of psychopathology diminished after controlling for shame 
(Pineles et al., 2006). While these studies have assisted in attaining a better 
understanding of the distinguishing correlates of shame and adaptive guilt, both clinical 
and empirical literatures are still inconsistent with regard to the specific links between 
psychological symptoms and shame and guilt.
Shame and guilt have been related to both depressive affect in day-to-day life, as 
well as with depression as a clinically relevant disorder. Empirical studies have 
established the existence of an association between guilt and depression (Alexander, 
Brewin, Vearnals, Wolff, & Leff, 1999; Ghatavi et al., 2002; Jarrett & Weissenburger, 
1990; Walters-Chapman, Price, & Serovich, 1995). Similarly, the relationship between 
shame and depression has also been widely established in the literature (Allan, Gilbert, 
& Goss, 1994; Andrews, 1995; Andrews & Hunter, 1997; Cheung, Gilbert, & Irons, 
2004; Fontaine et al., 2001; Tangney et al., 1992). 
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Both shame and guilt have been reported to be important factors in the etiology 
of symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), as well in the development and 
maintenance of symptoms of social anxiety disorder (SAD) (Gilbert, 2000; Shafran, 
Watkins, & Charman, 1996; Valentiner & Smith, 2008). Anxious symptoms have also 
been argued to play a role in reducing the intensity of the negative emotion, such as 
guilt (Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). For example, the 
constant worrying that is characteristic of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) is argued 
to operate, partly, as a means of reducing feelings of guilt in the individual (Freeston et 
al., 1994). Similarly, shame has been proposed to contribute to the reason why 
individuals may worry as well (Gosselin et al., 2003). 
With respect to the self-conscious emotion of pride, there is currently a lack of 
cross-cultural research on its impact on psychological distress. In general, pride has 
been conceptualised as a positive self-conscious emotion that is related to acts of 
achievement (Tracy & Robins, 2007a). How these achievements are appraised results in 
whether the individual experiences the emotion of hubristic or authentic pride (Tracy & 
Robins, 2007a). While authentic pride has been associated with high self-esteem and 
low levels of depression, hubristic pride has been related to depression and low self-
esteem (Orth et al., 2010; Tracy et al., 2009). 
This divergent relationship between the two facets of pride has been noted to 
mirror the relationship between shame and general guilt, as shame has been shown to 
associate with depression and low self-esteem, while guilt, in general, has been shown 
to be weakly associated with low levels of depression (Orth et al., 2010). Therefore, 
although previous studies have documented shame and hubristic pride to correlate 
weakly (r = .15) with each other, both emotions have been argued to reflect a 
maladaptive pattern, whereas guilt and authentic pride, despite correlating weakly (r = 
.08), appear to reflect a generally adaptive pattern (Orth et al.). To my knowledge, there 
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has yet to be conducted, an investigation of the impact of authentic and hubristic pride 
on symptoms of psychological distress from a cross-cultural perspective. 
Importantly, unique differences may exist between cultures with regard to the 
relationship between self-conscious emotions and psychological well-being. 
Researchers have argued that existing assumptions inherent in the theoretical 
understanding of shame, guilt and pride may not necessarily apply in collectivistic 
cultures (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Indeed, cross-cultural differences in the experience of 
shame, guilt and pride may have important implications for the current understanding of 
the relationship between self-conscious emotions and psychological distress. As 
highlighted by other researchers, other cultures rooted in other philosophical traditions 
might have different views of the self, and hence, potentially different views of self-
conscious emotions (Camras & Fatani, 2004; Kitayama et al., 1995; Mesquita & 
Karasawa, 2004).
Hypotheses
The aim of the present study was to conduct an exploratory examination of the 
impact of culture, gender and age on young adults’ experiences of self-conscious 
emotions, with specific regard to shame, both adaptive and maladaptive guilt, as well as 
both hubristic and authentic pride. The literature has well established the importance of 
interpersonal relationships in collectivistic cultures, whereby individuals define 
themselves through their close relationships that they share with in-group others 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Given guilt’s central focus of fostering interpersonal 
relationships, it was hypothesised that Singaporeans, as a representation of a 
collectivistic culture, would experience greater levels of guilt-proneness – both adaptive 
and maladaptive, when compared to their Australian counterparts. Due to the 
collectivistic valuation of shame that has been documented in the literature (Compos et 
al., 2007; Heine et al., 1999), a greater level of shame-proneness was also expected for 
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Singaporeans, as compared to their Australian counterparts. With regard to authentic 
and hubristic pride, the literature has documented that Asians have reported greater 
hubristic pride-proneness than their Western counterparts (Orth et al., 2010). Hence, it 
was hypothesised that Singaporeans would report a greater level of both authentic and 
hubristic pride than their Australian counterparts. 
The present study also aimed to explore how shame, guilt (adaptive and 
maladaptive)  and pride (hubristic and authentic) related to psychological well-being, 
with specific regard to depression, anxiety and stress, after demographic variables, such 
as nationality, gender and age, were controlled for. Taking into consideration the 
inconsistent findings of previous research, the present study hypothesised that 
individuals who reported greater guilt-proneness would experience more symptoms of 
anxiety. Individuals who reported greater shame-proneness were expected to report 
more symptoms of depression. Given that the literature has distinguished between the 
appraisal processes of authentic and hubristic pride, the current study aimed to explore 
how authentic and hubristic pride, which have not been extensively researched with 
regard to their  relationship with symptoms of psychological distress, relate to 
symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. Taking into account previous research that 
has associated hubristic pride with narcissism, psychopathy or Machiavellianism, it was 
hypothesised that hubristic pride would positively relate to symptoms of depression, 
anxiety and stress. It was also hypothesised that authentic pride would correlate 
negatively with symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. The present study also 
aimed to explore cross-cultural differences in relationships between self-conscious 




The current study was approved by the Murdoch University Research Ethics 
Office, Division of Research and Development (Ethics Approval number 2011/102). 
The original sample consisted of 212 individuals. Out of the 212 participants, 58 
individuals either did not manage to complete the entire questionnaire or possibly 
experienced a technical glitch in the survey, resulting in incomplete responses to the 
questionnaire. Only completed questionnaires from individuals who were within the age 
range of 18 to 35 years of age were included in the analysis. Consequently, the data 
from three participants aged 17, 38 and 42 years of age were excluded. The final sample 
consisted of 129 individuals, comprising of 65 Singaporeans, 64 Australians and 22 
individuals who were of other nationalities. In alignment with the present study’s aim of 
investigating specific cultural differences, individuals of nationalities other than 
Australian and Singaporean were excluded from the data analysis. This thesis utilised a 
convenience sampling technique, whereby the Australian and Singaporean cultures 
were selected as representatives of an individualistic and collectivistic culture, 
respectively, due to the convenience of their accessibility to the researcher.
Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of the Australian and 
Singaporean participants. The mean age of participants was 23.4 years (SD = 4.50, 
range = 18-35). For the purposes of investigating scores within the early adulthood age 
range, participants were allocated into four different age bands. Age Band 1: 18-20 
years (N = 37; 9 Males, 28 Females; 32 Australians, 5 Singaporeans), Age Band 2: 21-
23 years (n = 35; 9 Males, 28 Females; 16 Australians, 21 Singaporeans), Age Band 3: 
24-28 years (n = 38; 15 Males, 23 Females; 9 Australians, 29 Singaporeans), Age Band 
4: 29-35 years (n = 17, 7 Males, 10 Females; 7 Australians, 10 Singaporeans). Of the 
total sample, 49.6% were Australians and 50.4% were Singaporeans, and slightly less 




Demographics based on Nationality







Australians 64 12 52 22.0 4.33 100.0 0
Singaporeans 65 28 37 24.8 3.48 38.1 61.9
Whole sample 129 40 89 23.4 4.16 68.2 30.2
Measures
     The Test Of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & 
Gramzow, 2000). The TOSCA-3 is a measure widely used to assess proneness to shame 
and guilt (Robins et al., 2007; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner & 
Gramzow, 1989). Included in this measure are 16 scenarios from everyday life to which 
individuals indicate their reactions. Each scenario is paired with a set of four possible 
reactions. Responses are given on a Likert Scale which consists of 5 points, ranging 
from 1 (Not likely) to 5 (Very likely).  A sample scenario is, “You make plans to meet a 
friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood him up.” The four possible 
reactions to the above scenario are: a) You would think, ‘I’m inconsiderate’ b) You 
would think: “Well they’ll understand’ c) You would try to make it up to him as soon as 
possible d) You would think: ‘My boss distracted me just before lunch.” Reliability 
scores of .78, .77, .48, and .51 for their respective guilt, shame, hubristic and authentic 
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pride subscales of the TOSCA-3 were obtained in previous research (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). In the present study, the alpha coefficient for the test as a whole was 
.80, and for the guilt, shame, hubristic and authentic pride subscales, the alpha 
coefficients were .75, .80, .49 and .57, respectively. 
     Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire – 67. The Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire – 67 
(IGQ-67; O’Connor et al., 1997) is a 67-item, self-report questionnaire designed to 
access and measure four types of guilt. As mentioned in the introduction, for the 
purposes of this study, two out of the four subscales will be used: Survivor Guilt Scale 
(22 items) and Separation Guilt Scale (16 items). Responses to items are given on a 5-
point Likert-type scale and total scores are calculated by summing up the items’ scores 
under each subscale, having considered the reverse-scored items. Internal consistencies 
of .76 and.73 for Survivor Guilt and Separation Guilt Scales have been determined in 
previous research (O’ Connor et al., 1997). In the present study, the alpha coefficients 
were .81 for Separation Guilt and .84 for Survival Guilt.
Authentic and Hubristic Pride Scales. The pride scales are a trait version 
measure of authentic and hubristic pride. The authentic pride scale includes items such 
as “accomplished” and “productive” and the hubristic pride scale includes items such as 
“arrogant” and “egotistical”. Responses are measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In the present study, the alpha coefficients for 
the hubristic pride and authentic pride subscales were .90 and .89, respectively.
 Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS). The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 
(DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is used to access levels of depression, anxiety 
and stress. For the purposes of this study, the DASS will be used as a measure of 
psychological well-being and will be used to explore relationships of depression, 
anxiety and stress with measures of self-conscious emotions.  Responses are measured 
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on a 7-point Likert-type scale from Very strongly disagree to Very strongly agree. A 
sample question is, “I feel comfortable that I can control how anxious I am feeling.” No 
items were reverse-scored.  Test-retest reliability coefficients obtained from previous 
research (Crawford & Henry, 2003) was .95 for depression scales, .90 for anxiety, .93 
for stress and .97 for DASS overall. In this present study, the alpha coefficients for the 
following scales of the DASS are: Depression scales .90, Anxiety scales .77, Stress 
scales .88 and DASS overall .92. 
Procedure
Students from Murdoch University in Western Australia responded to an 
anonymous online survey (see Appendix A for full questionnaire) that was hosted by 
Murdoch University’s Social and Community On-line Research Database (SCORED) 
system, a website that provides access to a wide variety of psychological studies 
(http://scored.murdoch.edu.au). Participants accessed the online survey via one of 
two ways: the School of Psychology’s Subject Pool Research homepage, or via a 
Facebook website page that provided the link to the study published on SCORED.
Psychology students from Murdoch University received an hour’s worth of 
subject pool credit in return for their participation. The other participants had the option 
of participating in a draw to win a $50 ITunes voucher. The survey data was kept 
separate from the incentive entry list to ensure anonymity. 
Results
Guilt Analysis
In examining whether the experience of guilt differed between nationality, age 
and gender groups, a three-way between groups MANOVA was performed. The three 
dependent variables used were the TOSCA-3 guilt scale and the two IGQ-67 subscales: 
survival guilt and separation guilt. The independent variables were nationality 
(Australian and Singaporean), gender (Male and Female) and age groups (1 through 
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4). Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, 
univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and 
multicollinearity, with no serious violations observed. The MANOVA on the combined 
dependent variables revealed main effects of gender (F (3, 111) = 3.312, p = .023, 
partial eta squared = .08) and nationality (F (3, 111) = 2.842, p = .041, partial eta 
squared = .07) but no significant effect was found for age. There was also an interaction 
effect between age and nationality (F (9, 270), p =.025; partial eta squared = .06). 
When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, using a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .017, separation guilt showed statistical significance 
with regards to age bands, F (3, 113) = 3.525, p = .017, partial eta squared = .09. 
Specifically, the youngest participants, whose ages were between 18 to 20 years (Age 
band 1) (M = 45.469, SD = 2.486), were found to experience more separation guilt than 
the other participants (Age band 2: M = 39.95, SD = 1.85; Age band 3: M = 34.76, SD = 
2.35; Age band 4: M = 42.40, SD = 2.63). A main effect was found for nationality with 
regard to separation guilt, F (1,113) = 8.320, p = .005, partial eta squared = .07. 
Specifically, Singaporeans (M = 44.03, SD = 1.48) reported experiencing greater 
separation guilt than their Australians counterparts (M = 37.26, SD = 1.82).  
An interaction effect between nationality and age was observed for separation 
guilt, F (3, 113) = 4.798, p = .003, partial eta squared = .11. Post-hoc tests were 
conducted to investigate the interaction effect between age and nationality for 
separation guilt. A one-way independent sample ANOVA was conducted separately for 
each of the four age bands to examine between-group effects for Singaporeans and 
Australians. Statistically significant differences in the experience of separation guilt 
between Singaporeans and Australians were found between age bands 1 (18-20 years 
old) and 3 (24-28 years old), with Australians scoring significantly lower than 
Singaporeans.
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Gender effects were observed for TOSCA-3 guilt, F (1, 113) = 6.567, p = .012, 
partial eta squared = .06. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that females (M = 
66.04, SD = .84) experienced more TOSCA-3 guilt as compared to males (M = 61.32, 
SD = 1.64). None of the independent variables had statistically significant effects on 
survival guilt.
Shame Analysis
In examining whether shame differed between Singaporeans and Australians, 
age and gender, a three-way between groups ANOVA was conducted to explore the 
impact of age, gender and nationality on the level of shame-proneness, as measured by 
TOSCA-Shame. Preliminary assumption testing for normality, linearity, univariate 
outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, revealed 
no violations. 
There were no statistically significant interaction effects between age, gender 
and nationality. These included the interaction effect between gender and age group, F 
(3, 113) = .239, p = .869, partial eta squared = .01; gender and nationality, F (1, 113) = 
1.17, p = .281, partial eta squared = .01; age group and nationality, F (3, 113) = .02, p = 
.995, partial eta squared = .001; and the interaction effect between age group and 
nationality, F (3, 113) = .502, p = .681, partial eta squared = .01. 
The main effects for gender, F (1, 113) = 3.112, p = .08, partial eta squared = 
.27; nationality, F (1, 113) = .566, p = .453, partial eta squared = .01; and age group, F 
(3, 113) = 1.042, p = .377, partial eta squared = .03, also did not reach statistical 
significance.  
Pride Analyses
In examining whether authentic and hubristic pride differed between nationality, 
gender and age groups, the adjective-based Pride Scales were examined separately from 
the TOSCA-3 Pride items. The decision to conduct separate analyses in this manner was 
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based on the unique difference in the nature of the structure and content of the items in 
the two measures – the TOSCA-3 pride items consisted of scenario-based items, 
whereas the Pride Scales consisted of self-rated adjectives.
Scenario-based Pride Analyses: TOSCA-3 Pride
In examining whether the experience of authentic and hubristic pride differed 
between nationality, gender and age groups, a three-way between-groups MANOVA 
was performed. The two dependent variables used were the TOSCA-3 scenario-based 
authentic and hubristic pride scales. Preliminary assumption testing for normality, 
linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrices, and multicollinearity, revealed no violations. With regard to the combined 
dependent variables, there were no statistically significant differences between male and 
female participants, F (2, 112) = .301, p = .741, partial eta squared = .01; age groups, F 
(6, 224) = .69, p = .658, partial eta squared = .02; and nationalities, F (2, 112) = .146, p 
= .864, partial eta squared = .003), and there were no statistically significant interaction 
effects. When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, none 
of the differences for scenario-based authentic or hubristic pride reached statistical 
significance. 
Adjective-based Pride analyses: Pride Scales
In examining whether the experience of authentic and hubristic pride as a trait 
differed between nationality, gender and age groups, a three-way between-groups 
MANOVA was performed to investigate nationality, gender and age group differences 
in the experience of hubristic and authentic pride in a self-rated adjective-based measure 
of pride. The two dependent variables used were the Pride Scales, authentic and 
hubristic pride. The independent variables were nationality, gender and age group. 
Preliminary assumption testing for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate 
outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity found 
72
violations noted for Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices, as well as the 
hubristic pride scale for Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances. 
As the assumption of homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices was 
violated, the more robust Pillai’s Trace was used in assessing the combined dependent 
variables. There were no statistically significant differences between male and female 
participants, F (2, 112) = .325, p = .723; Pillai’s Trace = .006; partial eta squared = 
.006); age groups, F (6, 226) = .432, p = .857; Pillai’s Trace = .023; partial eta squared 
= .011); nationality, F (2, 112) = .793, p = .455; Pillai’s Trace = .014; partial eta 
squared = .014) and there were no statistically significant interaction effects. 
Cross-cultural Correlations of Self-concious Emotions and Psychological Well-being
Table 2
Correlations between measures of Self-conscious Emotions and Psychological Well-
being for Australians (scores for Singaporeans in parentheses)
Depression Anxiety       Stress
TOSCA-Shame .27* (.26*) .34** (.21ns)         .32** (.30*)
TOSCA-Guilt .07ns (.04ns) .11ns (-.03ns)        .15ns (.13ns)
Separation Guilt -.15ns (.09ns) .13ns (.23ns)       .08ns (.27*)
Survival Guilt .40** (.18ns) .43** (.29*)       .24ns (.36**)
TOSCA-Authentic Pride .14ns (.11ns) .03ns (-.09ns)        .16ns (-.05ns)
TOSCA-Hubristic Pride .21ns (.23ns) .06ns (.09ns)       .11ns (.04ns)
Authentic Pride Scale -.26* (-.17ns) -.18ns (-.12ns)       .10ns (-.21ns)
Hubristic Pride Scale .16ns (.25*) .12ns (.43***)       .24ns (.35**)
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001, ns non-significant
Table 2 above shows the correlations between measures of self-conscious 
emotions and psychological well-being for both Australians and Singaporeans. While 
shame was found to be significantly and positively correlated to all measures of 
psychological distress for Australians, Singaporean participants demonstrated positive 
and significant correlations between shame and depression and stress, but not anxiety. A 
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positive relationship was found between separation guilt and stress for Singaporeans, 
but not for Australians. Across both cultures, the TOSCA authentic and hubristic pride 
measures failed to yield statistically significant relationships between their respective 
measures of pride and psychological distress. Despite this, positive significant 
correlations were found between the adjective measure of hubristic pride and all three 
measures of psychological distress for Singaporeans, but not for Australians. No 
statistically significant relationships were evidenced between the adjective measure of 
authentic pride and psychological distress, with the exception of a significant negative 
relationship between authentic pride and depression for Australians only.
Given the present study’s findings of Singaporeans reporting significantly more 
separation guilt than Australians, the present study explored possible effects of 
separation guilt-free shame on psychological distress. Table 3 below shows the 
correlations between psychological distress and shame, with the effects of separation 
guilt controlled for.
Table 3
Correlations between Psychological Distress and Shame (Including scores partialed for 
Separation Guilt in parentheses)
Depression Anxiety Stress
Shame
Australians .27* (.31**) .34** (.33**) .32** (.31*)
Singaporeans .26* (.24ns) .20ns (.14ns) .30* (.24ns)
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001, ns non-significant
Assessing the two cultures individually, Australians showed significant 
correlations between shame and the three measures of psychological distress, whereas 
Singaporeans showed significant correlations between shame and depression and stress, 
but not anxiety. Given the significant difference in levels of separation guilt found 
between Australians and Singaporeans in prior analyses, correlations between shame 
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and psychological well-being were analysed, with separation guilt controlled for. Of 
interest, when the shared variance with separation guilt was controlled for, correlations 
between shame and psychological distress remained significant only for Australians, but 
not for Singaporeans.
Pychological Well-being: How Self-conscious Emotions Predict Symptoms of 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress
Stepwise regression was used to examine how self-conscious emotions (shame, 
pride and guilt) related to levels of depression, anxiety and stress, with demographic 
variables such as nationality, gender, age groups controlled. Prior to interpreting the 
results, several assumptions were evaluated. First, inspection of the normal probability 
plot of standardised residuals, as well as the scatterplot of standardised residuals against 
standardised predicted values, indicated that the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity of residuals were met. Furthermore, Mahalanobis distance did not 
exceed the critical value for any cases in the data file, indicating that multivariate 
outliers were generally not of concern. Lastly, relatively high tolerances for all 
predictors in the regression model indicated that multicollinearity would not interfere 
with the ability to interpret the outcome of the regression model.
How Self-Conscious Emotions Predict Symptoms of Depression
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess the ability of shame-
proneness, (TOSCA-3 Shame), guilt-proneness (TOSCA-3 guilt; IGQ Separation guilt; 
IGQ Survival guilt) and pride-proneness (TOSCA-3 pride; Pride Scales) to predict 
levels of depression, after controlling for the influence of demographic variables 
(gender, age and nationality). At the first step, the main effects of the demographic 
variables – nationality, gender and age were entered. Age was entered as a continuous 
variable and not according to age bands due to the unequal proportions of Singaporeans 
and Australians in each age band. The measures of shame-proneness, guilt-proneness 
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and both authentic and hubristic prides were entered at the second step. Each specific 
emotion was analysed separately, and grouped by their corresponding measures. For 
example, the guilt analysis consisted of all three measures of guilt: TOSCA-3 Guilt, 
IGQ Separation Guilt and IGQ Survival Guilt. The pride analysis consisted of TOSCA-
3 Pride (Authentic and Hubristic) and the Pride Scales (Authentic and Hubristic). The 
shame analysis included the TOSCA-3 Shame measurement. Statistics for the 
regression analyses are shown in Table 4.
For shame-proneness and the prediction of depression in individuals, 
demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining 8.1% of the variance in levels 
of depression. After entry of TOSCA-3 Shame at Step 2, the total variance explained by 
the model as a whole was 17.5%, F (4, 124) = 6.59, p < .001. The measure of shame 
explained an additional 9.4% of the variance in depression, after controlling for age, 
gender and nationality, R squared change = .094, F change (1, 124) = 14.11,  p < .001. 
In the final model, only gender and shame-proneness were statistically significant, with 
gender recording a slightly higher beta value (beta = -.32, p < .001) than TOSCA-3 
Shame scale (beta = .31, p < .001). 
For guilt-proneness and the prediction of depression in individuals, demographic 
variables were entered at Step 1, explaining 8.1% of the variance in levels of 
depression. After entry of TOSCA-3 Guilt, IGQ Separation and Survival guilt at Step 2, 
the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 18.6%, F (6, 122) = 4.64, p < 
.001. The three measures of guilt explained an additional 10.4% of variance in 
depression, after controlling for age, gender and nationality, R squared change = .104, F 
change (3, 122) = 5.21, p = .002. In the final model, only gender and survival guilt were 
statistically significant, with survival guilt recording a higher beta value (beta = .35, p < 
.001) than gender (beta = -.30, p = .001).
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Table 4
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Depression in Young Adults from Singapore 
and Australia. (Unstandardised (B), Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients).
Model 1  Model 2  
Variable B SE B β  ∆R2 B SE B β ∆R2
Age .236 .195 .11 .081* .24 .19 .11
Gender -5.19 1.70 -.27** -6.10 1.64 -.32**
Nationality -1.14 1.67 -.07 -.93 1.59 -.05
TOSCA-3 Shame .31 .08 .31** .094**
Age .236 .195 .11 .081* .28 .19 .13
Gender -5.19 1.70 -.27** -5.71 1.70 -.30**
Nationality -1.14 1.67 -.07 -1.41 1.66 -.08
TOSCA-3 Guilt -.07 .13 -.05 .104**
IGQ Separation -.01 .09 -.01
IGQ Survival     .29 .08 .35**
Age .236 .195 .11 .081* .27 .18 .13
Gender -5.19 1.70 -.27** -3.81 1.59 -.20*
Nationality -1.14 1.67 -.07 -2.07 1.54 -.12
TOSCA-3 Authentic Pride .04 .43 .01 .178**
Authentic Pride Scale -.60 .14 -.35**
TOSCA-3 Hubristic Pride .94 .44 2.16*
Hubristic Pride Scale .57 .17 3.35**
*p < .01; **p < .01
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For authentic and hubristic pride-proneness and the prediction of depression in 
individuals, demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining 8.1% of the 
variance in levels of depression. After entry of the TOSCA-3 authentic and hubristic 
pride measurements and the Pride Scales (authentic and hubristic) at Step 2, the total 
variance explained by the model as a whole was 25.9%, F (7, 127) = 6.06, p < .001. The 
four measures of pride explained an additional 18% of variance in symptoms of 
depression, after controlling for demographic variables, R squared change = .18, F 
change (4, 121) = 7.27, p < .001. In the final model, gender, both authentic and hubristic 
Pride Scales, as well as TOSCA-3 Hubristic Pride were statistically significant, with 
authentic Pride Scale recording the highest beta value (beta = -.35, p < .001), followed 
by hubristic Pride Scale (beta = .30, p = .001), TOSCA-3 Hubristic Pride (beta = .26, p 
= .033), and finally gender (beta = -.20, p = .018). 
How Self-conscious Emotions Predict Symptoms of Anxiety
Stepwise regression was used to assess the ability of shame-proneness, 
(TOSCA-3 Shame), guilt-proneness (TOSCA-3 guilt; IGQ Separation guilt; IGQ 
Survival guilt) and pride-proneness (TOSCA-3 pride; Pride Scales) to predict symptoms 
of anxiety, after controlling for the influence of demographic variables (gender, age and 
nationality). At the first step, the main effects of the demographic variables were 
entered. Age was entered as a continuous variable and not according to age bands due to 
the unequal proportions of Singaporeans and Australians in each age band. The 
measures of shame-proneness, guilt-proneness and both authentic and hubristic prides 
were entered at the second step. Each specific emotion was analysed separately, and 
grouped by their corresponding measures. For example, the guilt analysis consisted of 
all three measures of guilt: TOSCA-3 Guilt, IGQ Separation Guilt and IGQ Survival 
Guilt. The pride analysis consisted of TOSCA-3 Pride (Authentic and Hubristic) and the 
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Pride Scales (Authentic and Hubristic). The shame analysis included the TOSCA-3 
Shame measurement. Statistics for the regression analyses are shown in Table 5.
For shame-proneness and the prediction of symptoms of anxiety within 
individuals, demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining a statistically 
non-significant 1.8% of the variance in levels of anxiety, F (3, 125) = .75, p = .526. 
After entry of TOSCA-3 Shame at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a 
whole was 9.8%, F (4, 124) = 3.38, p = .012. The measure of shame explained an 
additional 8.1% of the variance in anxiety, after controlling for age, gender and 
nationality, R squared change = .098, F change (1, 124) = 11.11, p = .001. In the final 
model, only shame-proneness was statistically significant (beta = .29, p = .001).
For guilt-proneness and the prediction of symptoms of anxiety in individuals, 
demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining a statistically non-significant 
1.8% of the variance in levels of anxiety, F (3, 125) = .75, p = .526. After entry of 
TOSCA-3 Guilt, IGQ Separation and Survival guilt at Step 2, the total variance 
explained by the model as a whole was 19.8%, F (6, 122) = 5.03, p < .001. The three 
measures of guilt explained an additional 18.1% of variance in anxiety, after controlling 
for age, gender and nationality, R squared change = .181, F change (3, 122) = 9.16, p < 
.001. In the final model, only separation and survival guilt were statistically significant, 
with survival guilt recording a higher beta value (beta = .41, p < .001) than separation 
guilt (beta = .18, p = .041).
For authentic and hubristic pride-proneness and the prediction of symptoms of 
anxiety in individuals, demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining a 
statistically non-significant 1.8% of the variance in levels of anxiety, F (3, 125) = .75, p 
= .526. After entry of the TOSCA-3 authentic and hubristic pride measurements and the 
Pride Scales (authentic and hubristic) at Step 2, the total variance explained by the  
model as a whole was 18.9%, F (7, 127) = 4.04, p = .001. The four measures of
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Table 5
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Anxiety in Young Adults from Singapore and Australia. 
(Unstandardized (B), Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients).
Model 1  Model 2  
Variable B SE B β  ∆R2 B SE B β ∆R2
Age .14 .15 .084 .018 .14 .15 .09
Gender -1.45 1.33 -.10 -2.09 1.29 -.14
Nationality -.16 1.30 -.01 -.01 1.25 -.001
TOSCA-3 Shame .22 .07 .29** .081**
Age .14 .15 .084 .018 .22 .14 .14
Gender -1.45 1.33 -.10 -2.23 1.27 -.15
Nationality -.16 1.30 -.01 -1.21 1.24 -.09
TOSCA-3 Guilt -.16 .09 -.16 .181**
IGQ Separation .13 .07 .18*
IGQ Survival     .26 .06 .41**
Age .14 .15 .084 .018 .16 .14 .10
Gender -1.45 1.33 -.10 -.26 1.25 -.02
Nationality -.16 1.30 -.01 -.89 1.22 -.07
TOSCA-3 Authentic 
Pride -.25 .34 -.09 .172**
Authentic Pride Scale -.37 .11 -.29**
TOSCA-3 Hubristic 
Pride .52 .34 .19
Hubristic Pride Scale .57 .13 .39**
*p < .01; **p < .01
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pride explained an additional 17.2% of variance in symptoms of anxiety, after 
controlling for demographic variables, R squared change = .172, F change (4, 121) = 
6.41, p < .001. In the final model, only authentic and hubristic pride of the Pride Scales 
were statistically significant, with hubristic pride scale recording a higher beta value 
(beta = .39, p < .001) than authentic pride scale (beta = -.29, p = .001). 
How Self-Conscious Emotions Predict Symptoms of Stress
Stepwise regression was used to assess the ability of shame-proneness, 
(TOSCA-3 Shame), guilt-proneness (TOSCA-3 guilt; IGQ Separation guilt; IGQ 
Survival guilt) and pride-proneness (TOSCA-3 pride; Pride Scales) to predict symptoms 
of stress, after controlling for the influence of demographic variables (gender, age and 
nationality). At the first step, the main effects of the demographic variables were 
entered. Age was entered as a continuous variable and not according to age bands due to 
the unequal proportions of Singaporeans and Australians in each age band. The 
measures of shame-proneness, guilt-proneness and both authentic and hubristic prides 
were entered at the second step. Each specific emotion was analysed separately, and 
grouped by their corresponding measures. For example, the guilt analysis consisted of 
all three measures of guilt: TOSCA-3 Guilt, IGQ Separation Guilt and IGQ Survival 
Guilt. The pride analysis consisted of TOSCA-3 Pride (Authentic and Hubristic) and the 
Pride Scales (Authentic and Hubristic). The shame analysis included the TOSCA-3 
Shame measurement. Statistics for the regression analyses are shown in Table 6.
For shame-proneness and the prediction of symptoms of stress within 
individuals, demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining a statistically 
non-significant 4.9% of the variance in levels of stress, F (3, 125) = 2.13, p = .100. 
After entry of TOSCA-3 Shame at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a 
whole was 15.7%, F (4, 124) = 5.76, p < .001. The measure of shame explained an 
additional 10.8% of the variance in stress, after controlling for age, gender and 
81
Table 6
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Stress in Young Adults from Singapore and Australia. 
(Unstandardized (B), Standardised (β) Regression Coefficients).
Model 1  Model 2  
Variable B SE B β  ∆R2 B SE B β ∆R2
Age .23 .19 .11 .049 .24 .18 .12
Gender -2.13 1.65 -.12 --3.05 1.58 -.17
Nationality -3.82 1.62 -.23* -3.60 1.53 -.21*
TOSCA-3 Shame .32 .08 .33** .108**
Age .23 .19 .11 .049 .29 .18 .15
Gender -2.13 1.65 -.12 -3.57 1.62 -.20*
Nationality -3.82 1.62 -.23 -4.85 1.58 -.29**
TOSCA-3 Guilt .01 .12 .01 .132**
IGQ Separation .17 .08 .18*
IGQ Survival .23 .07 .29**
Age .23 .19 .11 .049 .25 .18 .12
Gender -2.13 1.65 -.12 -.74 1.60 -.04
Nationality -3.82 1.62 -.23* -4.74 1.56 -.28**
TOSCA-3 Authentic 
Pride .34 .44 .10 .121**
Authentic Pride Scale -.33 .15 -.20*
TOSCA-3 Hubristic 
Pride .09 .44 .03
Hubristic Pride Scale .69 .17 .38**
*p < .01; **p < .01
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nationality, R squared change = .108, F change (1, 124) = 15.90, p < .001. In the final 
model, only nationality and shame-proneness were statistically significant, with shame-
proneness recording a higher beta value (beta = .33, p < .001) than nationality (beta = -.21, 
p = .020). Gender also had a marginally statistically non-significant beta value (beta = 0.17, 
p = .055).
For guilt-proneness and the prediction of symptoms of stress in individuals, 
demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining a statistically non-significant 
4.9% of the variance in levels of stress, F (3, 125) = 2.13, p = .100. After entry of TOSCA-
3 Guilt, IGQ Separation and Survival guilt at Step 2, the total variance explained by the 
model as a whole was 18.1%, F (6, 122) = 4.48, p < .001. The three measures of guilt 
explained an additional 13.2% of variance in stress, after controlling for age, gender and 
nationality, R squared change = .132, F change (3, 122) = 6.55, p < .001. In the final model, 
gender, nationality, separation guilt and survival guilt were statistically significant, with 
survival guilt recording the highest beta value (beta = .289, p = .002), followed by 
nationality (beta = -.287, p = .003), gender (beta = -.20, p = .030) and finally, separation 
guilt (beta = .18, p = .040).
For authentic and hubristic pride-proneness and the prediction of symptoms of 
stress in individuals, demographic variables were entered at Step 1, explaining a 
statistically non-significant 4.9% of the variance in levels of stress, F (3, 125) = 2.13, p = 
.100. After entry of the TOSCA-3 authentic and hubristic pride measurements and the Pride 
Scales (authentic and hubristic) at Step 2, the total variance explained by the model as a 
whole was 17%, F (7, 127) = 3.53, p = .002. The four measures of pride explained an 
additional 12.1% of variance in symptoms of stress, after controlling for demographic 
variables, R squared change = .121, F change (4, 121) = 4.41, p = .002. In the final model, 
84
only nationality and both authentic and hubristic Pride Scales were statistically significant, 
with hubristic pride scale recording the highest beta value (beta = .38, p < .001), followed 
by nationality (beta = -.28, p = .003) and authentic pride scale (beta = -.20, p = .026). 
Discussion
The present study aimed to analyse the impact of nationality, gender and age on the 
experience of self-conscious emotions with specific regard to shame, guilt and pride, during 
the period of young adulthood. The experiences of these emotions were examined, and an 
exploration of how such emotions related to symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress 
was conducted. 
Cross-cultural Differences in Proneness towards Experiencing Self-conscious Emotions
The results pertaining to separation guilt supported the hypothesis that Singaporeans 
would differ from Australians in their levels of guilt-proneness. Although Australians and 
Singaporeans were not found to differ significantly in their experience of adaptive guilt and 
survival guilt, Singaporeans were found to report significantly greater proneness towards 
experiencing separation guilt, a form of maladaptive guilt. Of the three forms of guilt 
examined in the present study, separation guilt was one of the maladaptive forms of guilt 
that represented the exaggerated belief that to be different, or to separate, from one’s loved 
ones causes the latter harm (O’Connor et al., 1997). Indeed, this over-amplified sense of 
responsibility towards loved ones is believed to lead to behaviours that are motivated by the 
need to protect and remain loyal to one’s parents and loved ones (Erreich, 2011; O’Connor 
et al., 1997; Weiss & Sampson, 1986). At the crux of separation guilt lies an intense fear of 
causing harm to others, especially one’s parents, at the expense of pursuing one’s own 
desired goals. As a consequence, dysfunctional relationships are believed to be maintained 
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and perpetuated due to feared repudiation, as opposed to a source of mutual enjoyment and 
pleasure from the relationship (Erreich, 2011).
Singapore is reflective of a collectivistic society that places a strong emphasis on 
filial piety and the family as fundamental building blocks of the society (Quah, 1994). 
Indeed, young Singaporean adults are bound by an undercurrent of cultural guidelines to 
provide and care for their aging parents. As opposed to the earlier period of adolescence, 
during which these individuals were more dependent upon their parents to provide for 
them, young Singaporean adults are more likely to be in the life-stage where they would 
have commenced further education or employment, thereby gaining greater independence 
and financial capacity. With this newfound independence comes a novel, and culturally-
esteemed sense of responsibility to provide, care for and please their aging parents and 
family. Indeed, the characteristic notions of collectivistic social ties, including marriage, 
caring of young children and filial piety, may be so deeply and intricately intertwined 
within Singapore’s ideas on filial piety, and the family as core foundations of society has 
been so deeply entrenched in the system, that a hidden sense of responsibility for young 
adults to care for their parents may indeed set them apart from young adults who belong to 
individualistic cultures. 
In contrast is the Australian culture, which is reflective of the individualistic culture 
that highly values a focus on the self, self-independence and self-enhancement (Sun et al., 
2004; Triandis, 1995). Consistent with the literature, the present study’s finding of 
Australians’ lower level of separation guilt may reflect a different orientation of the self to 
their family and interpersonal relationships. Young Australian adults may consider entering 
tertiary education and the workforce, attaining financial independence and starting a family 
as key milestones. Indeed, it appears that the individualistic self may place critical 
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importance on the self as a unit of life and a source of identity (Heine et al., 1999). By 
contrast, familial and parental responsibility may have unique importance to young adults 
from collectivistic cultures, to the extent that irrational beliefs and large quantities of 
familial guilt may manifest themselves in the form of greater levels of separation guilt. 
These findings suggest a need to explore the clinically relevant implications of separation 
guilt’s relationship with psychological distress within both collectivistic and individualistic 
cultures.
It is interesting to note that the hypotheses that cultural differences would emerge in 
levels of shame-proneness and both hubristic and authentic pride-proneness were not 
supported in the present study. The present study’s finding that Singaporeans did not 
experience statistically greater or lesser shame-proneness than Australians may not be an 
accurate representation of the function of shame within collectivistic cultures. Although the 
positive perception of shame within collectivistic cultures has been demonstrated in the 
literature (Wong & Tsai, 2007), it is critical to note that shame-proneness has also been 
associated with greater deterrence of the emotion, for the specific purposes of reducing 
intrapersonal psychological distress and fostering and increasing interpersonal harmony 
(Tangney, 1990; Wallace & Nosko, 1993). Indeed, researchers have suggested that, as a 
result of their beliefs about their selves and others, shame-prone individuals make an effort 
to deter themselves from shameful experiences with others by developing defensive scripts 
such as denial, withdrawal, arrogance, blaming, perfectionism, and rage (Kaufman, 1989; 
Tangney, 1990) that effectively allow them to regain power back to themselves. Deterrence 
from shame allows for the establishment of power and dominance, which is believed to 
enable the shamed individual to protect himself or herself from the inherent fear of 
abandonment, and to prevent relational conflict. 
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Kaufman (1989) has also argued that shame relates directly to the conceptualisation 
of a flawed and defective self, whereby defensive scripts may assist in preventing the 
individual from experiencing the core self as inadequate and unlovable (Wallace & Nosko, 
1993). The absence of cultural differences with regard to shame-proneness in the current 
study may have manifested as a result of a deterrence, which stems from the valuation, of 
the emotion of shame within the Singaporean sample. Indeed, the collectivistic valuation of 
shame may not evidence itself in quantitative analyses, but may be better analysed by 
means of qualitative analyses, which may assist in attaining a deeper and richer 
understanding of cultural conceptualisations of self-conscious emotions, such as shame. 
In addition, the present study did not find statistically significant differences in the 
levels of pride-proneness between Singaporeans and Australians. These findings are 
inconsistent with the literature, which has reported a greater devaluation of pride within 
collectivistic cultures, and a greater valuation of pride in individualistic cultures (Eid & 
Diener, 2001; Mosquera et al., 2000). It should be noted that, although sparse within the 
literature, cross-cultural studies have also found inconsistent findings with regard to the 
individualistic and collectivistic perspectives on pride. Although the devaluation of pride in 
collectivistic cultures has been shown in previous studies, a few studies have also found 
that Asians were more likely to report experiencing greater levels of hubristic pride than 
individuals from individualistic cultures (Orth et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). The 
present study suggests that there might exist a discrepancy between the devaluation of pride 
within collectivistic cultures and the actual level of pride-proneness that collectivistic 
individuals experience. Specifically, it is suggested that a culture’s positive perception of a 
self-conscious emotion may not necessarily correspond with the actual quantity it presents. 
For example, even though collectivistic cultures’ devaluation of pride may result in the 
88
absence of physical expression of pride, the intrapersonal experience of pride may still 
occur for individuals within collectivistic cultures, which may have certain clinical 
implications for psychological distress. It is, therefore, vital to attain a better cultural 
understanding of the relationship that pride has with psychological distress. 
Self-conscious Emotions and Psychological Well-being
Maladaptive Guilt and Psychological Well-being
Similar to the psychological impact of shame, survival guilt related to, and 
predicted, overall negative psychological well-being, with specific regard to symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and stress. As expected, and consistent with the literature, the adaptive 
guilt measure (TOSCA-3 Guilt) was not found to be a predictor of depression. In 
comparison to the isolation and withdrawal that is characteristic of shame, guilt, whether 
adaptive or maladaptive, has, at its crux, a reparative nature, with the focus being on 
amending broken social ties and cultivating healthy interpersonal relationships. What is 
interesting is the finding that survival guilt was related to symptoms of depression, whereas 
separation guilt and adaptive guilt were not found to predict depression. It is possible that 
survival guilt’s greater inward focus on the self, which distinguishes it from the other two 
forms of guilt, could contribute to its relation with depression. This pattern appears to 
parallel shame’s relationship with psychological distress, which suggests that the 
intrapersonal focus of survival guilt and shame may be more likely to predict future 
depressive symptoms. In contrast, the interpersonal focus that characterises both separation 
guilt and adaptive guilt appears to be predictive of anxious symptoms that may stem from a 
motivation towards repairing and amending broken social relationships.
In contrast to the inward focus of survival guilt and shame, separation guilt, which 
has an outward focus on one’s perceived need to be unconditionally available and loyal 
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towards their loved ones, was found to predict symptoms of anxiety and stress. In 
accordance with the general notion of guilt being a predominantly socially constructed 
emotion, separation guilt, a form of maladaptive guilt, has been associated with a desire to 
amend broken social relationships, particularly those that concern one’s parents and family.  
It is of interest to note that while separation guilt was found to be a predictor of anxiety and 
stress, it was not found to be a predictor of depression. The literature has established that a 
consequence of separation guilt is manifest in the form of dysfunctional familial 
relationships that are perpetuated by feared repudiation (Erreich, 2011). The findings of the 
present study indicate that the experience of separation guilt has an impact on the 
individual’s psychological well-being, whereby separation guilt relates to, and predicts, 
symptoms of anxiety and stress. This finding is consistent with the literature’s general 
establishment of the psychological impact of the experience of generalised guilt, where 
guilt has been associated with symptoms of anxiety, as opposed to depression, due to 
guilt’s outward, pro-social focus on mending broken social relationships. 
The Dark Side of Hubristic Pride
It is interesting to note that even though pride has generally been regarded in the 
literature as a “positive” self-conscious emotion, its hubristic form was found to relate to 
psychological distress, after demographic variables, such as nationality, age and gender, 
were controlled for. Pride has been widely associated with positive thoughts, emotions and 
behaviour in the literature (Leary et al., 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). However, the 
present study has found that even a “positive” self-conscious emotion, such as hubristic 
pride, could relate to, and even predict, psychological distress within the individual. This 
finding sheds light on the complexity of pride as a self-conscious emotion and further 
illuminates the finer-grained mechanism of the emotion within the individual. While 
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hubristic pride may indeed lead to the immediate experiencing of positive emotions such as 
joy (Tracy & Robins, 2007a), it may also contain a negative and more isolating aspect – 
one that has not been given much consideration in research thus far. 
The present study’s findings were consistent with existing research, whereby 
hubristic pride was found to predict all three symptoms of negative psychological well-
being – depression, anxiety and stress. Hubristic pride, due to its intrapersonal focus of 
attribution of value to the self, was associated with greater depressive, anxious and stressful 
symptoms. It is suggested that hubristically proud individuals may place greater pressure on 
the self to perform well consistently, because of the nature of their valuing of the self in 
terms of their performance. Authentic pride, however, negatively predicted all three 
symptoms of psychological distress. Authentic pride has been argued to differ from 
hubristic pride, in that it places value on the achievement, rather than on the individual 
(Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Considering that the difference between hubristic and authentic 
pride is the internal or external attribution of the achievement – whether it is attributed 
externally to the act of achievement or internalised within one’s self-concept – the present 
study’s findings suggest the individual’s subjective attribution of achievement may pose 
implications for the experience of psychological distress. At the heart of hubristic and 
authentic pride lie an achievement and a value attribution. It is suggested that hubristic 
pride’s internal value attribution may contribute to a certain pressure towards consistent 
performance. In recent years, researchers have focused on the distinctions that have been 
drawn between the two facets of pride (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Gaining a 
comprehensive understanding of the individual’s unique internal or external attribution of 
the meaning and value of their experienced pride may assist clinicians in gaining a more 
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thorough understanding and assessment of the impact of pride on psychological distress 
itself.
Cross-cultural Impact of Self-conscious Emotions on Psychological Distress
Shame was correlated with all measures of psychological problems across both 
cultures, with the exception of anxiety for Singaporeans. However, with separation guilt 
partialed out, shame lost its significant associations for the Singaporean participants only 
and remained correlated with psychological distress for Australian participants. These 
results provide new insight on the possible cross-cultural impact of separation guilt’s 
shared variance with shame in the experience of psychological distress. It appears that 
separation guilt, to which Singaporeans were found to experience greater proneness, may 
interact with shame’s relationship with psychological distress for Singaporeans. When 
examining shame’s relationship with psychological distress, with separation guilt 
controlled for, the results have indicated that shame associates strongly with all three 
measures of psychological distress for Australians only. 
While previous studies have documented a collectivistic valuation of shame (Wong 
& Tsai, 2007), as well as a greater tendency of collectivistic individuals to report shame-
proneness (Bedford & Hwang, 2003), the present study suggests that, with particular regard 
to collectivistic cultures, shame may be operating with shared variance in other culturally 
relevant self-conscious emotions, such as separation guilt, to result in psychological 
distress. The results suggest that the actual emotion of shame itself appears to only be 
related to psychological distress within an individualistic culture, such as Australia, 
suggesting a possibility that collectivistic cultures, which value interpersonal relationships, 
may have existing social support for coping with negative self-conscious emotions, such as 
shame. In contrast, individualistic cultures, such as Australia, that possess an independent 
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self-construal may have lesser interpersonal and social resources that could assist the 
individual in coping with negative emotions of shame. These current findings also lend 
support to Wong and Tsai’s (2007) argument that existing models of self-conscious 
emotions could be skewed toward an individualistic conceptualisation, and support the 
consideration of unique models of self-conscious emotions within collectivistic cultures.
With specific regard to Singaporeans only, hubristic pride correlated with all three 
measures of psychological distress. This finding is of particular interest, and suggests that, 
despite a general devaluation of the emotion of pride within collectivistic cultures (Eid & 
Diener, 2001), collectivistic individuals, when experiencing pride that arises from 
attributions to internal, stable, and uncontrollable causes, are more likely to experience 
symptoms of psychological distress – namely, symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. 
These findings appear to present conversely to the collectivistic relationship between shame 
and psychological distress. Building on previous studies’ theories of the collectivistic 
valuation of shame and devaluation of pride (Eid & Diener, 2001; Wong & Tsai, 2007), the 
results of the present study suggest that the collectivistic valuation of shame may work to 
promote healthy social mechanisms that assist with coping with shame. However, the 
collectivistic devaluation of pride may inhibit the individual’s willingness toward 
expressing and disclosing the emotion of hubristic pride, which may result in lesser social 
resources for assisting with the internalised experience of hubristic pride, an emotion that 
has been associated with psychological distress and antisocial behaviour. 
In contrast, the individualistic valuation of pride, as established in the literature (Eid 
& Diener, 2001), may explain the lack of a relationship between pride, both hubristic and 
authentic, and psychological distress for the Australian participants. However, the 
individualistic culture’s negative views towards experiencing shame and the self-criticism 
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associated with it (Bedford & Hwang, 2003; Kitayama et al., 1995), may result in less 
adaptive ways of coping with the emotion, which may explain the relationship between 
shame and psychological distress for Australians.
Effects of Age on Separation Guilt
The present study also explored significant age differences in the experience of 
shame, guilt and pride. Results indicated that such differences existed only for separation 
guilt. The younger group of young adults, aged 18-20 years old, was reported to experience 
more separation guilt than older young adults. In addition, Singaporeans significantly 
accounted for more separation guilt in two age groups (18-20 year-olds and 24-28 year-
olds) than Australians. However, due to the disproportionate sample sizes of Singaporeans 
and Australians in these age bands, the results obtained require cautious interpretation and 
further confirmation with a larger and more proportionate sample. Of interest, significant 
differences across cultures for this young adult cohort were found for separation guilt, but 
not for adaptive guilt or survivor guilt. Two possible explanations of this are: 1) It further 
confirms that guilt is a multi-faceted emotion in which some of its components are highly 
correlated but are distinct in more than one way; 2) In the younger cohort, the steep 
gradient in changes could be due to the unique emphasis and relevance of separation guilt 
during this particular developmental stage. It may be possible that the concept of survivor 
guilt may be more relevant and pronounced during later stages of a lifespan, due to the 
nature of survivor guilt that involves surviving others in various events or situations. Guilt 
felt over these situations may not be prevalent in the young adult cohort, taking into 
consideration that the average age for this study was 23 years old. The present study’s 
findings also converge with findings from Orth et al. (2010) and Bruno et al. (2009) that, 
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pan-culturally and across the human adult lifespan, females experience more guilt than 
males.
Limitations and Future Suggestions
The present study was one of the first investigations into the young adult cohort 
with regard to the self-conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and pride, as well as their 
culture-specific relationship with symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. Given the 
result of greater separation guilt-proneness in Singaporeans, as well as the shared variance 
between separation guilt and shame on psychological distress in the Singaporean sample, 
future studies should examine culture-specific relationships and path influences of self-
conscious emotions, between each other, as well as with measures of psychological 
distress. 
In the present study’s cross-cultural investigation of the experience of self-
conscious emotions and their relation to psychological well-being, findings have suggested 
the need to consider the mediating effect of external variables that may be influencing the 
impact of self-conscious emotions on psychological well-being. Given the present study’s 
finding of Singaporeans reporting a greater tendency to experience separation guilt, as well 
as the collectivistic valuation of families and caring for one’s aging parents, assessing for 
the mediating effects of variables such as filial piety may assist in expanding the 
understanding of the finer mechanisms behind the experience of separation guilt within a 
collectivistic culture. 
Future studies should consider analysing the path of influence between self-
conscious emotions, psychological well-being and culturally-relevant external variables 
that may mediate both the strength and the direction of relationships. The present study’s 
finding of separation guilt as a culturally unique self-conscious emotion not only 
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encourages an exploration of other mediating variables that may contribute to this effect, 
but also highlights the need to investigate the psychological impact of such emotions within 
their corresponding cultures. While Singaporeans may have been found to report a greater 
propensity to experience separation guilt, and while separation guilt has been found to be a 
predictor of symptoms of anxiety and stress, the collectivistic orientation of Singapore may 
already have a well-established healthy coping mechanism for young adults to function 
well with the anxiety and stress that is associated with separation guilt.
While the chosen measurements for shame, pride and guilt, as well as psychological 
well-being, provide a quantitative assessment of the experience of self-conscious emotions 
within the individual, conducting a qualitative analysis may assist with gaining a richer and 
more in-depth understanding of how shame, pride and guilt may operate in different 
cultures. Indeed, the results of the present study have suggested that there might exist a 
discrepancy between the valuation, or devaluation, of an emotion, and the levels of reported 
proneness towards experiencing such emotions using quantitative measures. A qualitative 
assessment would contribute to the richness of knowledge by expanding on the quantitative 
knowledge and gaining culture-rich information with regard to how and why these self-
conscious emotions are experienced within the cultural context itself.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2: A QUALITATIVE CROSS-CULTURAL EXPLORATION OF 
THE EXPERIENCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN YOUNG ADULTS
While studies have found fundamental differences in the experience of self-
conscious emotions in individualistic and collectivist cultures, very few have conducted 
cross-cultural, qualitative analyses investigating self-conscious emotions across a specific 
age group. Importantly, recent research has highlighted the lack of in-depth research with 
regard to possible differences in the experience of self-conscious emotions between 
cultures, with specific regard to the period of early adulthood. Indeed the period of early 
adulthood has been found to be the only period during which large differences in the 
trajectories of shame, guilt and pride were observed (Orth et al., 2010).
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3) (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) is one 
of the most frequently used quantitative measures of shame and guilt, and its validity has 
been repeatedly confirmed (Robins et al., 2007). The TOSCA includes 16 scenarios from 
everyday life and measures the likelihood of several common reactions to those situations. 
By using a set of widely varying hypothetical scenarios, the TOSCA corresponds to the 
design of trait measures of guilt and shame. Responses are measured on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not likely) to 5 (very likely).
Scenario-based methods have been most frequently used in research on individual 
differences in shame, guilt, and pride (Reimer, 1995; Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, 
Gramzow, & Fletcher, 1990). Tangney and colleagues (1996) argued that it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to reliably distinguish between shame and guilt using conventional global 
self-report methods (e.g., “I always feel guilt”). To assess guilt about behaviour, distinct 
from shame about self, it is argued to be necessary to assess emotions that are embedded in 
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specific situations – yet it is precisely the introduction of specific situations that makes 
scenario-based methods sensitive to cultural effects.
This current study aims to qualitatively investigate similarities and differences in 
shame, guilt, and pride, as assessed in individuals of either Australian-Caucasian or 
Singaporean-Asian ethnicity. The present study will also investigate the cultural sensitivity 
of the TOSCA-3, by means of conducting a qualitative interview-version of the TOSCA-3. 
The qualitative version will consist of eight scenarios that are similar to those of the 
TOSCA-3, and will allow participants to expand on their responses. Importantly, the 
qualitative nature of the study will allow for a richer understanding of shame, guilt and 
pride than a quantitative measure alone will be able to achieve. Finally, the present study 
seeks to investigate the robustness of the TOSCA-3 as an efficient and effective primary 
measure of self-conscious emotions across both individualistic and collectivist cultures.
Method
Participants
The current study was approved by the Murdoch University Research Ethics Office, 
Division of Research and Development (Ethics Approval number 2011/086). Participants 
were recruited by means of personal contact to participate in a qualitative study 
investigating the experience and expression of self-conscious emotions – shame, pride and 
guilt.
The inclusion criteria for the participants in the study were that participants be of 
Australian or Singaporean nationality, and that they were within the ages of 19 and 35 
years. In addition, Singaporean participants must not have resided in Australia for more 
than three months, so as to ensure that possible effects of the influences of the Australian 
culture on the Singaporean sample was kept to a minimum.
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Participants consisted of five Australians and five Singaporeans. The mean age of 
the participants was 26.3 years. Five of the participants were women, and five were men. 
The Singaporean sample consisted of three young women and two young men. The 
Australian sample consisted of two young women and three young men.
Measures
A semi-structured interview was designed to elicit existential accounts with regard 
to self-conscious emotions. The interview was designed for the purpose of ensuring that the 
TOSCA-3, a frequently used quantitative measure of self-conscious emotions, was 
culturally sensitive and sufficiently rigorous to use as a main measure of self-conscious 
emotions in future studies. The TOSCA-3 consists of 16 different scenarios that involve 
self-conscious emotions, specifically pride, shame and guilt. The interview was designed as 
an extended and qualitative interview-version of scenarios similar to those of the TOSCA-
3. 
The semi-structured interview consisted of eight hypothetical scenarios that were 
associated with shame, guilt and pride (see Appendix B for the full set of interview 
scenarios). The semi-structured interview consisted of descriptive questions, through which 
participants were asked to provide a general account of their feelings towards the scenarios.  
Interviews were audio-recorded with a Sony PX720 voice recorder and transcribed 
verbatim. 
Analysis
The data was analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
(Smith, 1995; Smith & Osborn, 2003). IPA is a qualitative research method that combines 
phenomenology with hermeneutics. It is phenomenological because of the focus on a 
detailed examination of the personal and lived experiences of the participants. Specifically, 
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IPA is concerned with attempting to understand how participants themselves make sense of 
their experiences. The main focus is on the meanings that these experiences have for the 
participants and not to produce objective data on the event itself. In this way, IPA involves 
two key processes: first, the participants are attributing meaning to their experiences; 
second, the researchers are trying to understand this process of meaning construction of the 
participants. Therefore, and in order to enhance the trustworthiness of the research process, 
it is necessary that the researcher try to set aside his or her own beliefs, thoughts and 
preconceived notions about the phenomenon under investigation, a process called 
“bracketing” (Willig, 2008). In this case, the participant is concentrating on making sense 
of his or her own experience of self-conscious emotions, and the researcher is attempting to 
comprehend that experience through the participant’s language and expressed emotion. The 
approach is both empathic and interrogative with close attention paid to cognition and 
emotion within the interview and pattern of speech and mode of expression in the 
transcript.
After each transcript was read through, first reflections, associations, and 
preliminary interpretations were noted down by the researcher. Next, keywords that 
captured the essential quality of the participants’ statements regarding helping processes 
were noted in the margin. At the same time, themes were listed on a separate sheet. Next, 
attempts were made to cluster the themes under master themes. With regard to the level of 
analysis, classification, which refers to the act of classifying meaning units or themes that 
emerged from the data, was used. With each subsequent transcript that was analysed, 
themes and master themes were continuously analysed and defined. Through this process, 
categorisation was refined and a more integrated set of master themes was developed. An 
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independent reviewer, who had access to participants’ transcripts and instructions on 
classification, verified the themes identified below.
Results
The qualitative analysis resulted in two recurring master themes: (1) Intrapersonal 
Experience of self-conscious emotions; and (2) Interpersonal Experience of self-conscious 
emotions. The different themes will be discussed consecutively in detail using descriptive 
statements, each time illustrated by one selected verbatim quotation of the participants. 
Master Theme 1: Intrapersonal Experience of Self-conscious Emotions
The intrapersonal experience of self-conscious emotions refers to participants’ 
personal and inward experience of the emotions of shame, guilt and pride. Within this 
master theme, two constituent themes emerged – (1) Locus of Control and Blame; and (2) 
The Intrapersonal Experience of Shame, Guilt, and Pride.
Constituent Theme 1: Locus of Control and Blame
The first constituent theme that pervaded participants’ accounts and reappeared 
throughout their accounts was the “locus of control and blame”. This locus of control and 
blame was elicited by the scenarios that related to hypothetical situations of failure or 
success, and emerged as one of the core factors that determined the experience of the 
occurrence or co-occurrence of self-conscious emotions. The individual’s self-awareness 
and self-reflection on the scenarios of failure or success appeared to undergo a cognitive 
process that assessed the internalisation or externalisation of control and blame. 
Individuals who appeared to employ an internal locus of control seemed to blame 
themselves for failure and appeared to experience their shortcomings as a harsh and 
intensely personal and berating experience. In a scenario that involved damaging a car that 
101
the individual borrowed from a friend, the emotion of shame was observed as a prevalent 
feeling that followed this self-berating process. 
“I would feel horrible about it because it would have been all my fault that it 
happened. I would be thinking to myself: how could I be so clumsy and stupid? I 
would want to fix it, but to be honest, I wouldn’t know where to put my face or how 
I would face my friend in the future. They would never lend me their car again. I’d 
probably put off fixing the car… I’m not sure what I’d do – it would be quite 
overwhelming for me” (Singaporean man, 20 years)
In contrast, individuals who accounted for an external locus of control seemed to 
place the cause of fault or failure on an external object or aspect that was clearly unrelated 
to their own ability or capability. It appeared that the emotion of guilt, more so than shame, 
often followed the train of consciousness for individuals who processed failure with an 
external locus of control. 
“I’d be feeling bad about what happened but I would do my best to get it fixed. 
Actually, I might even explain to my friend that it was a really tight parking lot and 
I didn’t mean to scratch his car. I’d explain the situation and let him know that I’m 
sorry and I will get it fixed.” (Australian woman, 20 years)
Likewise, hypothetical situations relating to success seemed to also follow a similar 
cognitive filter through which the processes of self-awareness and self-reflection would 
result in feelings of pride. In a scenario that involved an individual’s essay being publicly 
praised and read out by a tutor to the class, individuals who appeared to internalise success 
seemed to relate their achievement directly to their own personal ability and effort. In 
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addition, it was often found that these individuals would even project their success onto 
their personal self-worth and being. This form of pride seemed most consistent with 
hubristic pride.
“I would feel pretty awesome about myself cos it says something about me and 
what I can do to achieve. I guess on the outside, if the tutor read out my essay as a 
model essay, I wouldn’t want to attract attention to myself… But on the inside I’d 
be happy to know that I did better than others in class. I’d feel smarter than them.” 
(Singaporean woman, 20 years)
In contrast, individuals who appeared to have an external locus of control seemed to 
experience similar feelings of achievement satisfaction. What set them apart, however, was 
whether their attribution of their success was placed upon their ability or their self-worth. 
Unlike individuals with an internal locus of control, individuals with an external locus of 
control did not appear to internally relate their success directly onto their personal self – 
their focus was more on the act of achievement, rather than the self who achieved. 
“I’d be pretty proud and pleased that I wrote a good essay and that I did a good job. 
Obviously the effort would have paid off. I’d be happy that I did well and that my 
work was good enough to be read out by the tutor.” (Australian man, 20 years)
Constituent Theme 2: The Intrapersonal Experience of Shame, Guilt, and Pride
Shame
Shame appeared to be experienced as an intensely private and personal emotion that 
involved the perceiving of the self as unworthy in the eyes of the self or others. Participants 
related feelings of shame that highlighted intense negative feelings of inadequacy and a 
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threatened self-worth. It appeared that shame worked towards creating distance between the 
individual from others, especially others who could potentially evaluate the individual. It 
was noted that participants who appeared to react with feelings of shame occasionally 
displayed social behaviour that included speaking quietly, blushing, avoiding eye contact, 
and sitting in a slumped or hunched body posture. In a scenario that involved poor 
performance on exams despite investing much effort in preparation, participants who 
responded with shame-proneness often placed an emphasis on themselves as personal 
defects, keeping a strong focus on a self that was perceived as flawed. The notion of the 
failure to live up to standards of worth in the eyes of others, or their own selves, seemed to 
hold high relevance to these participants, and, in addition, they related a fear of being 
vulnerable to the possible judgement of others.
“I would feel terrible because if I’d known how much effort I put in it and I still did 
badly, I mean it says a lot. Either there’s something wrong about my studying style, 
or I’m a failure… You feel like a failure because you studied so hard but didn’t get 
the results… and also towards other people – you’ll be seen as a failure” 
(Singaporean woman, 20 years)
Guilt
Participants who appeared to react with guilt seemed to place great emphasis on 
their need and want to repair the damage caused by their wrongdoing. They related a form 
of emotional discomfort within them that seemed to catalyse the motivation towards 
amending the situation. In scenarios that involved damaging a car that was borrowed from a 
friend and spilling a drink on a friend’s new dress, participants accounted for an intensely 
unpleasant emotional discomfort that stemmed from their actions that were either 
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incongruous with social standards, or their personal moral standard. They were quick to 
vocalise their subsequent step of action, which was to rectify their wrongdoing and repair 
social relationships. These included proposed acts of actively fixing the situation, making 
reparations, apologising, confessing or seeking forgiveness. The individual’s focus on the 
act of wrongdoing, and the subsequent planning towards rectifying the misdeed seemed to 
invoke a sense of personal consolation in participants. It was noted that participants initially 
presented as distressed when accounting for their feelings of guilt. However, they appeared 
to regain a calmer and brighter disposition once they started to speak about specific actions 
that they could take to amend their hypothetical act of wrongdoing.
“I’d be feeling guilty… like they’ve trusted me with their car, and I’ve done some 
damage to something that’s not mine… But after a couple of minutes, I’d be 
thinking ‘It’s okay, we can sort this out’. I’d try to think of how I can fix it for 
them” (Australian man, 19 years)
Pride
The two facets of pride – authentic and hubristic – pervaded participants’ accounts 
in their responses to scenarios that involved hypothetical situations of success, which 
included success in academics, family and friendship dimensions. It appeared that pride, in 
general, was experienced as a positive self-conscious emotion, which, in participants’ 
accounts, was stated to make them feel good about themselves. Participants linked their 
reactions to emotions such as happiness, contentment and satisfaction. 
The distinguishing factor for the experience of authentic or hubristic pride lay in 
whether participants attributed their sense of pride to an internal, unstable and controllable 
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cause (effort) – resulting in authentic pride, or to an internal, stable and uncontrollable 
cause (ability) – resulting in hubristic pride. 
Of interest, the nature of the inward experience of hubristic pride in Singaporean 
participants was found to not necessarily match its outward experience. In a scenario that 
involved the individual receiving a compliment on their attire, hubristic pride appeared to 
be experienced as an intensely private emotion that presented mainly within the 
individual’s private thoughts and feelings. This contrasted with the Australian participants’ 
accounts that involved hubristic pride. It seemed as though Australian participants were 
more likely to seek to communicate with others about their personal thoughts and feelings 
regarding their achievement.
“I would be really glad, because it means I look great. I’d feel great about myself. 
Honestly, I’d be feeling on top of the world… I would just say ‘Oh, thanks’ and talk 
about how I got it on sale… No I wouldn’t share it (participant’s feelings) with 
them.” (Singaporean woman, 26 years)
Master Theme 2: Interpersonal Experience of self-conscious emotions
The interpersonal experience of self-conscious emotions refers to participants’ 
experience of the emotions of shame, guilt and pride pertaining to their social interaction 
with others. Within this master theme, two constituent themes emerged – (1) Familial 
relationships; and (2) Non-familial social relationships.
Constituent Theme 1: Familial Relationships
Cluster Theme 1: Filial Piety
The concept of filial piety emerged as a significant cultural factor that differentiated 
Singaporean participants’ experience of shame and guilt from Australian participants’ 
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experience of those emotions. While the notion of familial bonds seemed to be important 
for both Australians and Singaporeans, there appeared to be a strong feeling of 
responsibility and obligation towards remaining filial towards parents for Singaporean 
participants. In a scenario that involved the failure to fulfil a promise that was made to the 
individual’s parents, Singaporean participants accounted for feelings of guilt that included 
an intense urgency to repair their wrongdoing as soon as they could. Of interest, a sense of 
shame was present in their reaction as well, whereby negative self-evaluation in the form of 
self-blame appeared to take place in Singaporean participants’ accounts. There appeared to 
be a focus on the consequences of their failure to live up to the promise that they made to 
their parents, which included the possibility of their parents’ disappointment in them, 
possible hurt inflicted upon the parent, and a disappointment in themselves for causing 
disruption in their parents’ general well-being. Despite the co-occurrence of shame and 
guilt in Singaporean participants, the urgency to make amends and repair the relationship 
with their parents seemed to be of greater importance than the inwardly-directed shame.
“She’s my mother, I have an obligation to her, and I’ve obviously hurt her 
feelings… I’d feel terrible… I’d try to rush down and see how she is.” (Singaporean 
woman, 26 years)
While Australian participants accounted for plans to rectify the situation, it appeared 
that their predominant focus was on the self, rather than on the relationship that they had 
with their parents. Australian participants accounted for feeling guilt that stemmed from 
their own failure at fulfilling an action that they had set out to do. It appeared that their 
experienced guilt was directed at themselves for their incapacity to carry out their promise. 
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In addition, unlike their Singaporean counterparts, there did not appear to be a presence of 
shame in their account for the scenario regarding filial piety.
“I would feel guilty because I’ve made a promise and I haven’t kept it. And that is 
important to me. I’d feel bad and guilty, and a bit like I’ve disappointed them and 
myself… Because I said something is going to happen and I was meant to go 
through with it, but something failed in the process. So therefore, it was my doing 
that didn’t allow it to happen.” (Australian man, 32 years)
Cluster Theme 2: Sibling Relationships
Group-conscious emotions emerged as an important theme in participants’ accounts 
with regard to a scenario that involved the individual’s relationship with a hypothetical 
sibling. In the scenario, both the individual and the individual’s sibling were applying for 
the same prestigious course at university. Participants are then advised that the individual’s 
sibling is subsequently successful at gaining entrance to the course, while the individual is 
not. When participants were asked how they would feel about the situation, Singaporean 
participants initially appeared to focus solely on their feelings towards the sibling who 
succeeded them. Specifically, they accounted for feelings of jealousy, and even hatred, that 
was directed at the sibling. In addition, the Singaporean participants expressed feelings of 
internally-directed shame after the interviewer requested them to explore feelings that they 
had towards themselves. They reported feelings of intense disappointment and self-blame at 
what they perceived as failure.
“I’d feel really terrible, actually. Because if you really want to get into some place 
and you can’t get in, especially if you’ve worked harder than your brother… I’d be 
very disappointed with myself. (When asked about feelings towards the individual’s 
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sibling) I’d feel like it was unfair, maybe a bit angry towards your brother. But it’s 
an unspoken thing. You won’t express it on the outside, because it’s not his fault. 
You just move on, but just don’t talk to your brother – because you won’t want to 
know how he’s doing.” (Singaporean woman, 23 years)
“I guess I wouldn’t be very happy, because coming from an Asian family, my 
parents and relatives can be sometimes a little nosey. And sometimes I feel it’s not 
right, but they might be insensitive and highlight the fact that he got in and I didn’t. 
At the next meeting with them, I’d really be dreading meeting my relatives. (When 
inquired about personal feelings) Internally, I wouldn’t be happy. I’d probably feel 
quite bad about myself and unhappy (Singaporean woman, 26 years)
In contrast, Australian participants initially focused on emotions that were related to 
the self. Specifically, they accounted for feelings of anger and injustice towards the 
situation, rather than at themselves. The Australian participants, in general, did not appear 
to relate the situation of failure to their self-worth, and it seemed that their main focus was 
on the possible explanations for the situation of failure. For example, they explored reasons 
that could explain why they did not perform well enough, which included the lack of 
invested effort, or problems with the assessment methodology. In addition, it was of 
interest to note that most of the Australian participants did not account for feelings that they 
had towards their sibling, unless they were prompted by the interviewer. 
I’d be very angry with myself. I don’t see it as a competition as such, but more a 
reflection of my own abilities. So if I didn’t get in, it’s because I didn’t do the work. 
Not defective as a whole person, just a little part of me that didn’t perform well 
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enough. (When asked about feelings towards the sibling) Depends on the 
relationship with my brother, if I’m really chummy with him, I might be really 
happy for him. (Australian man, 27 years)
“There’d be a mixture. I’d be quite torn about that. Because I’d be extremely 
disappointed, and I’d take it all on as I haven’t done a good enough job. So there’d 
be that aspect, but then I’d also be really, really pleased for my brother. There’d 
probably be a bit of jealousy as well – at his success. So that’d be a really 
complicated emotional experience.” (Australian woman, 32 years) 
Constituent Theme 2: Non-familial Social Relationships
Other in-group members who were not related to the individual’s family were also 
found to impact the experience and expression of self-conscious emotions. Of interest, 
certain cultural differences were found to emerge in Singaporean and Australian 
participants’ accounts for situations that involved public exposure to one’s failures and 
shortcomings. In the hypothetical scenario that involved a work setting, the individual had 
committed a mistake at work that resulted in the boss publicly shouting at the individual. 
Participants were requested to comment on their feelings after being publicly berated by the 
boss. In addition, they were also asked how they would have felt if fellow colleagues had 
enquired about how they were feeling. Singaporean participants were found to account for 
intense feelings of guilt at their committed mistake, as well as an internalised shame for 
their wrongdoing and the public exposure of their mistake. Furthermore, they accounted for 
a sense of humiliation that appeared to particularly, and directly, affect their self-worth and 
self-esteem. With regard to their feelings associated with colleagues enquiring about the 
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situation and their well-being, Singaporean participants were found to account for feelings 
of shame, which resulted in a general withdrawal from social support. There did not appear 
to be any intention to share their feelings with other in-group members.
“Being yelled at for my mistake, I would feel hurt. I must have done really badly. 
Outwardly, I would be frustrated at the situation… Inwardly, I would feel guilty 
because it’s something that I could have stopped and prevented. (When asked about 
their feelings when colleagues enquired about the situation) I would just make a 
joke out of it. I guess I would be defensive, I’ll make a joke out of it so they 
wouldn’t ask anymore… “ (Singaporean woman, 25 years)
By contrast, Australian participants firstly accounted for strong feelings of 
anxiousness, stress, and anger towards the individual’s boss for the public exposure of their 
misdeed. In addition, they reported feelings of guilt towards the act of wrongdoing that was 
associated with regret, as well as a desire to avoid the mistake in the future. Of interest, 
Australian participants appeared to react with feelings of appreciation for what they 
construed as social support from their co-workers and friends in the situation of public 
exposure to their failure. Most of the Australian participants reported that they would share 
their feelings about the situation with their colleagues who had enquired about it, stating 
that they would feel as though they had a network that cared for them.
“I’d feel anxiety and stress… that they’ve shouted at me for it. But there’s no reason 
why they should have shouted at me. I guess I must have done something really 
wrong. (When asked about colleagues enquiring about the situation) I’d feel good 
that they’re concerned, and I’d feel supported… like I’m a part of a supportive 
group and that I’m not alone.” (Australian man, 27 years)
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Discussion
The present study investigated the cultural sensitivity of an adapted qualitative 
interview-version of the TOSCA-3 on Australian-Caucasian and Singaporean-Asian 
individuals aged between 19 and 35 years.  The qualitative nature of the present study 
sought to explore and attain a richer understanding of the experiences of shame, guilt and 
pride across and within cultures, beyond that of the ability of a quantitative measure. The 
two major themes that emerged as crucial cultural and universal factors pertaining to self-
conscious emotions were the intrapersonal nature of the experience of self-conscious 
emotions, and the interpersonal nature of the experience of self-conscious emotions. 
Although this study utilised a different methodology (Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis) compared to other studies, the findings are consistent with 
most clinical and research reports of both universal and cross-cultural experiences of 
shame, guilt and pride. In line with cross-cultural studies that have found greater levels of 
shame and guilt for individuals from collectivist cultures compared to individuals of 
individualistic cultures (Kashima et al., 1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1998; Miller, 2002), the 
present study found a consistency with the theme of shame and guilt to be reported by 
Singaporean participants. Researchers have theoretically and empirically established the 
moral value of guilt and self-criticism in collectivistic cultures such as Asia (Campos et al., 
2007; Eid & Diener, 2001), and the present study’s finding of guilt and shame-proneness in 
Singaporeans supports previous findings that shame and guilt, in collectivist cultures, 
provide for the opportunity to self-reflect on one’s weakness and to work towards self-
improvement to meet shared social standards. It should be noted that the degree of guilt and 
shame-proneness that was accounted for by Singaporean participants might not necessarily 
reflect a high amount of guilt or shame in Singaporeans. While researchers have argued that 
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shame has been considered to be a maladaptive response for the individual who experiences 
it, shame might serve as an internal deterrent that prevents individuals from engaging in 
wrongful behaviour in the first place (Heery et al., 2003; Tangney et al., 1996). It could 
well be possible that shame, in particular, might motivate avoidant-behaviours in 
Singaporeans in the short run, while motivating a desire to change the self, so as to avoid 
situations of shame over time.
In addition, the present study has found that both shame and guilt can co-occur for 
Singaporeans in scenarios that were shown to only elicit guilt in Australians. Despite the 
co-occurrence of shame and guilt for Singaporeans, the present study found a general trend 
where Singaporeans emphasised a final reparative behaviour that was predominantly 
motivated by guilt, with a specific motive of repairing broken social relationships. This 
finding is consistent with the literature that has documented the collectivistic self to be 
defined by the individual’s social roles and relationships, whereby the opinions of others 
have been found to be greatly influential on the individual’s sense of self (Kashima et al., 
1995; Markus & Kitayama, 1998).
In contrast to their Singaporean counterparts, the emotions of guilt and shame were 
reported to be experienced differently for Australians. In situations that involved failure, 
Australian participants accounted for feelings of guilt that stemmed from an external locus 
of control. Australian participants were found to express regret at the wrongdoing, rather 
than at their own self. In addition they expressed a motivation towards engaging in 
reparative acts to amend the wrongdoing. This pattern of guilt was found to be consistent 
with the established literature, in which guilt appears to stem from the attribution of a 
negative act to controllable behaviours carried out by the self (Lickel et al., 2007; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004a). The nature of the experience of guilt by Australian participants’ could also 
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be explained by studies that have emphasised the individualistic self to be largely defined 
by their identity as an independent self who is unique and autonomous (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), and is driven towards the attainment of affirmed and stable positive 
attributes (Heine et al., 2001). By being more inclined to experiencing guilt, as compared to 
shame, individuals from individualistic cultures, such as Australia, could be working 
towards protecting their sense of self-esteem and self-worth, keeping the latter two 
concepts intact in their pursuit of an autonomous self with stable positive attributes.
The concept of filial piety emerged as a pivotal cross-cultural theme that had 
specific relevance to shame and guilt, as well as to the Singaporean culture. Singaporeans 
accounted for intense feelings of shame and guilt in response to situations that involved 
their wrongdoing in relation to their parents, or towards figures of authority. This 
contrasted greatly against the Australian respondents, who related their guilt to stem from a 
behaviour that was inconsistent with certain positive self-attributes. In line with research 
that has documented the sheer importance and prevalence of filial piety in Asian cultures, 
the present study found that Singaporeans placed extensive importance on feeling directly 
responsible for their parents’ happiness. In addition, the present study was also able to 
uniquely explore the internal experience within the individual during hypothetical situations 
involving filial piety, with specific regard to the proneness towards feeling shame and guilt, 
as elicited by situations of filial piety. Filial piety is, indeed, a central concept in a 
Confucianistic Asian society such as Singapore, and the present study has contributed to the 
literature by further exploring the dual filial piety model proposed by Yeh (2003). 
Reciprocal filial piety was observed to emerge as a theme especially for Singaporeans, who 
reported a sense of satisfaction at their ability to provide and care for their parents out of 
gratitude for their efforts in raising them. However, a major theme of authoritarian filial 
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piety was observed in the Singaporean sample as well, with specific regard to the internal 
experience of shame and guilt within the individual. Responses that involved authoritarian 
filial piety involved situations that related to the individual’s shame and guilt at their 
inability to emotionally and physically provide for their parents. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that Singaporeans also reported an obligation towards meeting their parents’ needs, at 
the expense of their own desires and wishes. This compliance with the individual’s parents’ 
wishes and the force of role requirements, together with the consequential shame and guilt 
experienced internally, reflect and further illuminate the authoritarian filial piety aspect of 
the dual filial piety model (Yeh, 2003). 
The present study found group-conscious emotions to penetrate through various 
levels of social life, setting the standards for not only families, but also communities and 
political behaviour. In situations that involved figures of authority in the workplace, 
Singaporeans were observed to behave submissively and respectfully towards the 
hypothetical figure of authority. Additionally, they reported internal feelings of shame and 
guilt at their perceived failure. In contrast, Australians were found to report feelings that 
were consistent with guilt and anger that were directed externally at the behaviour and the 
situation of failure. Of interest, the internalisation and self-blaming aspect of shame that 
was experienced by Singaporeans was reported to result in the tendency to withdraw, which 
consequentially led to a decrease in social support. By contrast, Australians appeared to be 
open to and accepting of the notion of social support. While the tendency to withdraw from 
social support may be perceived as an act that works towards preserving social harmony, 
the present study’s findings of Singaporeans’ guilt and shame that occur due to the 
pervasiveness of collectivistic values raise questions regarding the expense at which such 
pervasive values are practised.
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Authentic pride was found to be generally consistent for both the Australian and 
Singaporean sample across the scenarios. In addition, the present study’s findings also 
supported previous research that observed a greater likelihood for Asians to experience 
hubristic pride than Caucasians. In the present study, Singaporeans were found to attribute 
and internalise their personal achievements to reflect directly onto their personal self-worth. 
In contrast, Australians were more likely to attribute their achievements to the affirmation 
of their unique positive attributes. Beyond exploring the cross-cultural experience of pride, 
the present study was also able to explore the nature of the expression of pride in 
Singaporeans and Australians. Singaporeans, in general, were found to experience hubristic 
pride only in an internalised form – through thoughts and feelings. Singaporeans 
emphasised their reluctance to exhibit behavioural cues that might reveal their feelings of 
pride, and reported an unwillingness to share their feelings of hubristic pride with others, 
even with members who were part of their close social group. In this case, the intensity of 
the experience of hubristic pride within the individual was found to be inconsistent with the 
level of behavioural expression of the feeling. This finding further illuminates the 
experience of pride in collectivist cultures, shedding light on the discrepancy between the 
experience and the expression of pride in individuals from collectivist cultures. In addition, 
the present study also found that Australians were observed to be generally open towards 
sharing their internal experience of authentic or hubristic pride with members of their social 
group. 
Future studies should investigate some of the key findings of the present study. 
Specifically, the relation of filial piety to the experience of shame and guilt to collectivist 
cultures requires more in-depth and empirical analyses. In addition, the experience of 
elicited shame in both a public and private context should be further explored, with specific 
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regard to a cross-cultural analysis. Importantly, the nature of the co-occurrence of shame 
and guilt within the individual, with specific regard to the interaction between both guilt 
and shame, and the discrepancy between the internal experience and the external expression 
of shame, guilt and pride, both universally and cross-culturally, is also recommended for 
further exploration.
Future research should also consider Asian emigrants to western cultures, with 
specific regard to the generational effects on filial piety and self-conscious emotions. It may 
be that Asian emigrants face certain challenges of living in cultures that may not understand 
or endorse traditional values such as filial piety, and this may impact on the internal and 
external experience and evolution of these values from one generation of emigrants to 
another. It would be of interest to investigate the children of emigrants, who may become 
more acculturated to an individualistic culture and may therefore potentially reject 
traditional collectivist values.
Certain potential limitations of the present study need to be addressed. It should be 
noted that the small sample size of participants resulted in the need for cautious 
interpretations of the data with regard to self-conscious emotions and gender within a 
specific nationality. In addition, the IPA methodology of the present study meant that the 
depth and richness of data collected was subject to the extent that participants were willing 
to disclose such personal information. Researchers have highlighted the need for a 
particular focus on the experience of shame, guilt and pride during the period of early 
adulthood, and the present study has specifically addressed this and contributed to the 
literature through the qualitative exploration of these self-conscious emotions. The present 
study has also been able to highlight specific and vital differences in the experience of 
shame, guilt and pride between Australians and Singaporeans. The interview method of 
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data collection has also allowed for the attainment of qualitative responses that have 
provided for a deeper understanding of the experience and expression of shame, guilt and 
pride within and between an individualistic and collectivistic culture. Importantly, data 
from the present study has also supported the cultural sensitivity and robustness of the 
TOSCA-3 as a quantitative measure of self-conscious emotions. 
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3: THE IMPACT OF FILIAL PIETY ON THE EXPERIENCE OF 
SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS IN YOUNG ADULTHOOD
Self-conscious Emotions: Cultural Concerns
In November 2012, Gallup published results of an international poll where it was 
reported that Singapore ranked as the “least emotional country in the world” (Clifton, 
2012). Specifically, it was reported that “Singaporeans are the least likely in the world to 
report experiencing emotions of any kind on a daily basis” (Clifton, 2012). Gallup claimed 
that the 36% of Singaporeans who reported feeling either what they termed “positive” or 
“negative” emotions was the lowest percentage in the world. In contrast, 50% of 
Australians were reported to experience emotions of any kind on a daily basis. 
The present study challenges the Gallup poll’s bold claim that Singaporeans are 
“emotionless”, and suggests that issues of methodology and cultural factors should be 
considered in examining cultural differences in the study of emotions. Firstly, the Gallup 
poll posed questions that related to basic emotions, where examples of the poll’s questions 
included “Did you smile or laugh a lot yesterday?” and “Did you experience the following 
feelings (enjoyment, worry, stress, anger, physical pain) during a lot of the day yesterday?” 
Indeed, it is clear that the content of the poll’s questions related purely to basic emotions, 
which differ greatly from self-conscious emotions that require self-evaluation and that are 
complicated in their relationship with psychological distress (Kim, Thibodeau, & 
Jorgensen, 2011). In addition, the results of the Gallup poll raise questions in relation to the 
discrepancy between the inward experience and the outward expression of emotions, as 
well as relevant cultural differences in the inward experience and outward expression of 
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emotions – let alone self-conscious emotions. Moreover, the research evidence in the 
current program of research in this thesis challenges that of the Gallup poll.
Study 2 (Qualitative Study) has shed light on the collectivistic individual’s internal 
experience of self-conscious emotions, and how it may differ from the manner in which it is 
actually expressed outwardly. Additionally, Study 1 (Pilot Study) found that Singaporeans 
experience significantly more separation guilt than Australians, suggesting that there are 
certain specific self-conscious emotions that Singaporeans experience more than 
Australians. Importantly, Study 1 (Pilot Study) also found that when hubristic pride is 
experienced, and its shared variance with separation guilt is controlled for, Singaporeans, 
when compared to their Australian counterparts, were more likely to experience 
psychological distress, such as symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. In contrast, no 
relationship was found between hubristic pride and psychological distress for Australians. 
Study 1 found that Singaporeans were more prone than their Australian counterparts 
to experience maladaptive separation guilt. Despite this, no statistically significant cultural 
differences emerged for measures on shame, adaptive and survival guilt, or hubristic and 
authentic pride. With specific regard to psychological distress, Study 1 found that when 
Singaporeans experienced shame, the latter was not associated with symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and stress. However, shame experienced by Australians was found to 
be associated with psychological distress. Interestingly, Study 1 also found that when 
Singaporeans, but not Australians, experienced hubristic pride, the latter was associated 
with psychological distress. The findings of Study 1 highlight key cultural variations in the 
function of different self-conscious emotions, as well as the psychological impact on the 
individual. 
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Study 2 qualitatively examined cultural differences in the experience of self-
conscious emotions, through its qualitative adaptation of the TOSCA-3 measure. The 
findings of Study 2 highlighted unique cultural differences in the experience of shame and 
guilt, whereby the concept of filial piety emerged as a major point of reference for 
Singaporeans in their experience of self-conscious emotions. In addition, Study 2 also shed 
light on the possibility of a discrepancy that may exist between the internal experience and 
external expression of self-conscious emotions, especially within a collectivistic culture. 
For example, it was found that while Singaporeans reported that they would experience 
hubristic pride intrapersonally (inwardly), they reported that they would not be inclined to 
express the hubristic pride interpersonally (outwardly). Singaporeans expressed an 
acknowledgment of a cultural devaluation of pride, and stated that they would keep the 
emotion of hubristic pride private, a finding that converged with research that had 
documented an interpersonal-orientation within collectivistic cultures. In contrast, 
Australians were found to readily experience and express the emotion of hubristic pride, 
supporting studies that have argued for the independent self’s strive for personal 
enhancement. 
Gender Differences in the Experience of Self-conscious Emotions
In general, women have long been stereotyped as generally more emotional than 
men (Barratt & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Brody & Hall, 2008; Shields, 2002). However, some 
variation exists in the direction of gender differences with regard to specific basic emotions. 
Women are stereotyped as experiencing more awe, distress, fear, happiness, love, sadness, 
shyness, surprise and sympathy than men, whereas men are stereotyped as experiencing 
more anger than women (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000). With regard to the 
experience of self-conscious emotions, women have been stereotyped as experiencing 
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greater levels of guilt and shame, whereas men have been stereotyped as experiencing more 
pride (Plant et al., 2000). Interestingly, ethnic variation has been evidenced for gender 
stereotypes, with larger gender differences found among Caucasians than African 
Americans, Latin Americans and Asian Americans (Durik et al., 2006). Studies have found 
empirical evidence that suggests that while women may generally express more emotion 
and emotional intensity than men, there exists mixed evidence of gender differences in 
emotional experience (Grossman & Wood, 1993; Shields, 2002). With respect to self-
conscious emotions, studies have documented a pattern of gender similarities in authentic 
pride, women scoring higher on shame and guilt, and men scoring higher on hubristic pride 
(Brody & Hall, 2008; Ferguson & Eyre, 2000; Roberts & Goldenberg, 2007; Tracy & 
Robins, 2007a).
Hypotheses
Guided by theories in the existing literature, as well as empirical findings of Studies 
1 and 2, the present study was an explorative study that aimed to investigate cultural and 
gender differences between young Australian and Singaporean adults, with regard to 
shame, guilt (adaptive and separation guilt), hubristic and authentic pride, as well as 
reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety. The present study also sought to explore culture-
specific relationships between self-conscious emotions, as well as attitudes towards filial 
piety, and various aspects of psychological distress. It was hypothesised that Singaporeans, 
as compared to Australians, would report greater levels of separation guilt and hubristic 
pride. Young Singaporean adults were also hypothesised to report higher levels of 




The current study was approved by the Murdoch University Research Ethics Office, 
Division of Research and Development (Ethics Approval number 2012/033). Data used for 
the present study was collected via the Murdoch University’s Social and Community On-
line Research Database (SCORED) system, a website that provides access to a wide variety 
of psychological studies (http://scored.murdoch.edu.au) (see Appendix C for the full 
questionnaire). Participants were recruited using several strategies: The Murdoch 
University Subject Pool Research website and via a Facebook website page that provided 
the link to the study published on SCORED.
Psychology students from Murdoch University received an hour’s worth of subject 
pool credit in return for their participation. The rest of the participants had the option of 
participating in a draw to win a $500 Apple voucher. The survey data was kept separate 
from the incentive entry list to ensure anonymity. 
The original sample consisted of 443 individuals. Only completed questionnaires 
from individuals who were within the age range of 18 to 35 years of age were included in 
the analysis. Consequently, the data from six participants aged 14, 15, and 17 years of age 
were excluded. The final sample consisted of 182 Singaporeans and 189 Australians. In 
alignment with the present study’s aim of investigating specific cultural differences, 
individuals of nationalities other than Australian and Singaporean (n = 66) were excluded 
from the data analysis. Table 7 shows the demographics of Australian and Singaporean 
participants. The mean age of participants was 24.9 years (SD = 4.56, range = 18-35). Of 
the total sample, 49.6% were Australians and 50.4% were Singaporeans.
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Table 7
Demographics based on Nationality







Australians 189 36 153 23.50 4.87 100.0 0
Singaporeans 182 54 128 26.27 3.73 25.7 74.3
Whole sample 371 90 281 24.86 4.56 63.9 36.1
Measures 
Demographics. Demographic data on gender, age, occupation, nationality and 
country of residence were collected. 
The current study utilised some measures that were identical to Study 1. These 
measures included the TOSCA-3, DASS and MACSA-R.
The Test Of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA-3; Tangney et al., 2000) In the present 
study, the alpha coefficient for the test as a whole was .80. The alpha coefficients for the 
shame, guilt, hubristic pride and authentic pride subscales were .80, .75, .51 and .52, 
respectively. 
     Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire – 67 (IGQ-67; O’Connor et al., 1997; Bruno et al., 
2009) For the purposes of the present study, only the Separation Guilt Scale was used. The 
original 16-item subscale was trimmed down to 13 items. This process of elimination 
excluded items that had the lowest factor correlation to the overall subscale measure in 
Study 1. Responses to items are given on a 5-point Likert-type scale and scores are 
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calculated by summing up the items’ scores under each subscale. For the present study, the 
alpha coefficient was .82 for Separation Guilt.
Authentic and Hubristic Pride Scales (Tracy & Robins, 2007c) This measure is an 
expansion of the original Authentic and Hubristic Pride Scales (Tracy & Robins, 2007c). Its 
modification includes scales for both shame and guilt. The scales are a trait version 
measure of shame, guilt, authentic and hubristic pride. The shame scale includes items such 
as “disgraced” and “devalued”, and the guilt scale includes items such as “remorseful” and 
“regretful”. Analyses of internal consistency resulted in a Cronbach alpha of .88 for the 
Authentic Pride scale, .88 for the Hubristic Pride scale, .88 for the Shame scale, and .79 for 
the Guilt scale. The alpha coefficient for the test as a whole was .87.
 Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). In this 
present study, the alpha coefficients for the following scales of the DASS are: Depression 
scales .90, Anxiety scales .83, Stress scales .86 and DASS overall .93.
Modified Affective Control Scale for Adolescents – Revised (MACSA-R; Geddes & 
Dziurawiec, 2007). The MACSA-R is a revised and shorter version of the Modified 
Affective Control Scale for Adolescents (MACS-A; Geddes & Dziurawiec, 2007). Geddes 
and Dziurawiec (2007) adapted the 42-item Affective Control Scale (ACS) originally 
developed by Williams, Chambless, and Ahrens (1997) to create the MACS-A. The 
MACSA-R is an 18-item self-report measure of the fear of various emotions, which is 
defined as a fear of losing control over one’s emotions and one’s reactions to emotions. The 
MACSA-R is comprised of three subscales: Fear of Anxiety, Fear of Depressed Mood and 
Anger, and Lack of Control of Anxiety. In the present study, the alpha coefficient for the 
test as a whole was .91. The specific subscales of Fear of Anxiety, Fear of Depressed Mood 
and Anger, and Lack of Control of Anxiety were .84, .87, and .70, respectively.
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Dual Filial Piety Scale (DFPS; Yeh & Bedford, 2003). The DFPS is a 16-item self-
report measure of both reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety. Respondents indicated how 
important each statement was to them. Examples of items measuring reciprocal filial piety 
included “Hurry home upon the death of a parent, regardless of how far away you live” and 
“Be grateful to parents for raising you”. Authoritarian items included “Live with parents 
even after marriage” and “Compliment your parents when needed to save their face”. For 
the present study, analysis of internal consistency resulted in a Cronbach alpha of .88 for 
the reciprocal and .80 for the authoritarian filial piety subscales. The overall Cronbach 
alpha was .87 for the entire measure.
Results
Cultural Effects on Self-conscious Emotions
A series of MANOVAs was conducted to assess for the effect of nationality on 
specific self-conscious emotions. The self-conscious emotions were grouped into four main 
groups: 1) Maladaptive separation guilt and filial piety; 2) Shame; 3) Adaptive guilt 
(TOSCA-3 Guilt subscale and Adjective-Scales Guilt subscale); and 4) Pride (Both 
hubristic and authentic subscales of the TOSCA-3 Pride and Adjective Pride Scales). For 
the purpose of conducting an exploratory study, a Bonferroni adjustment to the alpha level 
of .05 was not conducted for the analyses. The present study’s exploratory aim is not to 
prove or replicate existing theories and models, but to explore the possible existence of the 
impact of culture on measures of specific self-conscious emotions and filial piety. Table 8 
below shows the correlations between measures of filial piety and the self-conscious 
emotions. 
For separation guilt and its relationship with other self-conscious emotions and 
attitudes towards filial piety, the strongest positive correlation was observed to occur 
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between separation guilt and authoritarian filial piety. Weaker and moderate correlations 
were observed between separation guilt and reciprocal filial piety, shame and guilt. There 
was also a weak, negative correlation between separation guilt and authentic pride.  
Results indicated that reciprocal filial piety shared moderate, positive correlations 
with authoritarian filial piety and guilt, as measured by the guilt scale. Additionally, there 
was a weak, positive correlation between reciprocal filial piety and authentic pride, as 
measured by the Authentic Pride Scale. Weak, positive correlations were found between 
authoritarian filial piety and shame, guilt and pride.
There was a strong, positive correlation between the TOSCA-Shame and the 
TOSCA-Guilt scales. Additionally, a moderate, positive correlation was found between the 
TOSCA-Shame and the Shame Scale measures. In general, moderate to strong, positive 
correlations were found between shame and guilt. There was also a moderate, positive 
correlation between shame, as measured by the Shame Scale, and hubristic pride, as 
measured by the Hubristic Pride Scale. A moderate and negative correlation was also found 
to exist between shame and authentic pride, as measured by the Authentic Pride Scale. 
When adaptive guilt was measured by the Guilt Scale, a moderate, positive 
correlation was found between adaptive guilt and hubristic pride (Hubristic Pride Scale). In 
contrast, the TOSCA-Guilt Scale revealed a weak, negative correlation between adaptive 
guilt and hubristic pride (Hubristic Pride Scale). There was also a weak, negative 
correlation between adaptive guilt, as measured by the Guilt Scale, and authentic pride, as 
measured by the Authentic Pride Scale. 
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Table 8
Correlations of measures of Self-Conscious Emotions and Filial Piety (Australians above the diagonal, Singaporeans below diagonal)
*p < .05; **p < .01
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Separation Guilt - .38** .58** .19* .14 .23** .26** -.08 -.03 -.13 -.10
2. Reciprocal Filial 
Piety
.44** - .43** .17* .28** .07 .20** .08 .12 .05 .09
3. Authoritarian Filial 
Piety
.66** .43** - .11 .04 .14 .13 -.09 -.07 -.03 .01
4. TOSCA-Shame .41** .22** .27** - .50** .36** .32** .06 .04 .09 -.28**
5. TOSCA-Guilt .17* .42** .08 .54** - .12 .19** -.002 .10 -.14 -.07
6. Shame Scale .23** -.15* .13 .24** .04 - .69** -.05 -.04 .26** -.29**
7. Guilt Scale .32** .06 .18* .34** .13 .66** - -.18* -.09 .38** -.23**
8. TOSCA- Hubristic 
Pride
.02 .07 .06 .02 .08 .05 -.08 - .70** .01 .19*
9. TOSCA- Authentic 
Pride
.08 .02 .06 .07 .15* .01 -.01 .77** - .02 .19**
10. Hubristic Pride 
Scale
.14 -.19* .16* .12 -.14** .50** .45** .08 .10 - .10
11. Authentic Pride 
Scale
-.06 .16* -.02 -.16* .09 -.13 -.15* .30** .25** .08 -
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Maladaptive Separation Guilt and Filial Piety Analysis
In examining whether the experience of separation guilt and filial piety (reciprocal 
and authoritarian) differed between nationality and gender, a two-way between groups 
MANOVA was performed. The three dependent variables used were the IGQ-separation 
guilt subscale and the two DFPS subscales: reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety. The 
independent variable was nationality (Australian and Singaporean). Preliminary assumption 
testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious 
violations observed. There was a statistically significant difference between Australians and 
Singaporeans on the combined dependent variables, F (3, 347) = 10.55, p < .001, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .92; partial eta squared = .08, as well as for gender, F (3, 347) = 5.00, p = .002, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .96; partial eta squared = .04. No interaction effects between nationality 
and gender were observed.
When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, all three 
dependent variables evidenced statistical significance for the effect of nationality. With 
specific regard to nationality effects, separation guilt reached statistical significance, F (1, 
349) = 6.23, p = .013, partial eta squared =.02; reciprocal filial piety reached statistical 
significance, F (1, 349) = 8.82, p = .003, partial eta squared = .03; and authoritarian filial 
piety reached statistical significance, F (1, 349) = 30.01, p <.001, partial eta squared = .08. 
An inspection of the mean scores indicated that Singaporeans reported higher levels of 
separation guilt, reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety than their Australian counterparts.
With specific regard to gender effects, two of the three dependent variables reached 
statistical significance. Separation guilt reached statistical significance, F (1, 349) = 9.91, p 
= .002, partial eta squared =.03; and reciprocal filial piety reached statistical significance F 
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(1, 349) = 5.43, p = .02, partial eta squared = .02. An inspection of the mean scores 
indicated that females reported higher levels of separation guilt and reciprocal filial piety 
than their male counterparts. Table 9 shows the mean values on the measures of separation 
guilt, authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety, for nationality and gender.
Table 9
Mean scores of Nationality and Gender on measures of Separation Guilt and Filial Piety
Australians Singaporeans F value Males Females       F value
Sep Guilt         30.52 32.63 6.23** 30.25   32.90           9.91**
AFP 19.22 23.35 30.01*** 21.05   21.51             .37
RFP 39.37 41.05 8.82** 39.55   40.86           5.43*
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Note: Sep Guilt = Separation Guilt; AFP = Authoritarian Filial Piety; RFP = Reciprocal 
Filial Piety
Shame Analysis (TOSCA-3 Shame and Shame Scale) 
In examining whether the experience of shame differed between nationality and 
gender, a two-way between groups MANOVA was performed. The two dependent 
variables used were the two measures of shame – TOSCA-3 Shame subscale and the Shame 
Scale. The independent variables were nationality (Australian and Singaporean) and gender 
(male and female). Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, 
linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious violations observed. There was a 
statistically significant difference between males and females on the combined dependent 
variables, F (2, 351) = 13.71, p < .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .93; partial eta squared = .07. No 
nationality, or interaction between nationality and gender, effects were observed. When 
results for the dependent variables were considered separately, the only gender difference 
to reach statistical significance was the TOSCA-3 Shame subscale measure, F (1, 352) = 
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27.49, p <.001, partial eta squared = .07. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that 
females reported higher levels of shame (M = 53.00, SD = .50) than males (M = 47.56, SD 
= .90).
Adaptive Guilt Analysis (TOSCA-3 Guilt and Guilt Scale)
In examining whether the experience of adaptive guilt differed between nationality 
and gender, a two-way between groups MANOVA was performed. The two dependent 
variables used were the two measures of adaptive guilt – TOSCA-3 Guilt subscale and the 
Guilt Scale. The independent variables were nationality (Australian and Singaporean) and 
gender (male and female). Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for 
normality, linearity, univariate and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-
covariance matrices, and multicollinearity, with no serious violations observed. There was a 
statistically significant difference between male and female respondents on the combined 
dependent variables, F (2, 356) = 5.60, p = .004, Wilks’ Lambda = .97; partial eta squared 
= .03. No nationality, or interaction between nationality and gender, effects were observed. 
When results for the dependent variables were considered separately, the only gender 
difference to reach statistical significance was the TOSCA-3 Guilt subscale measure, F (1, 
357) = 11.03, p =.001, partial eta squared = .03. An inspection of the mean scores indicated 
that female respondents reported higher levels of shame (M = 65.72, SD = .37) than male 
respondents (M = 63.17, SD = .68).
Pride Analyses (TOSCA-3 Pride and Pride Scales)
Due to low correlations between the Scale Hubristic Pride measure with the other 
three measures of pride (TOSCA-3 Hubristic and Authentic subscales and Scale Authentic 
Pride), analysis for the effects of gender and nationality on pride were conducted 
separately. 
131
Firstly, a two-way between groups MANOVA was performed using three 
dependent variables, the two measures of authentic pride (TOSCA-3 Authentic Pride and 
Scale Authentic Pride), and the TOSCA-3 Hubristic Pride subscale. The independent 
variables were nationality (Australian and Singaporean) and gender (male and female). 
Preliminary assumption testing was conducted to check for normality, linearity, univariate 
and multivariate outliers, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, and 
multicollinearity, with no serious violations observed. There was no statistically significant 
difference for nationality (F (3, 353) = 1.79, p =.15, partial eta squared =.02), or gender (F 
(3, 353) = .48, p = .70, partial eta squared = .004) on combined dependent variables. There 
was also an absence of an interaction effect between gender and nationality, F (3, 353) = 
1.20, p = .31, partial eta squared = .01.
Secondly, a two-way between groups ANOVA was used to examine the effect of 
gender and nationality on hubristic pride, as measured by the Scale Hubristic Pride. The 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances was significant, indicating that the variance of 
scores on Scale Hubristic Pride across groups was not equal. As suggested by Pallant 
(2010), a more stringent alpha value of .01 was set for evaluating the results of the 
ANOVA. There were no statistically significant results for the main effects of nationality 
(F (1, 352) = 1.57, p =.21, partial eta squared = .004), or gender (F (1, 352) = .84, p = .36, 
partial eta squared =.002), as well as no interaction between gender and nationality (F 
(1,352) = 3.13, p = .08, partial eta squared = .009).
It should be noted that when an independent-samples t-test was conducted to 
compare the Scale Hubristic Pride scores for Singaporeans and Australians, a significant 
difference between Australians and Singaporeans was found, t (336.63) = -2.71, p = .007, 
two-tailed). As the equality of variances for the two groups was found to be violated 
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(Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances), the alternative t-value corresponding to equal 
variances not assumed was used. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that 
Singaporeans reported higher levels of hubristic pride (M = 11.77, SD = 4.13) than 
Australians (M = 10.68, SD = 3.36). An independent-samples t-test that was conducted to 
compare gender differences with regard to scores on Scale Hubristic Pride found no 
statistically significant differences between males and female respondents, t (354) = .995, p 
= .32, two-tailed).
Cultural Relations betweem Self-conscious Emotions, Filial Piety, and Psychological Well-
being
Table 10
Correlations between measures of Self-conscious Emotions, Filial Piety and Psychological 
Distress for Australians (scores for Singaporeans in parentheses)
Depression Anxiety Stress
Separation Guilt .18* (.12ns) .31** (.25**) .16* (.14ns)
Reciprocal Filial Piety .07ns (-.06ns) .17* (.02ns) .09ns (.01ns)
Authoritarian Filial Piety .06ns (.08ns) .25** (.15*) .06ns (.00ns)
TOSCA-Shame .40** (.32**) .44** (.34**) .48** (.30**)
TOSCA-Guilt .09ns (.10ns) .23** (.14ns) .20** (.09ns)
Scale Shame .53** (.48**) .56** (.44**) .41** (.36**)
Scale Guilt .50** (.55**) .52** (.46**) .38** (.50**)
TOSCA-Authentic Pride .03ns (-.11ns) .02ns (-.02ns) .05ns (-.02ns)
TOSCA-Hubristic Pride .03ns (-.10ns) -.01ns (-.01ns) .003ns (-.05ns)
Scale Authentic Pride -.37** (-.23**) -.15* (-.12ns) -.10ns (-.10ns)
Scale Hubristic Pride .20** (.34**) .12ns (.34**) .12ns (.35**)
MACS Average 0.68** (0.56**) 0.59** (0.59**) 0.60** (0.62**)
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ns non-significant
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Table 10 shows the correlations between the measures of shame, adaptive and 
separation guilt, hubristic and authentic pride, filial piety, fear of affect and measures of 
psychological distress for Australians and Singaporeans. Maladaptive separation guilt was 
related to all three measures of depression, anxiety and stress for Australians, but only to 
symptoms of anxiety for Singaporeans. Reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety was related 
to symptoms of anxiety for Australians, while only a low magnitude correlation (r = .15) 
was found between authoritarian filial piety and anxiety for Singaporeans. Moderate 
magnitude correlations were found between shame and psychological distress for 
Australians and Singaporeans, with Singaporeans showing slightly weaker correlations 
across all three subscales of psychological distress. 
While weak to moderate correlations were found between adaptive guilt, as 
measured by the TOSCA-Guilt subscale, and symptoms of anxiety and stress within the 
Australian sample, adaptive guilt remained unrelated to psychological distress for the 
Singaporeans respondents. However, adaptive guilt, as measured by the Scale Guilt, was 
found to be moderately correlated to all three components of psychological distress across 
both nationalities. These findings indicate that the scenario-based measure, the TOSCA-
Guilt subscale, may be a more culturally sensitive measurement of adaptive guilt than its 
trait-based counterpart, the Scale Guilt subscale.
In general, the TOSCA measure of hubristic and authentic pride found no 
statistically significant correlations between pride and psychological distress for both 
nationalities. However, the Pride Scales appeared to tap into cultural differences. For both 
Singaporeans and Australians, Authentic pride correlated negatively with symptoms of 
depression. Authentic pride was also negatively and weakly related to anxiety within the 
Australian population. Within the Singaporean sample, hubristic pride, as measured by the 
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Pride Scales, showed significant positive correlations at a moderate level with all three 
measures of depression, anxiety and stress. In contrast, hubristic pride was only found to 
correlate weakly with depression for the Australian sample.
Table 11
Correlations between measures of Self-conscious Emotions, Filial Piety and Fear of Affect 
Control for Australians (scores for Singaporeans in parentheses)








Separation Guilt .29** (.28**) .20** (.27**) .10ns (.16*) .25** (.30**)
Reciprocal 
Filial Piety
.09ns (-.02ns) -.06ns (-.05ns) -.02ns (-.02ns) .00ns (-.04ns)
Authoritarian 
Filial Piety
.16* (.11ns) .07ns (.06ns) -.01ns (.03ns) .11ns (.09ns)
TOSCA-Shame .58** (.47**) .53** (.47**) .22** (.21**) .59** (.50**)
TOSCA-Guilt .26** (-.08ns) .18* (.16*) .11ns (-.05ns) .23** (.11ns)
Scale Shame .51** (.42**) .44** (.47**) .36** (.28**) .54** (.49**)
Scale Guilt .49** (.47**) .41** (.48**) .32** (.32**) .50** (.53**)
TOSCA-
Authentic Pride
.08ns (.12ns) .03ns (.03ns) -.14ns (-.16*) .02ns (.04ns)
TOSCA-
Hubristic Pride
.04ns (.04ns) -.06ns (-.05ns) -.11ns (-.15*) -.04ns (-.04ns)
Scale Authentic 
Pride
-.34** (-.29**) -.37** (-.28**) -.30** (-.36**) -.41** (-.35**)
Scale Hubristic 
Pride
.13ns (.30**) .14ns (.33**) .12ns (.27**) .16* (.36**)
*p < .05, ** p < .01, ns non-significant
Table 11 above shows the correlations between measures of self-conscious 
emotions, filial piety, and fear of affect for both Australians and Singaporeans. Both 
Singaporeans and Australians showed low to moderate magnitude positive correlations 
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between separation guilt and fear of affect control. Across both nationalities, reciprocal and 
authoritarian filial piety showed no statistically significant relationships with affect control. 
For both nationalities, moderate magnitude correlations were found between shame, as 
measured by both the TOSCA-Shame subscale and the Scale Shame measure, and affect 
control. In general, TOSCA-3 adaptive guilt was found to positively correlate with affect 
control for Australians only. Similar to correlations between psychological distress and 
TOSCA-Pride subscales, no statistically significant relationships were found for TOSCA-
Pride (authentic and hubristic) and affect control for both Singaporeans and Australians. 
While authentic pride, as measured by the adjective-based scale, showed consistently 
negative correlations with affect control and its three subscales for both nationalities, the 
scale measure of hubristic pride showed significant positive correlations with affect control 
for Singaporeans only.
Discussion
Cross-cultural research on the experience of self-conscious emotions and its 
relationship with psychological distress remains sparse, and further exploration of the 
understanding of the modus operandi of such emotions has been recommended in the 
literature, especially with regard to young adults (Meehan et al., 1996; Orth et al., 2010; 
Wong & Tsai, 2007). The current study examined cultural and gender differences with 
regard to attitudes towards filial piety and the experience of self-conscious emotions, 
namely maladaptive separation guilt, adaptive guilt, shame, and hubristic and authentic 
pride. Cultural relationships were also explored with regard to the association between self-
conscious emotions and filial piety with psychological distress. 
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Cultural Differences in the Experience of Self-conscious Emotions and Attitudes towards 
Filial Piety
The present study’s findings suggest that, as compared to their Australian 
counterparts, Singaporeans experience greater levels of separation guilt. This finding 
replicates those of Studies 1 and 2, and contributes to the literature a more in-depth and 
cross-cultural understanding of separation guilt as a form of maladaptive guilt. While the 
present study did not confirm cross-cultural differences in the experience of adaptive guilt, 
separation guilt appears to be of greater significance to young adults in Singapore, who are 
reflective of a collectivistic culture. Separation guilt refers to a maladaptive form of guilt 
that consists of an exaggerated belief that separation or differing from one’s loved ones will 
cause the latter harm (O’Connor et al., 1997). Importantly, it involves a distorted sense of 
loyalty which is argued to result in behaviours that are motivated by the need to constantly 
protect and remain loyal to parents and loved ones (Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997). 
The current literature is lacking in studies that have assessed differences in the 
experience of separation guilt between individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Meehan et 
al., 1996). Furthermore, to my knowledge, most of the studies in this area have researched 
cross-cultural differences in various self-conscious emotions within a population that 
resided within an individualistic culture. For example, Meehan et al. (1996) examined 
differences in the experience of various forms of maladaptive guilt, including separation 
guilt, between African-Americans, Euro-Americans and Latin Americans, all of whom 
resided in the United States. In the present study, 74.3% of Singaporean participants and 
99.5% of Australian participants were residents in their respective countries during data 
collection. Given that a key component of separation guilt is the notion of separation from 
one’s parents or loved ones, the present study’s findings indicate that this separation 
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transcends beyond a physical separation, and it is suggested that an emotional separation 
from loved ones may be of particular importance in the understanding of collectivistic 
separation guilt.
The present study’s findings of greater levels of separation guilt in Singaporeans 
than Australians supports existing theories that argue that culture may be an important 
variable in the experience of self-conscious emotions (Mesquita & Walker, 2003; Tracy & 
Robins, 2007b). Indeed, collectivistic individuals are proposed to hold interdependent self-
construals, with the self viewed as embedded within, as well as dependent upon, a larger 
social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In contrast, individuals from individualistic 
cultures have been found to possess self-construals that are more independent in nature, 
whereby the self is viewed as primarily separate from the social context (Heine et al., 1999; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The finding of greater separation guilt that was reported by 
Singaporeans aptly reflects the notion of a collectivistic and interdependent self-construal 
that places a key importance on one’s social context. In addition, it also raises questions 
with regard to the pathogenic potential of maladaptive guilt within collectivistic cultures. 
At its heart, separation guilt is a form of maladaptive guilt, which stems from excessive and 
irrational forms of guilt (O’Connor et al., 1997). This is in great contrast to the more pro-
social and beneficial form of adaptive guilt that is reported in the literature. Results of the 
present study indicate that the collectivistic individual’s relationships with family, 
especially parents, may be of key importance in the current theoretical understandings of 
the interdependent nature of the collectivistic self and its social context. 
The present study also found that Singaporeans held stronger attitudes towards both 
reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety than their Australian counterparts. Indeed, 
researchers have argued for the importance of taking into account the dual nature of filial 
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piety in both theory and research (Laidlaw, et al., 2010; Yeh, 2003), whereby both 
reciprocal and authoritarian forms of filial piety have been empirically validated in the 
literature (Yeh & Bedford, 2003). The findings of the present study support the literature, 
which has documented strong associations between the general concept of filial piety and 
collectivist contexts, as compared to individualist contexts (Schwartz et al., 2010). 
However, it is important to note that, as compared to Australians, Singaporeans were found 
to hold stronger attitudes towards reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety. These findings 
suggest that the collectivistic individual may possess stronger beliefs that reflect the 
importance of attending to parents out of a genuine gratitude, as well as suppressing one’s 
own desires, so as to comply with their parents’ wishes.
The present study’s findings of weaker attitudes towards filial piety in Australians, 
as compared to their Singaporean counterparts, is in line with the existing literature, which 
has documented a weaker endorsement towards filial piety values in Western populations 
than Asian, African-American and Latin-American populations (Schwartz et al., 2010). The 
extant literature has mostly studied cross-cultural differences in attitudes towards a general 
unidimensional conceptualisation of filial piety, and has related filial piety to both positive 
psychological well-being, as well as psychological distress (Schwartz et al., 2010). 
Researchers have highlighted that there is an aspect of filial piety that goes a step further 
and implies a lifelong subjugation of self for the family, including obligations to obey, 
honour, care for, and avoid shaming one’s parents (Schwartz et al., 2010). The present 
study’s consideration of a dual-concept of filial piety (Yeh & Bedford, 2003) has 
contributed to the literature a more in-depth understanding of attitudes towards filial piety 
in both a collectivistic and individualistic society. Australians, as representative of an 
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individualistic culture, appear to place less of an importance on genuine gratitude towards 
one’s parents, or subjugating the self for the family.  
In line with the findings from Study 1, results from the present study suggest no 
statistically significant differences in the levels of shame-proneness between Singaporeans 
and Australians. This outcome might be interpreted as inconsistent with the extant literature 
that has reported a general valuation of the negative self-conscious emotion of shame 
within collectivistic cultures, in which shame is perceived as a virtue and is intentionally 
instilled within children from a young age (Fung et al., 2003; Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
However, it is suggested that shame may operate in the young adult Singaporean context to 
motivate short-term avoidances of wrongful acts. Indeed, researchers have proposed that 
shame may work to deter individuals from committing wrongful acts, and may even 
motivate a desire to change the self over time (Lickel et al., 2007). From a collectivistic 
perspective, deterrence from shameful behaviour would indeed have the adaptive function 
of improving interpersonal relationships, as well as preventing ostracism or aggression 
from others (Lickel et al., 2007). Additionally, it may be possible that Singaporeans’ 
greater levels of authoritarian filial piety and separation guilt may work to contribute to a 
sense of subjugation of the self for the family, which may include avoidance of incurring 
shame or disrespect to one’s family (Schwartz et al., 2010). These factors may have 
contributed to a lower level of reported shame-proneness within the collectivistic 
Singaporean sample in the present study.
Consistent with the quantitative findings of Study 1, the present study did not find 
statistically significant differences in the levels of pride-proneness between Singaporeans 
and Australians. The extant literature has been somewhat scattered in its reporting of the 
cultural valuation and experience of pride. While some studies have reported a greater 
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devaluation of pride within collectivistic cultures, and a greater valuation of pride in 
individualistic cultures (Eid & Diener, 2001; Mosquera et al., 2000), other cross-cultural 
studies have found inconsistent findings with regard to the individualistic and collectivistic 
experiences of pride (Orth et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Despite the documentation 
of the devaluation of pride in collectivistic cultures, some studies have also found that 
Asians were more likely to report experiencing greater levels of hubristic pride than 
individuals from individualistic cultures (Orth et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). It is 
suggested that there may exist a discrepancy between the valence (or value) of pride within 
collectivistic cultures and the actual level of pride-proneness in collectivistic cultures such 
as Singapore. Specifically, it is suggested that a culture’s valuation of a self-conscious 
emotion may not necessarily correspond with the actual measurable quantity that it 
presents. Instead, gaining an understanding of cultural differences in the experience of pride 
and its relation to psychological distress may assist in a more meaningful comprehension of 
the impact of pride on psychological well-being.
Culturally Relevant Relations among Self-conscious Emotions, Filial Piety and 
Psychological Distress
Multicultural Effects of Shame on Psychological Distress
Although Australians and Singaporeans were not found to differ in their levels of 
shame-proneness, the strongest correlations were found to exist between the emotion of 
shame and all three symptoms of psychological distress – depression, anxiety and stress – 
for both nationalities. In contrast, depression was not related to adaptive (reparative) guilt 
for either Australians or Singaporeans, and was only weakly related to separation guilt for 
Australians. These findings are in line with the literature, which has widely documented the 
strong relationships between shame and depressive symptoms (Kim et al., 2011). The 
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present study’s findings support the literature, which claims that shame has conjured the 
reputation for being viewed as more devastating and more detrimental to the individual’s 
self-concept and self-esteem, as compared to guilt (Wong & Tsai, 2007). This unique link 
between shame and depressive symptoms may be explained in a few ways. Firstly, shame is 
characterised by a serious state of social rejection, which has been argued to threaten the 
fundamental need of belongingness. This social rejection has been theorised to elicit 
depressive symptoms. Guilt, in contrast, has been argued to show weaker and less 
consistent links to depressive symptoms as it is unlikely to signal such a serious state of 
social threat. Second, shame, but not guilt, involves an intense and internally directed focus 
on the flawed self, which is likely to elicit ruminative processes that have been shown to 
predict depressive reactions to negative events (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Parker, & Larson, 1994). Third, shame, but not guilt, has been characterised by specific 
causal attributions that share a substantial overlap with attributions that predict depressive 
symptoms (Abramson et al., 2002). Fourth, the unique factor of withdrawal and social 
isolation associated with shame may relate to depressive symptoms due to decreased social 
support, as well as lessened contact with positively reinforcing stimuli (Joiner, Coyne, & 
Blalock, 1999; Lewinsohn, Gotlib, & Hautzinger, 1998).
How Maladaptive is Separation Guilt?
The present study found that separation guilt was related to all three symptoms of 
psychological distress for Australians, but only to anxious symptoms for Singaporeans. 
Even then, a weaker relationship between separation guilt and anxious symptoms was 
found to exist for Singaporeans, as compared to Australians. When compared to adaptive 
guilt, separation guilt was unique in its relation to depressive symptoms for Australians 
only. Additionally, adaptive guilt was related to anxious and stressful symptoms for 
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Australians, but not for Singaporeans, for whom psychological distress remained unrelated 
to adaptive guilt. It is suggested that the maladaptive aspect of separation guilt may have 
particular psychological implications for Australians, with its specific relation with 
depressive symptoms. In support of this argument, prior studies, which have argued for the 
maladaptive nature of separation guilt, have found similar relationships to those seen in the 
Australian sample between separation guilt and depressive and anxious symptoms 
(O’Connor et al., 1999). It should also be noted that participants in the O’Connor et al. 
(1999) study resided in the United States, which is a known individualistic society.  It is 
suggested that the collectivistic, interdependent self that values, and is defined by, social 
relationships may aid with the maladaptive nature of separation guilt. Specifically, the 
existence and valuation of social relationships within a collectivistic society, such as 
Singapore, may provide increased social support and positively reinforcing stimuli, which 
may work to prevent a relation with depressive symptoms that was found for Australians. It 
may be that in prioritising the individual person over group allegiances and obligations 
(Hofstede, 2001), Australians, as reflective of an individualistic culture, may not have the 
unique protective function against depressive and stressful symptoms, which the 
collectivistic Singaporean culture may possess. These findings contribute to the literature a 
richer cultural understanding of how both maladaptive separation guilt, as well as adaptive 
guilt, may be more strongly associated with psychological distress within an individualistic 
culture, such as Australia’s, as compared to Singapore’s collectivistic culture.
Filial Piety’s Relation to Psychological Distress
While authoritarian filial piety was related to anxious symptoms for both 
Australians and Singaporeans, anxious symptoms were also weakly related to reciprocal 
filial piety for Australians only. These findings are of interest, especially given that 
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Singaporeans were found to report stronger attitudes towards reciprocal and authoritarian 
filial piety than Australians. To my knowledge, the extant literature has not investigated 
cross-cultural differences in the relationships between a dual-conceptualisation of filial 
piety and psychological distress, and the present study is unique in its contribution to the 
literature. Although the present study found that authoritarian filial piety related to anxious 
symptoms for both the Australian and Singaporean participants, Singaporean participants 
demonstrated a weaker link between authoritarian filial piety and anxious symptoms, as 
compared to their Australian counterparts. Indeed, authoritarian filial piety has been 
characterised by hierarchy and submission towards one’s parents’ wishes, at the 
individual’s own expense (Yeh & Bedford, 2003), and has been positively related to 
parental emphasis on obedience, indebtedness to parents, impulse control, proper conduct, 
overprotection, harshness and inhibition of children’s self-expression, self-mastery and all-
round personal development (Ho, 1994). 
Results of the present study indicate that the beneficial aspects of reciprocal filial 
piety may be unique to a collectivistic society, such as Singapore’s. Reciprocal filial piety 
encompasses emotionally and spiritually attending to one’s parents out of gratitude for their 
efforts in having raised one, and physical and financial care for one’s parents as they age 
(Yeh, 2003). Despite reciprocal filial piety being associated with better intergenerational 
relationships (Lawrence et al., 1992) and lower levels of parent-child conflict (Yeh & 
Bedford, 2003), a positive relation was found for reciprocal filial piety and anxious 
symptoms for Australians. It might be that Australians who hold strong attitudes towards 
reciprocal filial piety may not cope, as effectively as their Singaporean counterparts, with 
the pressure that may be related to attending to one’s parent’s physical, emotional and 
mental needs. Furthermore, the period of young adulthood may find Australian individuals 
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experiencing challenging transitions that may involve taking responsibility for oneself and 
achieving financial independence (White & Wyn, 2004). These challenging transitions that 
are relevant to the period of young adulthood may take precedence in their lives over 
familial concerns of filial piety (Hofstede, 2001), whereby even reciprocal filial piety may 
be related to anxious symptoms for young adult Australians. Again, collectivistic values of 
interpersonal harmony and social support are suggested to contribute towards a protective 
function against psychological distress, which appears to be absent within the 
individualistic Australian context. 
Pride’s Relation to Psychological Distress
Consistent with the findings of Study 1, with specific regard to Singaporeans only, 
hubristic pride was found to strongly relate to all three measures of psychological distress. 
In contrast, hubristic pride was only related to depression for Australians. As mentioned 
before, the extant literature has been scattered in its documentation of the valuation and 
proneness of pride within collectivistic cultures (Eid & Diner, 2001; Tracy & Robins, 
2007a). The present study’s findings suggests that, despite a general devaluation of the 
emotion of pride within collectivistic cultures (Eid & Diener, 2001), collectivistic 
individuals, when experiencing hubristic pride that arises from attributions to internal, 
stable, and uncontrollable causes, are more likely to experience symptoms of psychological 
distress. It is suggested that the collectivistic devaluation of pride may inhibit the 
individual’s willingness toward expressing and disclosing the emotion of hubristic pride 
with interpersonal others, which may result in lesser social resources that may assist with 
the internalised experience of hubristic pride, an emotion that has been associated with 
psychological distress and antisocial behaviour. The collectivistic individual’s knowledge 
of the social devaluation of pride may also result in depressive, anxious and stressful 
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emotions. In contrast, the individualistic culture’s valuation of pride, as established in the 
literature (Eid & Diener, 2001), may explain the lack of a relationship between hubristic 
pride and symptoms of anxiety and stress for Australians.
Authentic pride, by contrast, was negatively associated with depressive symptoms 
for both Australians and Singaporeans. In addition, it was weakly and negatively associated 
with symptoms of anxiety for Australians. Consistent with the literature, the results of the 
present study suggest that, for both Australians and Singaporeans, authentic pride may 
promote the individual’s status in a more pro-social and psychologically beneficial manner 
than hubristic pride. While the literature has established that authentic pride may promote 
the enhancement of one’s status through relationship-oriented and pro-social means (Carver 
et al., 2010; Tracy & Robins, 2007a), the present study’s findings suggest that authentic 
pride may also benefit the individual’s psychological well-being, through its protective 
function that may aid against depressive and anxious symptoms.
Gender Differences in the Experience of Self-conscious Emotions and Attitudes towards 
Filial Piety
Gender stereotypes of emotion maintain that while men experience more pride, 
women experience more guilt and shame (Else-Quest, Higgins, Allison, & Morton, 2012). 
Indeed, women have generally been stereotyped as being more emotional than men (Barrett 
& Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Brody & Hall, 2008; Shields, 2002). In line with previous studies 
that have documented women scoring higher on measures of shame and guilt (Brody & 
Hall, 2008; Ferguson & Eyre, 2000; Orth et al., 2010), the present study found that women 
reported greater levels of shame, adaptive guilt and separation guilt than men. 
Acknowledging that women may experience higher levels of shame and guilt, whether 
adaptive or maladaptive in nature, is suggested to be a vital component of attaining a richer 
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understanding of, and improving, women’s mental health. Consistent with the results of a 
meta-analysis of gender differences in self-conscious emotions (Else-Quest et al., 2012), 
the present study found gender similarities in the emotion of pride. These results provide 
evidence that gender stereotypes regarding men experiencing more pride than women may 
not necessarily be accurate. In addition, the present study’s results also indicated that 
women were also found to report stronger attitudes toward reciprocal filial piety than men.
Limitations and further research
Wong and Tsai (2007) have called to attention the need for models of self-conscious 
emotions that reflect other cultural contexts that differ from the dominant individualistic 
culture, from which most of the current understandings of self-conscious emotions are 
derived (Camras & Fatani, 2004; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). Taking into consideration 
the findings of Singaporeans’ greater levels of separation guilt (also evidenced in Study 1) 
and stronger attitudes towards both reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety, as compared to 
Australians, as well as the strong association between hubristic pride and psychological 
distress in Singaporeans, future research should consider studying the relationships and 
influences of specific self-conscious emotions, attitudes towards filial piety, and their 
relationship with psychological distress. Future research should also consider widening the 
age group of participants to examine the developmental trajectories of culturally variant 
self-conscious emotions, such as separation guilt or hubristic pride within collectivistic 
cultures. Lastly, the results of the present study require caution in their interpretation due to 
the cross-sectional design of the study. To investigate cultural differences in the causal 
relationships of self-conscious emotions, future research may benefit from the application 
of a longitudinal design.
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 4: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEPARATION GUILT, 
HUBRISTIC PRIDE, FILIAL PIETY, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS IN YOUNG 
AUSTRALIAN AND SINGAPOREAN ADULTS
A growing body of research has suggested that culture has a profound influence on 
the way individuals define the self, which, in turn, is believed to impact upon the 
experience of self-conscious emotions (Tracy & Robins, 2007b). For example, individuals 
from collectivistic cultures tend to hold an interdependent concept of the self, viewing the 
self as rooted within, and reliant upon, a larger social context; whereas individuals from 
individualistic cultures are more likely to hold a more independent concept of the self, 
viewing the self as largely distinct from one’s social context (Heine et al., 1999; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991).
Conventional and prevailing models of self-conscious emotions, such as shame and 
guilt, have been criticised for holding assumptions that negative appraisal by others, or 
oneself, is entirely negative and non-beneficial to the individual (Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
Indeed, this prevailing assumption may effectively reflect the value placed on positive 
feelings in many individualistic cultures (Heine et al., 1999; Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
However, given that research has demonstrated that individualistic cultures promote the 
independent self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), and given that most models 
of shame and guilt have been based on Western samples, it is likely that the perception of 
self-conscious emotions that has contributed to emotion research might be skewed towards 
an individualistic conceptualisation (Wong & Tsai, 2007). 
Findings from Study 2 have suggested that attitudes of filial piety may impact on 
collectivistic individuals’ experience of separation guilt. Additionally, results from studies 
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1, 2 and 3 have found that young Singaporean adults experience significantly greater levels 
of separation guilt, as well as stronger filial attitudes, as compared to their Australian 
counterparts. Study 3 has also found that young Singaporean adults demonstrated strong 
relationships between hubristic pride and symptoms of stress, anxiety and depression. 
Taken together, it appears that filial attitudes may work towards impacting upon self-
conscious emotions, and the present study has aimed to investigate the specific relations 
between separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic pride, and psychological distress within both 
Singaporean and Australian contexts.
Culturally relevant concepts such as filial piety may be important to study in 
conjunction with self-conscious emotions and culture, as they may offer valuable insight 
into culturally-specific societal values. For example, it may be possible that reciprocal or 
authoritarian filial piety relates to separation guilt, a form of maladaptive guilt that 
specifically relates to the belief that separating from, or differing from, one’s loved ones 
will cause them harm (O’Connor et al., 1997). The distorted sense of disloyalty that 
characterises separation guilt, which has been found to result in behaviours that are 
motivated by the need to consistently protect and remain loyal to parents and loved ones 
(Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997; Weiss & Sampson, 1986), may have a specific 
relationship with authoritarian filial piety. Focusing on filial concerns with regard to its 
relation to self-conscious emotions may bring to light a more comprehensive understanding 
of the complex internal experience of emotions held by people within families, when 
directed more specifically at an individual rather than societal level.
It is possible that separation guilt, with its emphasis on an exaggerated belief that 
separating or differentiating from one’s loved ones will cause them harm, may share some 
common ground in an individual’s filial attitudes. Indeed, separation guilt’s distorted sense 
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of loyalty, which motivates the need to protect and remain loyal to parents and loved ones 
(Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997), appears to share some common factors with filial 
piety’s emphasis on meeting one’s parents’ material and emotional needs. For example, 
separation guilt might relate to authoritarian filial attitudes, due to its stemming from a fear 
of harming others, especially one’s parents, as a result of pursuing one’s own desires 
(O’Connor et al., 1997). Examining the manner in which societal values, such as filial 
piety, might impact on relations between different self-conscious emotions, such as 
separation guilt and hubristic pride, might assist in gaining a more in-depth understanding 
of the experience and function of self-conscious emotions within individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures.
Findings from Study 3 have indicated that young Singaporean adults, as compared 
to their Australian counterparts, demonstrate stronger relationships between hubristic pride 
and symptoms of psychological distress, namely stress, anxiety and depression. Even 
though pride has been conceptualised as a positively valenced emotion (Carver et al., 2010; 
Tracy & Robins, 2004a), hubristic pride, in particular, has been associated more strongly 
with selfishness, personal excellence, and motivating a self-enhancing drive for social 
status, power, and adoration from others (Campbell & Foster, 2007; Tracy et al., 2009). 
Researchers have yet to explore the possible relations between filial attitudes and the self-
conscious emotion of hubristic pride. Given that Study 3 has found that Singaporeans 
demonstrate stronger relationships between hubristic pride and psychological distress, it 
would be beneficial to explore whether one or both facets of filial piety directly contribute 
to the experience of hubristic pride within individualistic and collectivistic individuals. It is 
suggested that both reciprocal and authoritarian filial attitudes, when contributed to by 
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separation guilt, might contribute directly to feelings of hubristic pride, which may impact 
upon subsequent psychological distress.
Hypothesised Theoretical Model
Guided by theory and the findings of Studies 1, 2, and 3, the present study aimed to 
investigate the possible relations between filial piety, two self-conscious emotions – 
separation guilt and hubristic pride, as well as anxious and depressive symptoms. Hubristic 
pride, given its unique relationship with symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress for 
Singaporeans, was also highlighted as a self-conscious emotion of particular interest. The 
present study is innovative in a number of ways. In conducting structural equation 
modelling, the present study aimed to assess whether filial piety may play a culture-specific 
role in its interaction with separation guilt and hubristic pride, as well as with symptoms of 
depression and anxiety. Figure 2 below shows the hypothesised model for the proposed 
relations between separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic pride and psychological distress.
Figure 2. Hypothesised theoretical model relating separation guilt, filial piety and 




















As past research, as well as the findings from Studies 1 and 2, have shown that the 
experience and valuation of self-conscious emotions have been found to differ distinctly 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, the present study sought to investigate 
how filial piety, both reciprocal and authoritarian, may mediate the relationships between 




Data used for the present study is identical to that of Study 3. 
Measures
     Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire – 67. In this present study, the alpha coefficient was 
.82 for the 12-item Separation Guilt subscale (see Table 3 for the alpha coefficients for 
trimmed subscales used in the present study).
Authentic and Hubristic Pride Scales. Analyses of internal consistency on the 
original 7-item subscales resulted in a Cronbach alpha of .88 for the Authentic Pride scale, 
.88 for the Hubristic Pride scale, .88 for the Shame scale, and .79 for the Guilt scale (see 
Table 3 for the alpha coefficients for trimmed subscales used in the present study). 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS). In the present study, the alpha 
coefficients for the original 7-item subscales of the DASS are: Depression subscale .90, 
Anxiety subscale .83, and Stress subscale .86 (see Table 3 for the alpha coefficients for 
trimmed subscales used in the present study).
Dual Filial Piety Scale (DFPS). Analysis of internal consistency of the original two 
8-item subscales resulted in a Cronbach alpha of .88 for the reciprocal and .80 for the 
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authoritarian filial piety scale (see Table 3 for the alpha coefficients for trimmed subscales 
used in the present study.
Data Analysis
All statistical analyses, with regard to structural equation modelling, were 
conducted with AMOS 18 to examine the relationships between separation guilt, filial 
piety, hubristic pride and psychological distress. All data available were used applying 
casewise maximum likelihood (Wothke, 1998). Following the recommendations of Hu and 
Bentler (1999) and Kline (2005), (a) the chi-square test statistic and the p value, (b) the 
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), (c) the standardized root-mean-square 
residual (SRMR), and (d) the comparative fit index (CFI) are presented. For RMSEA, a 
cutoff value close to .05 is required for a relatively good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and a 
value lower than .08 indicates a reasonable model fit (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & 
King, 2006). Furthermore, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended a value close to .08 for 
SRMR. In addition, a cutoff value of .90 has been considered representative of a well-
fitting model (Bentler, 1992), although some researchers have suggested a CFI cutoff value 
close to .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). However, given the exploratory nature of the present 
study, the process of testing for equivalence of a causal structure can be substantively 
meaningful, as both practical and statistical significance can be taken into account (Byrne, 
Shavelson, & Muthen, 1989; Tanaka & Huba, 1984).
Results
Descriptive Information
Reliability analyses were performed to evaluate the model-based internal 
consistency of the subscales. As shown in Tables 12 and 13, the internal consistency of the 
scales was acceptable to good.
153
Table 12




M (SD) Range Alpha 
Coefficient
IGQ-Separation Guilt 8 31.93 (7.07) 36 (15-51) .79
Reciprocal Filial Piety 4 40.65 (4.55) 21 (27-48) .88
Authoritarian Filial 
Piety
5 21.07 (6.59) 32 (8-40) .79
Hubristic Pride Scale 5 11.22 (3.79) 17 (7-24) .83
DASS-Depression 5 10.14 (9.03) 42 (0-42) .88
DASS-Anxiety 5 7.63 (7.47) 34 (0-34) .80
(Alpha coefficient based on trimmed scales used in the present study’s model)
Table 13
Comparison table of Descriptive Statistics and Internal Consistency Coefficients between 
Australians and Singaporeans
Australians
Scale Retained Number 
of Original Items
M (SD) Range Alpha Coefficient
IGQ-Separation 
Guilt
8 31.01 (6.75) 35 (15-50) .76
Reciprocal Filial 
Piety
4 40.09 (4.34) 20 (27-47) .85
Authoritarian 
Filial Piety
5 18.88 (5.84) 25 (8-33) .77
Hubristic Pride 
Scale
5 10.68 (3.36) 15 (7-22) .80
DASS-
Depression
5 10.24 (9.07) 36 (0-36) .89
DASS-Anxiety 5 7.83 (7.76) 34 (0-34) .81
Singaporeans
Scale Retained Number 
of Original Items
M (SD) Range Alpha Coefficient
IGQ-Separation 
Guilt
8 32.88 (7.27) 35 (16-51) .81
Reciprocal Filial 
Piety
4 41.22 (4.70) 20 (28-48) .90
Authoritarian 
Filial Piety
5 23.31 (6.57) 32 (8-40) .80
Hubristic Pride 
Scale
5 11.77 (4.13) 17 (7-24) .85
DASS-
Depression
5 10.03 (9.03) 42 (0-42) .88
DASS-Anxiety 5 7.42 (7.18) 28 (0-28) .79
(Alpha coefficient based on trimmed scales used in the present study’s model)
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Tables 14 and 15 present the pairwise correlations between separation guilt, filial 
piety, hubristic pride and symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
Table 14
Correlations between Subscales of Separation Guilt, Filial Piety, Hubristic Pride and Symptoms of 
Depression and Anxiety
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Separation Guilt -






4. Hubristic Pride .04 -.07 .12* -
5. DASS-
Depression
.15** .002 .07 .27** -
6. DASS-Anxiety .27** .092 .18** .23** .63** -
*p < .05; **p < .01
Table 15
Comparison of Correlations between Subscales of Separation Guilt, Filial Piety, Hubristic Pride 
and Symptoms of Depression and Anxiety for Australians and Singaporeans (Australians above the 
diagonal, Singaporeans below the diagonal)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Separation Guilt - .38** .58** -.13 .18* .31**
2. Reciprocal Filial 
Piety
.44** - .43** .05 .07 .17*
3. Authoritarian 
Filial Piety
.66** .43** - -.03 .06 .25**
4. Hubristic Pride .14 -.19* .16* - .20** .12
5. DASS-
Depression
.12 -.06 .08 .34** - .62**
6. DASS-Anxiety .25** .02 .15* .34** .64** -
*p < .05; **p < .01
Tables 16, 17, 18 and 19 show the correlation statistics, including the mean and 
standard deviation values, for each survey item that was originally in the scale.
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Table 16
Correlations between items in original IGQ Separation Guilt Subscale


























3 .32 .36 -
4 .28 .32 .28 -
5 .23 .27 .20 .57 -
6 .32 .41 .37 .37 .41 -
7 .21 .25 .47 .25 .25 .52 -
8 .17 .36 .17 .22 .20 .36 .24 -
9 .28 .28 .20 .17 .16 .33 .24 .22 -
10 .30 .25 .57 .16 .18 .34 .35 .02 .35 -
11 .28 .25 .36 .25 .27 .23 .22 .19 .17 .21 -
12 .12 .15 -.01 .05 .09 .16 .13 .13 .13 -.07 .09 -
(Top row shows the mean (standard deviation in parentheses) for each item)
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Table 17
Correlations between items in original Dual Filial Piety Scale (DFPS)


































3 .58 .45 -
4 .12 .32 .15 -
5 .76 .31 .57 .11 -
6 .26 .41 .19 .35 .27 -
7 .65 .39 .67 .10 .73 .28 -
8 .14 .33 .08 .35 .13 .48 .11 -
9 .46 .31 .32 .27 .43 .39 .43 .33 -
10 .33 .50 .34 .25 .32 .49 .36 .37 .44 -
11 .50 .41 .42 .09 .53 .24 .52 .13 .40 .40 -
12 .33 .41 .34 .29 .34 .46 .33 .39 .42 .51 .34 -
13 .46 .20 .34 .001 .50 .16 .45 .05 .32 .17 .43 .23 -
14 .10 .20 .07 .15 .08 .33 .08 .30 .25 .25 .11 .29 .11 -
15 .49 .39 .49 .11 .53 .35 .58 .18 .49 .49 .51 .35 .40 .26 -
16 .14 .23 .10 .29 .09 032 .11 .45 .42 .36 .18 .34 .10 .41 .28 -
(Odd-numbered items refer to Authoritarian Filial Piety items; even-numbered items refer to Reciprocal Filial Piety items; top row shows mean values 
(standard deviation in parentheses) for each item)
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Table 18
Correlations between items in the original Hubristic Pride Scale
















3 .62 .49 -
4 .47 .50 .52 -
5 .49 .43 .53 .60 -
6 .48 .40 .49 .52 .62 -
7 .51 .44 .52 .50 .56 .83 -
(Item 1 “Arrogant”; Item 2 “Conceited”; Item 3 “Egotistical”; Item 4 “Pompous”; Item 5 
“Smug”; Item 6 “Snobbish”; Item 7 “Stuck-up”) (Top row shows the mean values (standard 
deviation in parentheses) for each item)
Table 19
Correlations between items in the original Depression and Anxiety subscales of the DASS
Item
Depression 3 5 10 13 16 17 21
3 .66 (.77) 1.21 
(.90)
.58 (.85) 1.00 
(.88)
.65 (.80) .50 (.79) .47 (.80)
5 .39 -
10 .54 .36 -
13 .61 .47 .60 -
16 .63 .51 .60 .65 -
17 .55 .42 .58 .58 .60 -
21 .51 .39 .64 .56 .60 .62 -
Anxiety 2 4 7 9 15 19 20
2 .86 (.92) .41 (.74) .35 (.65) .85 (.91) .49 (.75) .45 (.69) .42 (.74)
4 .36 -
7 .31 .53 -
9 .24 .34 .37 -
15 .28 .51 .44 .54 -
19 .26 .50 .45 .22 .48 -
20 .26 .51 .36 .42 .56 .45 -
(Top rows for each subscale shows the mean (standard deviation in parentheses) values for 
each item)
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Development and Validation 
To study the stability of the exploratory factor structure, CFA was conducted on 
each of the psychometric measurements used. Based on high modification indices (MI), 
which implied loadings on multiple factors), theoretical relevance, and wording of the 
items, a reduction of items was performed in a systematic way, with fit indices examined at 
each step. IGQ-Separation guilt had a reduction from 12 to 8 items; DASS-Depression and 
DASS-Anxiety both had a reduction from 7 to 5 items; Scale Hubristic Pride had a 
reduction from 7 to 5 items; and Authoritarian and Reciprocal Filial Piety had reductions 
from 8 items each to 5 and 4 items, respectively. The changes resulted in each measurement 
showing acceptable fits, as shown in Table 20 below. 
Table 20
Summary of Goodness of Fit Statistics for Subscales of Separation Guilt, Filial Piety, 
Hubristic Pride and DASS-subscales
(DFPS included subscales of both Reciprocal and Authoritarian Filial Piety; Pride Scales included 
two subscales of Hubristic Pride and Authentic Pride; DASS included subscales of Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress)
For the Separation Guilt subscale, three pairs of error correlations were allowed, due 
to very similar content between pairs of items. Specifically, a correlation between the error 
terms of Item 3 (“I wish I could be more like my parents”) and Item 10 (“I am glad I am not 
like my parents”) was allowed, due to the similar content and use of the word “like” in both 
Subscale χ2 df p χ2/df CFI RMSEA 90% CI SRMR
Separation 
Guilt
40.70 17 .001 2.39 .97 .061 .037, .086 .037
DFPS 118.55 26 <.001 4.56 .94 .09 .081, .116 .061
Pride 
Scales
64.71 34 .001 1.90 .98 .049 .031, .068 .038
DASS 161.41 86 <.001 1.88 .97 .049 .037, .060 .040
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items. A second correlation between the error terms of Item 4 (“I feel that bad things may 
happen to my family if I do not stay in close contact with them”) and Item 5 (“It makes me 
anxious to be away from home for too long”) was also allowed, as the content of both pairs 
was very similar. Lastly, a third correlation between two error terms of two items was 
allowed (Item 1 “It makes me uncomfortable to have critical thoughts about my parents” 
and Item 2 “I feel bad when I disagree with my parent’s ideas or values, even if I keep it to 
myself”), taking into account the similar content of both items. Items 7, 8, 9 and 12 were 
deleted, as they had the weakest loadings on the Separation Guilt subscale.  
With regard to the Dual Filial Piety Scales (DFPS), from the Reciprocal Filial Piety 
subscale, Items 9, 11 and 15 were deleted, as high MI values indicated that these items 
loaded highly on the Authoritarian Filial Piety subscale as well. From the Authoritarian 
Filial Piety subscale, Items 14 and 16 were deleted, as both items loaded on the Reciprocal 
Filial Piety subscale and had weak loadings on their corresponding subscale. Items 4 of the 
Authoritarian subscale, and Item 13 of the Reciprocal subscale were also deleted as the 
three items had the weakest loadings on their respective subscales.
For the Pride Scales, based on high MI values, which indicated loadings on both 
Hubristic and Authentic factors, Item 25 (“Snobbish”) and Item 14 (“Egotistical”) of the 
Hubristic Pride Scale, as well as Item 22 (“Self-worthy”) and Item 19 (“Productive”) of the 
Authentic Pride Scale were deleted. 
For the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS), high MI values for Item 8 
(“I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy”) of the Stress Scale indicated that the item 
was loading on other factors as well, which resulted in the item being left out. A correlation 
between the error terms of two items regarding symptoms of Stress, pertaining to Item 1 (“I 
found it hard to wind down”) and Item 12 (“I found it difficult to relax”) was allowed, as 
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the content of both pairs of items was very similar. For the Anxiety Scale, a correlation 
between the error terms of two items regarding symptoms of anxiety, Item 4 (“I 
experienced breathing difficulty (e.g. excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the 
absence of physical exertion)”) and Item 7 (“I experienced trembling (e.g. in the hands)”) 
was allowed, taking into account the similar content of both pairs of items. Furthermore, 
Items 3 and 5 of the Depression subscale, as well as Items 2 and 19 of the Anxiety subscale 
were left out, due to weak loadings on their corresponding subscales.
Testing for Multigroup Invariance of Instrument Scores (Measurement Model)
Testing for factorial equivalence between instrument scores for Australians and 
Singaporeans encompassed a series of hierarchical steps that started with the determination 
of a baseline model for each group separately. Following the completion of this preliminary 
task, tests for the equivalence of parameters were conducted across groups at each of 
several increasingly stringent levels. Specifically, the pattern of factor loadings for each 
observed measure was tested for its equivalence across groups. Once the measures that 
were group-invariant were identified, these parameters were constrained equal while 
subsequent tests of the structural parameters were conducted. As each new set of 
parameters was analysed, the previous sets that were known to be group-invariant were 
cumulatively constrained equal. Therefore, the entire process of ascertaining 
nonequivalence of measurement and structural parameters across groups involved the 
testing of a series of increasingly restrictive hypotheses. 
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Table 21
Summary of Configural Baseline Models Goodness of Fit Statistics for Instruments
Scale χ2 df p χ2/df CFI RMSEA 90% CI SRMR
Separation 
Guilt
55.43 34 .001 1.63 .97 .041 .020, .060 .051
DFPS 159.92 52 <.001 3.08 .93 .075 .062, .088 .056
Hubristic 
Pride





115.96 66 <.001 1.76 .97 .045 .031, .059 .044
(DFPS included subscales of both Reciprocal and Authoritarian Filial Piety; Pride Scales included 
two subscales of Hubristic Pride and Authentic Pride; DASS included subscales of Depression, 
Anxiety)
Tables 22, 23, 24 and 25 show summaries of goodness-of-fit statistics for tests of 
multigroup invariance with regard to factorial equivalence of instrument scores for the 
DFPS, separation guilt subscale, hubristic pride scale, and the DASS-depression and 
DASS-anxiety subscales.
Testing for equivalence of structural model 
Table 26 below shows the summary of goodness-of-fit statistics for tests of 
multigroup invariance of the hypothesised structural model. As identified in Table 27, four 
regression paths – Separation guilt  Anxiety; Reciprocal Filial Piety  Hubristic Pride; 
Reciprocal Filial Piety  Anxiety; and Authoritarian Filial Piety  Anxiety were found to 
be noninvariant between Australians and Singaporeans. 
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Table 22
Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Tests of Multigroup Invariance for DFPS
Model description Comparative 
Model
χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df Statistical 
Significance
CFI ∆CFI
1. Configural model; no equality constraints imposed - 159.92 52 - - - .927 -
2. Measurement model




Model 2A 3 versus 1 190.86 59 10.94 7 NS .924 .003
Note: ∆χ2 = difference in χ2 values between models; ∆df = difference in number of degrees of freedom between models; ∆CFI = difference in CFI values 
between models; RFP = Reciprocal Filial Piety; AFP = Authoritarian Filial Piety.
Table 23
Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Tests of Multigroup Invariance for Separation Guilt Subscale
Model description Comparative 
Model
χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df Statistical 
Significance
CFI ∆CFI
1. Configural model; no equality constraints imposed - 55.43 34 - - - .972 -
2. Measurement model
(Model A) All factor loadings and error covariances 
constrained equal




Model 2A 3 versus 1 67.84 44 12.41 10 NS .969 .003




Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Tests of Multigroup Invariance for Hubristic Pride Subscale
Model description Comparative 
Model
χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df Statistical 
Significance
CFI ∆CFI
1. Configural model; no equality constraints imposed - 28.94 10 - - - .970 -
2. Measurement model
(Model A) All factor loadings constrained equal 2A versus 1 41.50 14 12.56 4 p < .05
0.0136
.956 .014
(Model B) Factor loading for Item 7 constrained equal 2B versus 1 28.95 11 0.01 1 NS .971 .001
3. Structural model
Model 2B 3 versus 1 28.95 11 0.01 1 NS .971 .001
Note: ∆χ2 = difference in χ2 values between models; ∆df = difference in number of degrees of freedom between models; ∆CFI = difference in CFI values 
between models
Table 25
Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Tests of Multigroup Invariance for DASS-Depression and Anxiety Subscales
Model description Comparative 
Model
χ2 df ∆χ2 ∆df Statistical 
Significance
CFI ∆CFI
1. Configural model; no equality constraints imposed - 115.96 66 - - - .971 -
2. Measurement model
(Model A) All factor loadings and error covariance 
constrained equal
2A versus 1 122.82 75 6.86 9 NS .972 .001
3. Structural model
Model 2A with covariance between DEP and ANX 
constrained equal
3 versus 1 122.82 75 6.86 9 NS .972 .001
Note: ∆χ2 = difference in χ2 values between models; ∆df = difference in number of degrees of freedom between models; ∆CFI = difference in CFI values 
between models; DEP = DASS-Depression subscale; ANX = DASS-Anxiety subscale
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Table 26
Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Configural and Measurement Models
Structural invariance Tests Comparative 
Model




1. Configural model; no equality constraints imposed on 
regression paths (all factor loading constraints in 
measurement model imposed except for the 2 items 
identified as noninvariant)
- 1387.71 926 - - - .910 -
1B. Configural model 1 + all error correlations constrained 
equal
- 1392.33 930 - - - .910 -
2. Measurement Model
(Model A) All regression paths constrained equal 2A versus 1B 1426.54 939 34.21 9 p < .0001 .905 .005
(Model B) Regression path for SEP-Guilt  FPR 
constrained equal
2B versus 1B 1394.15 931 1.82 1 NS .910 .000
(Model C) Model B + regression path for SEP-Guilt  FPA 
constrained equal
2C versus 1B 1394.15 932 1.82 2 NS .910 .000
(Model D) Model C + regression path for FPR  HP 
constrained equal
2D versus 1B 1405.28 933 12.95 3 p < .01 .908 .002
(Model E) Model C + regression path for HP  DEP 
constrained equal
2E versus 1B 1394.18 933 1.85 3 NS .910 .000
(Model F) Model E + regression path for FPA  HP 
constrained equal
2F versus 1B 1400.41 934 8.08 4 NS
P = .088
.909 .001
(Model G) Model F + regression path for FPR  ANX 
constrained equal
2G versus 1B 1408.87 935 16.54 5 p < .01 .908 .002
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Note: ∆χ2 = difference in χ2 values between models; ∆df = difference in number of degrees of freedom between models; ∆CFI = difference in 
CFI values between models; SEP-Guilt = Separation guilt; FPR = Reciprocal Filial Piety; FPA = Authoritarian Filial Piety; HP = Hubristic 
Pride; DEP = DASS-Depression subscale; ANX = DASS-Anxiety subscale
(Model H) Model F + regression path for SEP-Guilt  ANX 
constrained equal
2H versus 1B 1405.87 935 13.54 5 p < .05 .908 .002
(Model I) Model F + regression path for FPA  ANX 
constrained equal
2I versus 1B 1407.38 935 15.05 5 p < .05 .908 .002
(Model J) Model F + regression path for DEP  ANX 
constrained equal
2J versus 1B 1400.68 935 8.35 5 NS .909 .001
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Testing the Full Hypothesised Model of the Relationships among Separation Guilt, Filial 
Piety, Hubristic Pride and Psychological Distress
A split-half analysis was conducted on the full data set (n = 371) to examine the 
structure of the hypothesised model. Comparable findings were found for the analysis of 
the first half (n = 175),  χ2 (451) = 621.46, p < .001, χ2/df = 1.38, RMSEA = .047, 90% CI 
[.037, .055], SRMR = .073, CFI = .924, and the second half of the data set (n = 196) ),  χ2 
(451) = 713.98, p < .001, χ2/df = 1.54, RMSEA = .055, 90% CI [.047, .062], SRMR = .076, 
CFI = .909.
Testing the configural model on Singaporeans alone, the goodness-of-fit measures 
revealed an acceptable model fit, χ2 (451) = 713.09, p < .001, χ2/df = 1.58, RMSEA = .057, 
90% CI [.049, .064], SRMR = .078, CFI = .91. Testing of the configural model on 
Australians revealed an acceptable model fit, χ2 (451) = 655.70, p < .001, χ2/df = 1.45, 
RMSEA = .049, 90% CI [.041, .057], SRMR = .073, CFI = .91. 
Multi-group analysis structural equation modelling was applied to test the 
theoretically hypothesised model relating separation guilt and hubristic pride to filial piety 
and symptoms of depression and anxiety. All variables in the model were entered as latent 
constructs. Table 27 below shows a summary of the goodness-of-fit statistics for 
comparative tests of multigroup invariance on the full model. Goodness-of-fit results from 
this test of invariant factor loadings provided evidence of a well-fitting model χ2 (935) = 
1400.68, p < .001, χ2/df = 1.58, RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.033, .041], SMSR = .073, CFI = 
.91. It was concluded that, with the exception of the four regression paths that were 
identified as noninvariant between Singaporeans and Australians (FPRHP; FPRANX; 
SEP-GuiltANX; FPAANX), all other paths were operating similarly across 
Australians and Singaporeans, and that the model showed an adequate fit to the data that 
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Table 27
Goodness-of-fit statistics for Comparative Tests of Multigroup Invariance
Model χ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR Comparison ∆χ2 ∆df p ∆CFI
1: Configural model (no 
equality constraints)
1368.79 902 <.001 .909 .039 (.033-.041) .0725 - - - -
(1B): All factor loadings, 
regression paths and error 
correlations constrained equal
1441.16 941 <.001 .903 .038 (.034-.042) .0802 1B versus 1 72.37 39 <.001 .006
2: All factor loadings (except 
Item 5 on FPR and Item 26 on 
HP) constrained equal
1387.71 926 <.001 .910 .037 (.033-.041) .0730 Model 2 vs. Model 1 18.92 24 NS .001
3: Model 2 + all error 
correlations constrained equal
1392.33 930 <.001 .910 .037 (.033-.041) .0732 Model 3 vs. Model 1 23.54 28 NS .001
4: Model 3 + all paths 
constrained equal (except those 




1400.68 935 <.001 .909 .037 (.033-.041) .0732 Model 4 vs. Model 1 31.89 32 NS .000
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supported the hypothesised relationships between the specific self-conscious emotions, 
filial piety and psychological distress.
Testing for Cultural Differences in Parameter Estimates
Follow-up analyses on the multigroup analysis of invariance on the structural model 
were conducted to determine how certain factor-loading parameters were not operating in a 
similar manner between Australians and Singaporeans. Comparisons between standardised 
parameter estimates for regression path coefficients were used to determine the level of 
significance with regard to path coefficients for Australians and Singaporeans (see Figure 
3).
 
Figure 3. Standardised parameter estimates of the multi-group analysis model relating 
filial piety, separation guilt and hubristic pride to depression and anxiety for Australians 
(Standardised parameter estimates for Singaporeans in parentheses; four regression paths 
identified as noninvariant between Australians and Singaporeans highlighted in yellow). 
For both Singaporeans and Australians, separation guilt was found to independently 
contribute to both reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety. The standardised parameter 
estimates indicated that separation guilt was more strongly associated with authoritarian 
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filial piety than reciprocal filial piety for both nationalities. Additionally, separation guilt 
was found to negatively contribute to symptoms of anxiety for the Singaporean sample 
only. With the exception of authoritarian filial piety’s contribution to hubristic pride, 
Singaporeans generally demonstrated higher standardised parameter estimate values for the 
relationships between separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic pride and psychological 
distress. 
Interestingly, cultural differences were noted in both reciprocal and authoritarian 
filial piety’s independent contributions to symptoms of anxiety. For the Singaporean 
sample, both forms of filial piety were found to be negatively associated with symptoms of 
anxiety, although authoritarian filial piety was found to have a stronger negative association 
with symptoms of anxiety. In contrast, the Australian sample demonstrated much weaker 
relationships between filial piety and symptoms of anxiety. In addition, while authoritarian 
filial piety was found to independently contribute to hubristic pride across both 
nationalities, a stronger negative association was found between reciprocal filial piety and 
hubristic pride for Singaporeans, as compared to their Australian counterparts. For both 
nationalities, hubristic pride was found to independently contribute to symptoms of 
depression. The results indicate that both authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety may have 
specific significance for individuals within a collectivistic culture, whereby filial piety may 
interact with self-conscious emotions, such as separation guilt and hubristic pride, to 
influence depressive and anxious symptoms. 
Discussion
The present study aimed to assess whether filial piety may play a culture specific 
role in its interaction with separation guilt and hubristic pride, as well as symptoms of 
depression and anxiety. The present study sought to investigate how filial piety, both 
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reciprocal and authoritarian, may influence the relationships between separation guilt, 
hubristic pride and psychological distress for both Australians and Singaporeans. Indeed, 
this study was undertaken to meet the expressed need for models of self-conscious 
emotions that consider cultural differences (Wong & Tsai, 2007), given that current 
understandings of self-conscious emotions are largely skewed towards individualistic 
cultures.
Testing the Hypothesised Model of the Relationships among Separation Guilt, Filial Piety, 
Hubristic Pride and Psychological Distress
The SEM model designed to test the hypothesised theoretical model had an 
acceptable fit to the data and supported the predictive utility of the model. In terms of the 
relationships among separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic pride and psychological distress, 
the present study confirmed that, across both Australian and Singaporean cultures, 
separation guilt makes independent contributions to both reciprocal and authoritarian filial 
piety. While, to my knowledge, there has not been any research on the relationship between 
separation guilt and filial piety, researchers have argued that separation guilt consists of an 
overbearing and overpowering sense of responsibility towards one’s family and loved ones 
(O’Connor et al., 1997). Furthermore, separation guilt has been characterised by an 
exaggerated belief that to separate, or differ, from one’s loved ones will cause the latter 
harm (Erreich, 2011; O’Connor et al., 1997). The concept of filial piety shares some similar 
ground with separation guilt, as it relates to important ideas about how children should treat 
their parents (Yeh & Bedford, 2003). Indeed, within the literature, there exists a 
commonality between separation guilt and filial piety – a sense of parental loyalty that may 
result in behaviour that is motivated by the need to protect and remain loyal to one’s 
parents (O’Connor et al., 1997; Weiss & Sampson, 1986). For both Australians and 
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Singaporeans, as representative of individualistic and collectivistic cultures, respectively, 
the present study’s model has shown that separation guilt makes independent contributions 
to both authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety. Indeed, the maladaptive nature of separation 
guilt is highlighted in the stronger contributions of separation guilt to authoritarian filial 
piety, as compared to separation guilt’s contribution to reciprocal filial piety, for both 
nationalities.
Authoritarian Filial Piety’s Contribution to Hubristic Pride
Studies 1, 2, and 3 have shown that Singaporeans reported significantly greater 
levels of separation guilt than their Australian counterparts. Furthermore, Study 3 found 
that Singaporeans reported significantly stronger attitudes towards both reciprocal and 
authoritarian filial piety. The present study found that for both nationalities, authoritarian 
filial piety contributed to hubristic pride. However, the model indicated that reciprocal filial 
piety was found to contribute negatively to hubristic pride for Singaporeans only. In 
general, the collectivistic valuation of filial piety has been widely documented in the 
literature (Yim et al., 2011). In contrast, individualistic Western cultures have been 
suggested to possess fewer philosophies of care that actively encourage sacrifice and care 
for older generations, with young people having been found to hold negative attitudes 
towards ageing and older people (Slotterback & David, 1996). 
Even though the importance and relevance of filial piety has been highlighted in the 
present study, reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety may have culturally significant, yet 
differing, contributions towards the self-conscious emotion of hubristic pride. Indeed, 
researchers have argued that filial piety cannot be understood unless its dual nature is 
recognised and applied in both theory and research (Laidlaw et al., 2010; Yeh, 2003). 
Although the literature has documented the general valuation, as well as the positive 
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impact, of filial piety within collectivistic cultures, findings from the present study 
contribute to current understandings of the dual-conceptualisation of filial piety and its 
culturally-unique associations with self-conscious emotions. The present study has found 
that authoritarian filial piety may independently contribute to emotions of hubristic pride 
within the individual, which, in turn, may result in psychological distress for individuals 
from both collectivistic and individualistic cultures.
It is suggested that authoritarian filial piety’s notion of the ‘sacrifice’ of one’s own 
desires and submission to one’s parents’ wishes might lead both individualistic and 
collectivistic individuals to experience what is largely considered as the ‘positive’ self-
conscious emotion of hubristic pride. Within the literature, hubristic pride has been 
conceptualised as a distinct facet of pride that is more loosely associated with actual 
accomplishments, and may involve a self-evaluative process that reflects a less authentic 
sense of self, such as distorted and self-aggrandised views of the self (Tracy & Robins, 
2007a). Hubristic pride has been associated with narcissism (Lewis, 2000), interpersonal 
problems, relationship conflict and various maladaptive behaviours (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998; Campbell, 1999; Wubben et al., 2012). The present study’s finding of 
authoritarian filial piety’s direct contribution to hubristic pride is a novel finding, and may, 
perhaps, reflect a unique form of compensation for the individual’s perceived lack of 
control, subjugation and sacrifice made for their parents at their own expense, as reflective 
of their attitude towards authoritarian filial piety. 
Further, it is suggested that feeling hubristically proud might afford the individual 
with strong authoritarian filial attitudes a greater sense of perceived control. Indeed, the 
concept of sacrificing one’s own desires for their parents’ wishes in authoritarian filial piety 
may be counterproductive in its association with hubristic pride. The individual, who holds 
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strong attitudes towards authoritarian filial piety, may give up their own desires to fulfil the 
wishes of their parents, and in acts of pleasing their parents, may receive intrapersonal and 
interpersonal (social) rewards that work to reinforce their socially desirable behaviour. This 
may be related to greater levels of hubristic pride, as opposed to authentic pride, whereby 
the individual may internalise and attribute the value of their achievement directly onto 
their self-concept, especially because of their act of sacrifice. While the findings from 
Study 3 indicated that hubristic pride was related to stronger depressive and anxious 
symptoms for Singaporeans, findings from the present study indicate that when hubristic 
pride stems from authoritarian filial piety and separation guilt, hubristic pride is 
subsequently related to psychological distress, which is experienced by both Australian and 
Singaporean young adults. 
Moreover, the present study found that, for young Singaporean adults, reciprocal 
filial piety may have the beneficial aspect of negatively contributing to hubristic pride, 
which may work towards preventing the occurrence of associated psychological distress. In 
addition to the beneficial aspects of reciprocal filial piety that have been identified in 
previous research (Yeh & Bedford, 2003), such as enhanced interpersonal relationships, the 
present study found that reciprocal filial piety may even prevent the experience of other 
negative self-conscious emotions, such as hubristic pride, which may contribute to future 
psychological distress. Reciprocal filial piety was also found to negatively contribute 
towards anxious symptoms for Singaporeans in the present study’s model. In line with prior 
research, these findings also support the pro-social and beneficial attributes of reciprocal 
filial piety, and establish that the two distinct facets of filial piety should be studied together 
when assessing filial piety’s association with self-conscious emotions and psychological 
distress.
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Clinical Findings and Implications
The present study’s model found that separation guilt negatively contributed to 
symptoms of anxiety for Singaporeans only. In the existing literature, guilt, both adaptive 
and maladaptive, has been more strongly related to psychological symptoms of anxiety, as 
opposed to depressive symptoms (Orth et al., 2006). Furthermore, Studies 2 and 3 lend 
support to the association between separation guilt and anxious symptoms for both cultures. 
However, the present study’s model indicates that it may well be possible that filial piety, 
whether authoritarian or reciprocal in nature, assists in mediating the relationship between 
separation guilt and anxiety for young Singaporean adults. Again, this highlights the 
beneficial importance of filial piety within a collectivistic culture. 
Indeed, for young Singaporean adults only, both reciprocal and authoritarian filial 
piety were found to have direct and negative contributions towards symptoms of anxiety. 
While reciprocal filial piety’s negative contribution to anxious symptoms may be 
understood through the pro-social and beneficial aspects of reciprocal filial piety for the 
individual’s well-being (Laidlaw et al., 2010; Yeh, 2003), the present study’s finding of 
authoritarian filial piety’s negative contribution to anxious symptoms for Singaporeans 
appears to be a novel finding. Previous research has argued for the negative impact of 
authoritarian filial piety on the individual (Yeh & Bedford, 2003). For example, 
authoritarian filial piety has been associated with submission and suppression of one’s own 
desires at the expense of one’s parents’ wishes, as well as harshness and inhibition of self-
expression (Ho, 1994; Yeh & Bedford, 2003). However, the model in the present study 
indicates that, for young Singaporeans, authoritarian filial piety has a directly negative 
contribution to symptoms of anxiety. It is suggested that the importance placed on the 
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family as a foundational cornerstone of collectivistic societies effectively works towards 
shifting the individual’s focus from an independent to an interdependent framework. 
Although authoritarian filial piety may comprise complying with one’s parents’ 
wishes at the expense of the individual’s own desires, it may be possible that the 
collectivistic focus on interpersonal and familial harmony may assist in alleviating direct 
feelings of anxiousness for young Singaporean adults. Additionally, filial piety, whether in 
the authoritarian or reciprocal form, ultimately focuses on meeting one’s parents’ emotional 
and physical needs and wishes. This prosocial element of filial piety might be compounded 
by the motivation behind separation guilt to amend and repair broken social relationships 
and wrongdoings, which is suggested to collectively work towards achieving social and 
familial harmony and alleviating any experienced psychological distress in relation to the 
latter. As such, the negative contribution of authoritarian filial piety on symptoms of 
anxiety, for young Singaporean adults, further supports previous research and theories that 
argue for an interdependent conceptualisation of the self in collectivistic individuals.    
For young Australian adults, the present study’s model indicates that both 
authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety do not have any direct relations with symptoms of 
anxiety. The absence of direct contributions from authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety to 
anxious symptoms in young Australian adults may reflect the generally weaker emphasis 
on the active encouragement of sacrifice and care for older generations in individualistic 
cultures, such as Australia. Indeed, previous studies have found that younger individualistic 
adults have been found to hold negative attitudes towards ageing and older people 
(Schwartz et al., 2010; Slotterback & David, 1996). Furthermore, Study 3 has lent evidence 
to weaker attitudes of filial piety within the young Australian adult sample, as compared to 
their Singaporean counterparts. These generally weaker filial attitudes are also suggested to 
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contribute to the absence of direct contributions from filial piety to anxious symptoms for 
young Australian adults. However, as discussed above, the present study’s model has 
indicated that when authoritarian filial attitudes stem from the experience of separation 
guilt, young Australian adults experience hubristic pride, which subsequently contributes to 
psychological distress. 
The development of the present study’s model is of theoretical and empirical 
significance, because self-conscious emotions, such as separation guilt and hubristic pride, 
have yet to be studied in relation to one another. In addition, filial piety has yet to be 
studied in relation to separation guilt or hubristic pride. The present study’s model has 
encapsulated the cross-cultural associations between separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic 
pride and symptoms of depression and anxiety. The model appears to be transferable and 
relevant to cross-cultural research of self-conscious emotions, with specific regard to the 
collectivistic cultures. Furthermore, the model is useful for clinical practice, as it allows 
clinicians to (a) gain an understanding of how culturally relevant variables, such as filial 
piety, may directly or indirectly impact upon psychological distress within the individual, 
especially within collectivistic cultures. (b) apply an understanding of the complexity of 
self-conscious emotions to psychological distress within their clinical practice, (c) evaluate 
their clinical practice interventions based on cross-cultural complexities of the interaction 
between specific self-conscious emotions, attitudes toward filial piety and psychological 
distress. In addition, the model in the present study especially highlights the importance of 
filial piety in a collectivistic culture, because authoritarian filial piety is associated with 
hubristic pride and symptoms of depression and anxiety. In contrast, reciprocal filial piety 
is negatively associated with hubristic pride. This implies that psychological interventions 
for mood disorders, where symptoms of depression or anxiety are relevant, may need to 
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consider the role of the collectivistic individual’s attitudes toward filial piety, as well as the 
possible presence of separation guilt and hubristic pride.
Limitations and Further Research
Notwithstanding the fact that the present study’s model successfully identified 
cultural differences in the associations between separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic pride 
and symptoms of depression and anxiety, further cross-cultural research should be 
performed to confirm the validity of the model. In follow-up studies, the target group could 
be enlarged to include older adults, to investigate for possible changes to the experience of 
separation guilt, hubristic pride and attitudes towards filial piety as the individual 
progresses through the lifespan. Additionally, due to the present study’s exploratory nature 
and the presence of nonnormality in the sample, findings should be cautiously interpreted. 
Another limitation would be the well-known issue related to the administration of 
self-report measures – social desirability. What alleviates this concern in the present study 
is the fact that some of the means of the different subscales varied substantially, which may 
suggest that participants did not show a tendency to try to come across as individuals who 
did not experience negative emotions (self-conscious emotions or emotional distress). In 
addition, in my conceptualisation of the relations between separation guilt, hubristic pride, 
filial piety and psychological distress, it was not my intention to be comprehensive by 
investigating all the possible self-conscious emotions by adding in other emotions such as 
shame and adaptive guilt. Instead, my aim was to develop a model that was theoretically 
and empirically informed by prior research, as well as the results of Studies 1, 2 and 3. 
While the present study is, to my knowledge, the first to explore indirect 
relationships between separation guilt and hubristic pride through culturally relevant 
variables such as filial piety, future studies should investigate possible and additional 
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interactions of other self-conscious emotions, and how culture-specific interactions may 
impact upon psychological distress. Lastly, caution should be exercised when discussing 
the directions of effects in the model, as cross-sectional data were used. To explore and 
uncover possible causal relationships, future research will require the application of a 
longitudinal design.
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The cultural relevance of self-conscious emotions during the period of young 
adulthood was supported in all four studies, with each study adding a key contribution to 
the overall understanding of the emotions of shame, guilt and pride in Singaporean and 
Australian young adults. In Study 1, separation guilt emerged as a culturally relevant self-
conscious emotion that distinguished young Singaporean adults from their Australian 
counterparts. Furthermore, Study 3 provided further quantitative evidence that Singaporean 
young adults reported greater separation guilt than Australians. In addition, the relationship 
between hubristic pride and psychological distress was found to be particularly relevant for 
Singaporeans, more so than their Australian counterparts. 
Study 2 contributed to the literature qualitative data with regard to cultural 
differences in both the inward experience, as well as the outward expression of self-
conscious emotions between Singaporeans and Australians, as representatives of 
collectivistic and individualistic cultures, respectively. Study 2 has assisted in attaining a 
richer and more comprehensive understanding of the experience and expression of 
particular self-conscious emotions within collectivistic and individualistic cultures. In 
general, young Singaporean adults were found to report more shame and hubristic pride, 
while their Australian counterparts were found to report more authentic pride. In particular, 
Study 2 found that, as compared to their Australian counterparts, Singaporeans reported 
experiencing more familial guilt, which is similar in its conceptualisation to separation 
guilt, which appeared to be influenced by attitudes towards filial piety. 
This thread was further explored in Study 3, in which Singaporeans were found to 
report stronger attitudes towards both authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety than 
Australians. In addition, Study 3 replicated Study 1’s finding of greater separation guilt in 
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young adult Singaporeans, as well as hubristic pride’s relation with psychological distress 
within the Singaporean sample. Finally, Study 4 examined the specific relations between 
separation guilt, hubristic pride, filial piety and psychological distress in a model for both 
Singaporeans and Australians. Attitudes towards filial piety were found to be particularly 
distinct to, and relevant for, Singaporeans. Specifically, although separation guilt 
independently contributed towards filial piety for both Australians and Singaporeans, both 
authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety had unique cultural relations with hubristic pride, as 
well as with symptoms of depression and anxiety. A common thread that has emerged in 
the studies conducted was that shame was found to be strongly related to psychological 
distress for both Australians and Singaporeans. 
An exploration of the relations between separation guilt, filial piety, hubristic pride 
and psychological distress provides a unique contribution to the literature. Findings indicate 
that attitudes towards one’s parents may play a critical role for young Singaporean adults’ 
experience of hubristic pride and psychological distress, more so than for their Australian 
counterparts. Depending on the nature of their attitudes towards their parents – reciprocal or 
authoritarian – young Singaporean adults may be deterred from, or may be subject to, the 
experience of hubristic pride and psychological distress. This is an interesting finding, as 
researchers have argued for the need to consider and apply the dual-nature of filial piety in 
research (Laidlaw et al., 2010; Yeh, 2003). This finding would imply that both reciprocal 
and authoritarian forms of filial piety are not mutually independent of each other. Taken 
together, despite differences in their respective relations with hubristic pride and 
psychological distress for Singaporeans, both authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety appear 
to be distinctly different, and yet essential elements in encapsulating the concept of filial 
piety within a collectivistic Asian context.
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Because the findings of each of the individual studies of this thesis have been 
summarised and discussed in earlier chapters, the following discussion focuses on the 
broader lessons from the combined results. Specifically, this discussion examines the 
general contributions that this thesis has made to our understanding of culturally distinct 
experiences of self-conscious emotions and their relation to psychological distress. In 
addition, the potential implications that the findings have for theory development in the 
area of self-conscious emotions will be explored. This thesis also has practical implications 
for clinical practice with regard to the experience and expression of self-conscious 
emotions and how such emotions may relate to symptoms of depression and anxiety. These 
practical implications highlight the importance of the findings of this thesis in informing 
clinical intervention and work with young adults. 
Theoretical Implications
Separation Guilt and Filial Piety
This thesis has contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of separation 
guilt as a form of maladaptive guilt, which was examined in two different cultural settings. 
Results of the studies have answered the call by researchers for a better understanding of 
the differentiation among various forms of guilt across cultures, with specific regard to how 
they differ and why such differences might exist (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Specifically, 
separation guilt was found to exist as an important self-conscious emotion that operated 
differently between the Singaporean and Australian cultures, with young Singaporean 
adults reporting greater levels of separation guilt than young Australian adults. This may be 
explained by the nature of guilt itself. Guilt has been defined as an interpersonally driven 
emotion, which stems from the need to maintain positive attachments towards others 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Specifically, guilt – both adaptive and 
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maladaptive – has been suggested to derive from altruism, a fear of causing harm to others, 
and to be related to empathy and the maintenance of social attachments (O’Connor et al., 
1999). Singaporeans’ greater separation guilt, as compared to their Australian counterparts, 
may be explained by the interpersonal nature of guilt, and the collectivistic emphasis on 
interpersonal relationships. 
Importantly, young adults’ attitudes towards filial piety appear to be a key concept 
that may play an important role with regard to why separation guilt operates in a different 
pattern between Australians and Singaporeans. This thesis has illustrated that the difference 
in the experience of separation guilt may, in fact, be due to differences between 
individualistic and collectivistic conceptions of the self, whereby the collectivistic self, 
which has been proposed to value familial harmony and social relationships over the 
enhancement of the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), may possess stronger attitudes 
towards remaining filial towards their parents. This is not to say that individualistic 
Australian young adults do not care for their parents. Rather, it may be that the 
collectivistic valuation of remaining filial towards one’s parents may explain stronger 
attitudes towards filial piety in the young Singaporean adult cohort. The contribution of 
separation guilt to the experience of filial piety, within a collectivistic culture such as 
Singapore, appears to be embedded within a much more complex interaction with hubristic 
pride. As demonstrated in this research, this is a unique contribution to the literature, as no 
other studies have examined the intricate relationships between various self-conscious 
emotions, such as guilt and pride, between cultures. 
The concept of filial piety has long been strongly established and deeply embedded 
within the collectivistic Asian culture (Yim et al., 2011). In July 2013, China issued a 
decree making elderly parents now protected under the “Elderly Rights Law” (Meng & 
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Hunt, 2013), which allows elderly Chinese parents the right to file lawsuits against their 
children who fail to regularly visit them or contact them by phone. This new Chinese law 
that has harshly enforced the concept of filial piety appears to address recent research 
regarding the corrosion of Confucian virtues among China’s youth (Meng & Hunt, 2013). 
China’s new law that has legally enforced filial piety appears to emphasise the concept of 
authoritarian filial piety, through the forceful submission to role requirements that address 
compulsory compliance with the young adult’s parents’ wishes and desires due to parents’ 
seniority in physical and social terms (Yeh, 2003). Of greater relevance may be the 
behavioural and emotional consequences that young Chinese adults may experience as a 
consequence of being subject to the Elderly Rights Law. Indeed, the findings of this thesis 
are consistent with previous research that has demonstrated the negative intrapersonal 
psychological repercussions of authoritarian filial piety (Ho, 1994). Interestingly, although 
young Singaporean adults reported greater separation guilt and stronger attitudes towards 
both authoritarian and reciprocal filial piety, the current findings indicated a stronger 
relationship between authoritarian filial piety and anxiety for young Australian adults, as 
compared to young Singaporean adults. Furthermore, even reciprocal filial piety, which has 
been associated with better intergenerational relationships and lower levels of parent-child 
conflict (Lawrence et al., 1992; Yeh & Bedford, 2003), was positively related to symptoms 
of anxiety for young Australian adults, while it remained uncorrelated to psychological 
distress for young Singaporean adults. Additionally, separation guilt was positively 
correlated to symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress for young Australian adults, while 
it was observed to be only positively associated with anxious symptoms for young 
Singaporean adults.
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A number of reasons for these findings were explored. First, Singaporeans’ stronger 
attitudes towards both reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety may reflect the deeply 
embedded Confucian values of attending to one’s parents’ needs and desires. The period of 
young adulthood may be of particular relevance with regard to the experience of separation 
guilt and attitudes towards filial piety. Research has indicated that young adulthood is 
specifically marked by values that include self-responsibility, financial independence and 
making independent decisions (Arnett, 2004). In fact, the period of young adulthood has 
been suggested to possess the highest incidence of mental disorders of any age cohort 
(Rowling et al., 2005), with critical life transition periods resulting in young adult 
individuals perceiving themselves as vulnerable and lacking a general sense of confidence 
and control (Janoff-Bulman & Frantz, 1997). For young Singaporean adults, the personal 
and financial independence and self-responsibility that mark the period of young adulthood 
may signal to young adults from collectivistic cultures, such as Singapore, to commence 
reciprocating and meeting the emotional, physical and financial needs of their aging 
parents, thereby resulting in strong attitudes towards filial piety within the young 
Singaporean adult context. By contrast, Australia, as a predominantly individualistic 
culture, may place a greater importance on self-enhancement in an individually-focused 
manner, attributing less intensive emotional attachment towards interpersonal relationships 
(Sun et al., 2004; Triandis, 1995). The weaker attitudes towards filial piety in young 
Australian adults may indicate that Australians going through the period of young 
adulthood may place a greater emphasis on their independence and self-enhancement, 
rather than placing an importance on being filial to their parents. This is not to say that 
young Australian adults do not value their family. Young Australian adults may function 
within a culture that celebrates independence, individualism and self-enhancement, with 
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their families supporting and celebrating their sons and daughters’ progression towards 
independence and self-responsibility.
Another contribution of this thesis is a better understanding of how and why 
maladaptive guilt and filial piety may relate to psychological distress in a different manner 
within the Australian and Singaporean context. It appears that when young Australian 
adults reported experiencing strong separation guilt and attitudes towards filial piety, a 
positive relation was found with psychological distress. In contrast, Singaporeans showed 
generally weaker or non-significant relations. An explanation for this may lie in the manner 
in which self-concept is defined in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. While 
individualistic cultures have been found to consider the self as unit of life and a source of 
identity, it is important to note that both success and failure are attributed to one’s own 
individual ability (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2004). This sense of direct and sole responsibility 
for success and failure contrasts with the collectivistic identity that conceptualises the self 
as predominantly defined by its relationships with in-group others. This difference in the 
definition of self-concept between individualistic and collectivistic cultures might imply 
that when young Australian adults feel separation guilt and strong filial attitudes towards 
their parents, they may experience the negative repercussions of the pressure to meet 
expectations and amend parent-child conflict. Specifically, the negative repercussions may 
be felt in isolation, whereby young Australian adults may lack the social support with 
regard to coping with negative self-conscious emotions such as separation guilt. By 
contrast, despite experiencing stronger separation guilt and attitudes towards filial piety, 
young Singaporean adults may already have an existing social coping mechanism that may 
be providing them with psychosocial and interpersonal support to the young Singaporean 
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adult to buffer the negative repercussions of separation guilt and the expectations and 
pressures of authoritarian filial piety. 
Essentially, the focus on social relationships and familial harmony within 
collectivistic cultures may assist the young Singaporean adult’s coping with separation 
guilt. Ironically, though, it appears that the source of the problem may be the source of the 
solution as well – while family and parental issues may have been the cause of separation 
guilt and authoritarian filial piety, the sources of support, through reciprocal filial piety and 
social supports, may contribute towards being part of the solution. Findings of this thesis 
support the conceptualisation of a dual-nature of filial piety, and affirm the crucial 
importance of social relationships within a collectivistic culture to better understand how 
self-conscious emotions are experienced within cultures. 
Shame: A Destructive Self-Conscious Emotion
Another major self-conscious emotion examined in this thesis was the emotion of 
shame. Compared to Australians, Singaporeans were expected to report greater proneness 
towards experiencing shame, due to the collectivistic valuation of shame (Fung, 1999; Fung 
et al., 2003). Quantitative analyses found that young Singaporeans and Australian adults 
did not statistically differ in their levels of shame. While this finding was somewhat 
inconsistent with previous research that has suggested the virtuous nature of shame in 
collectivistic cultures (Fung et al., 2003; Wong & Tsai, 2007), a few explanations of this 
thesis’ findings are explored. First, the lack of quantitative evidence of a greater shame-
proneness in young Singaporean adults does not imply that shame is not a focal emotion in 
collectivistic cultures, nor that it is not positively valued within the Singaporean context. In 
fact, it is suggested that negatively evaluating the self, which is a core component of shame, 
may have motivational significance within a Singaporean collectivistic culture. 
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Specifically, this motivational significance is proposed to deter collectivistic individuals 
from performing potentially shame-inducing actions. Although research has indicated that 
children of Chinese parents are subjected to shaming techniques so as to induce shame and 
to socialise them to be well-behaved (Fung et al., 2003), findings from this thesis suggest 
that it may be possible that by the time collectivistic children reach the period of young 
adulthood, they may have learnt shame deterrence, so as to avoid the negative intrapersonal 
repercussions of the emotion.
A second contribution that this thesis makes to our understanding of shame is the 
severe negative associations between shame and psychological well-being. Across both 
Australian and Singaporean cultures, shame was strongly associated with devastating 
consequences on the young adult’s psychological well-being and was strongly related to 
symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. This finding is consistent with the extant 
literature, which has established the negative psychological impact of shame (Lewis, 1971; 
Tracy & Robins, 2004a), and contributes to the cross-cultural understanding of shame. An 
explanation for the negative cross-cultural impact of shame on psychological well-being 
lies in the very nature of shame in itself. Shame focuses on the individual’s self-concept, 
and contrasts with guilt’s focus on the wrongful act that was committed by the individual 
(Barrett, 1995; Tangney, 1990). As such, shame is proposed to operate in an intensely 
intrapersonal manner, where even strong collectivistic interpersonal relationships may not 
prove helpful for the shamed individual. Even though shame may be elicited by situations 
where the social self is at risk of being harmed (Gilbert, 1997; Scheff, 2003), the actual 
experience of shame may, indeed, be more devastating than that of adaptive or maladaptive 
guilt. While guilt involves a focus on an action to amend a wrongdoing, shame’s focus on 
the self is proposed to lead to a self-concept that is eventually eroded, rather than preserved, 
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over time. Indeed, shame-prone individuals have been found to withdraw and isolate 
themselves from social relationships (Young, 1991). Taking into account the shamed 
individual’s withdrawal from social connection and self-isolation, it makes sense that 
shame has powerful associations with psychological distress, both within individualistic 
and collectivistic cultures. The protective factor that collectivistic cultures may offer to 
coping with negative self-conscious emotions, as seen with guilt, do not appear to apply to 
shame. Indeed, shame emerges as a unique self-conscious emotion with potentially 
devastating repercussions for psychological well-being.  
Pride
Both facets of pride - authentic and hubristic – were also examined in this thesis as 
major components of the self-conscious emotion of pride. In general, results from this 
thesis support the pro-social nature of authentic pride that has been demonstrated in the 
literature (Wubben et al., 2012). Indeed, findings from this thesis indicate that authentic 
pride appears to be negatively related to symptoms of depression for both young Australian 
and Singaporean adults. An important contribution that this thesis makes to our 
understanding of pride is the demonstration of cultural differences in the experience of 
hubristic pride in relation to psychological distress. In sum, the four studies have effectively 
provided qualitative and quantitative evidence that indicated hubristic pride’s association 
with psychological distress, more so for young Singaporean adults than their Australian 
counterparts. This is a unique finding, because hubristic and authentic pride and their 
relations to psychological distress have yet to be studied from a cross-cultural perspective. 
It appears that hubristic pride’s relation to psychological distress may have a unique and 
important relevance for young Singaporean adults. 
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A number of reasons for hubristic pride’s relationship with psychological distress 
were explored. First, the literature has suggested that hubristic pride has been strongly 
associated with personal excellence, motivating self-enhancing drive for social status, 
power, and adoration from others (Tracy et al., 2009). However, hubristic pride has been 
found to correlate with behaviours consistent with antisocial traits, such as hostility, 
selfishness and greed (Baumeister et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2005; Tracy et al., 2009). 
Importantly, researchers have found that hubristically proud individuals report a proneness 
towards an exaggerated self-opinion, self-importance, and have suggested them to be 
socially uncomfortable, as well as to experience anxiety with regard to social relationships 
and insecurity about being liked by others (Tracy et al., 2009). It appears that although 
hubristic pride may result in a strong drive for personal excellence and self-enhancement, 
social relationships are, essentially, at great risk of being harmed. This potential damage is 
suggested to explain the strong relationship between hubristic pride and symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and stress in young Singaporean adults. Due to the collectivistic 
valuation of social harmony and interpersonal relationships, the intrapersonal experience of 
hubristic pride within the collectivistic individual may present as severely incongruous with 
a collectivistic society’s norms and values of social cohesion. Psychological distress may 
stem from the collectivistic individual’s inward knowledge of the dissonance between their 
hubristic pride and the valuation of social relationships. In contrast, the general absence of a 
relationship (or weaker relationship) between hubristic pride and psychological distress in 
young Australian adults is suggested to be the result of a matching of elements of hubristic 
pride and those of the values of an individualistic culture. Individualistic cultures have been 
characterised by their conception of an independent self that is unique and autonomous 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991), with individuals perceiving personal autonomy values as 
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more important than concerns relating to social relationships (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, 
& Park, 1997). 
The individualistic society’s characteristics of autonomy, independence and self-
enhancement are suggested to establish an acceptable social platform for the social 
acceptance of hubristic pride. Even though hubristic pride may be associated with hostility 
and anxiety with regard to social relationships, these behavioural and emotional 
consequences of hubristic pride may be less devastating for the individualistic young 
Australian adult. Interestingly, an individualistic culture, such as that of Australia’s, may 
be, in itself, a protective factor for psychological distress as a result of hubristic pride. The 
results of this thesis have contributed to a richer, and more culturally diverse, understanding 
of hubristic pride by expanding on existing knowledge on behavioural and social 
consequences to include a more cross-cultural and intrapersonal dimension that includes the 
hubristically proud individual’s mental well-being.
Hubristic pride, when contributed to by separation guilt and authoritarian filial 
piety, may also operate within complex relations with psychological distress for both 
Australians and Singaporeans. Findings of this thesis indicated that hubristic pride, when 
contributed to by separation guilt and authoritarian filial piety, has direct contributions 
towards the experience of psychological distress for both Australians and Singaporeans. 
This finding furthers the understanding of the complexity of self-conscious emotions by 
illuminating the relations between specific self-conscious emotions of separation guilt and 
hubristic pride, relevant cultural variables such as filial piety, and psychological distress. 
Taken together, the findings of all four studies suggest that young Australians do not 
generally relate feelings of hubristic pride with psychological distress, unless factors, such 
as familial guilt and having to submit to one’s parent’s wishes, which are less congruent 
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with the individualistic self-conceptualisation, are imposed upon them. Also highlighted 
were the protective factors of reciprocal filial piety, which appear to be relevant specifically 
for young Singaporean adults, as evidenced by its negative contributions towards hubristic 
pride and symptoms of anxiety. For both Australian and Singaporean individuals, the 
notion of having to sacrifice their own desires and submit to one’s parents’ wishes may 
result in feelings of hubristic pride, which might include self-aggrandised views of the self 
(Tracy & Robins, 2007a) that are suggested to compensate for their personal loss. 
Ironically, the experience of hubristic pride that follows authoritarian filial piety is then, 
subsequently, related to symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
Clinical Implications
The findings of this thesis have practical implications for clinical interventions with 
young adults who present with symptoms of mood disorders, such as depressive and 
anxious symptoms that may be related to self-conscious emotions. All four studies in this 
thesis are valuable in informing how specific self-conscious emotions may potentially 
protect or harm an individual’s mental well-being. Additionally, this thesis has contributed 
to a much needed cultural understanding of variations in the experiences of self-conscious 
emotions across both the Australian and Singaporean young adult context, and results may 
be able to assist in the tailoring of therapeutic interventions for young adults from 
individualistic or collectivistic backgrounds. 
Young adulthood, a life stage that is marked by transitions that involve life-
changing decisions, has been identified by researchers as having the highest incidence of 
mental disorders of any age cohort (Rowling et al., 2005). The clinical implications of self-
conscious emotions on mental well-being, during the period of young adulthood, are of 
immense relevance, given the impact and complexity of the relationships between various 
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self-conscious emotions and psychological distress. Across both Australian and 
Singaporean cultures, findings of this thesis suggest that shame may present itself as a 
devastating self-conscious emotion that can greatly impact on the individual’s experience 
of depressive, anxious or stressful symptoms. While both adaptive and maladaptive forms 
of guilt were found to relate more strongly to anxiety and stress than depression, shame was 
related to depression, anxiety and stress for both young Australian and Singaporean adults. 
This finding is consistent with the literature, which has documented a stronger relationship 
between shame and depressive symptoms, as compared to guilt and depressive symptoms 
(Kim et al., 2011). 
The attributional pattern that is implied within the self-criticised and flawed shamed 
individual has been argued to be more maladaptive and self-destructive than guilt, with 
shame sharing strong associations with symptoms of depression (Tangney et al., 1995), 
eating disorders (Cleary, 1992), substance abuse and addictions (Young, 1991), as well as a 
myriad of psychological symptoms of distress (Kim et al., 2011). Indeed, shame appears to 
target an individual’s core self-concept, commanding the individual to assess the possibility 
of a faulty, worthless or flawed self. A core component of shame is the behavioural 
consequence of withdrawal from social relationships and self-isolation (Lewis, 1971). 
When working with young people who present with shame-proneness and depressive 
symptoms, and especially if the young adult client reports avoidance or withdrawal 
motives, it may be important for the clinician to explore and strengthen the young person’s 
social resources, and to encourage the maintenance of healthy and supportive social 
connections and interpersonal relationships. Additionally, clinicians may consider it useful 
to work with the young adult on shifting the inward focus of shame towards reparative 
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behaviour with the aim of amending broken social relationships and reducing withdrawal 
behaviour. 
Shifting shame towards the reparative behaviour that is central to adaptive guilt may 
empower young adult clients by reducing the intensity of shame and psychological distress, 
and may allow for more efficient and effective therapeutic intervention. In addition, 
therapists should remain vigilant to the bidirectional relationship of shame within a 
therapeutic context via the process of transference (Herman, 2011), and, utilising a client-
centred framework, equip young adult clients with skills to regulate shame (e.g. self-
compassion; Gilbert, 2011) and transform shame towards more adaptive core self-beliefs 
and modified behaviour (Tangney & Dearing, 2011).
The current findings also have practical implications with regard to culturally 
unique emotional experiences linked to psychological distress. It is suggested that filial 
piety may play an important role as a factor that may interact with one or more self-
conscious emotions to elicit psychological distress in young adults within both authoritarian 
and collectivistic cultures, whereby reciprocal filial piety appears to be a culturally unique 
protective factor, negatively contributing towards symptoms of anxiety and hubristic pride.  
Clinicians working with young adults who possess a collectivistic orientation are 
encouraged to take into account cultural values and attitudes, such as those towards a dual 
concept of filial piety, to inform their formulation of the presenting problem and work 
towards incorporating intervention strategies that include their family members. It may be 
important to take into account the need to preserve the dual-faceted nature of filial piety 
within clinical work, where clinicians may find it useful to first assess for attitudes towards 
both reciprocal and authoritarian filial piety, and to subsequently work with the young adult 
and their family to increase their attitudes towards reciprocal filial piety, while reducing 
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authoritarian filial piety attitudes. Such tailoring of psychotherapy intervention may work 
towards preventing or reducing levels of hubristic pride that are associated with 
authoritarian filial piety, as well as any related symptoms of depression and anxiety in the 
young adult. Within collectivistic societies, mental health campaigns may also benefit from 
focusing on building and strengthening attitudes towards reciprocal filial piety and healthy 
parent-child relationships for the young adult population.
Young Australian adults, as compared to their Singaporean counterparts, 
demonstrated a stronger relationship between guilt – both adaptive and maladaptive – and 
symptoms of anxiety. Guilt has been characterised by an outwardly directed attention to a 
wrongfully committed act, which has negatively impacted on others (Leith & Baumeister, 
1998). Clinicians working with young adults from individualistic cultures may find it useful 
to tap into relationship-enhancing qualities that have been related to guilt (Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002). For example, clinicians may tailor intervention to incorporate working on 
empathy and perspective taking, which may assist the young adult with amending and 
restoring broken social relationships that may have contributed to their feelings of guilt. In 
addition, it may be helpful to encourage the building and maintaining of positive 
interpersonal relationships that may be a protective factor for the young adult.
Methodological Factors
It is important to highlight methodological factors, with regard to the choice of 
psychometric assessments, which might have influenced the strength of association of 
shame, guilt and pride with psychological distress. In particular, researchers have suggested 
that the application of generalised (e.g. adjective-based) versus contextual (e.g. TOSCA-3 
scenarios) may be different for shame and guilt. Differences in the associations between 
shame and depressive symptoms are not expected for generalised versus contextual 
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measurements, as shame is essentially defined by the condemnation of a globally faulty self 
(Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), with both types of measurements approaches 
effectively tapping into this important element of shame (Kim et al., 2011). However, 
generalised guilt measurements, such as Study 3’s adapted adjective-based Guilt subscale, 
have been argued to result in stronger links to depressive symptoms, as such measures 
require respondents to perform the shame-like task of evaluating the global self in a way 
that contradicts notions of guilt as involving specific wrongful behaviours that arise from 
specific contexts (Kim et al., 2011). 
Indeed, findings from Study 3 have indicated that the generalised measure of guilt, 
which was the adapted adjective-based guilt subscale, demonstrated robust links with 
depression, while contextual measures of guilt – both adaptive and separation guilt – did 
not evidence similar associations. These findings may assist in informing the choice of 
clinical measurements of depressive symptoms within clinical practice and research. It has 
long been accepted, as seen in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
Fifth Edition (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), that guilt is a diagnostic 
criteria for depressive disorders, such as Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). Indeed, the 
DSM-V states that “inappropriate or excessive guilt” is a diagnostic criterion for MDD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). As a result, many clinical self-report instruments 
that have been designed to measure depressive symptoms include guilt-related items. 
Among such measures are the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) 
and the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (Hamilton, 1960). The findings of this thesis 
suggest that using contextual measures of guilt allows for a more accurate measurement of 
maladaptive guilt’s association with depressive symptoms. Specifically, the current 
findings indicate adaptive guilt’s weak relationship with depressive symptoms, and 
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maladaptive (survivor or separation) guilt’s more robust relationship with depressive 
symptoms. This pattern makes sense, because maladaptive guilt measures assess forms of 
guilt that are generally contextually bounded, but ultimately maladaptive and excessive in 
nature. For psychometric measurements that assess for depressive symptoms, clinicians 
should keep in mind that the presence of guilt items in self-report depression scales may 
result in an inflation of the relationship between guilt and depressive symptoms, as 
compared to scales which do not include guilt items. 
Limitations
There are a number of limitations in this thesis that should be addressed. Firstly, in 
Study 1, it would have been ideal to compare Australians residing in Australia to 
Singaporeans residing in Singapore during the period of data collection.  Instead, only 
30.2% of the Singaporean sample in Study 1 resided in Singapore. With the majority of the 
Singaporean sample residing overseas during the period of data collection, there may have 
been an inflation of separation guilt scores for the Singaporean sample. It should be noted, 
however, that participants’ nationality was determined by the country that they identified as 
having lived most of their lives in. Additionally, this limitation was rectified in the 
subsequent studies. Study 2’s participants lived in their country of nationality, and Studies 
3 and 4 attained a more accurate representation of Singaporeans residing in Singapore, with 
74.3% of Singaporeans reporting that they lived in Singapore during the time of data 
collection. Another limitation related to sample issues was the inability to attain sufficient 
participants in each of the four age bands that young adulthood was separated into. While 
Study 1 attempted to investigate cultural differences in self-conscious emotions across ages, 
results of analyses required cautious interpretation due to the low number of participants 
within certain age bands. 
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Although this thesis was able to distinctly examine specific cultural differences in 
the experience of self-conscious emotions between Australians and Singaporeans, attaining 
data from a greater number of nationalities representative of different individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures may have assisted in drawing conclusions that could be more 
generalisable to the concepts of individualism and collectivism. However, directly 
comparing two specific nationalities is also a strength of this thesis, in its ability to attain a 
more accurate and specific cultural understanding of the experience of self-conscious 
emotions and its relation to psychological distress. Indeed, other studies that have examined 
cultural differences in self-conscious emotions have often compared various ethnic cultures 
(Asians vs Caucasians; African-Americans vs. Caucasians) that reside within the same 
country (Meehan et al., 1996; Orth et al., 2010).
Another limitation to this thesis, with particular regard to Studies 1, 3 and 4, is the 
use of self-report measures for the purposes of quantitative analyses. The concern of social 
desirability may have been alleviated by the fact that some means of different subscales 
varied substantially, suggesting that participants did not exhibit an inclination towards 
coming across as individuals who did not experience negative self-conscious emotions or 
psychological distress. In addition, Study 2 was able to explore and attain a richer 
understanding of the cross-cultural experiences of shame, guilt and pride, beyond that of 
the ability of quantitative measures. This thesis’ application of correlational analyses in the 
investigation of the link between specific self-conscious emotions and symptoms of 
depression, anxiety and stress, resulted in the inability to confirm causal implications. 
However, it should be noted that previous key studies that have examined the relations 
between self-conscious emotions and psychological distress have also used a correlational 
design (O’Connor et al., 1999). Additionally, Study 4 tested a latent variable model that 
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depicted the independent contributions of specific self-conscious emotions and filial piety 
on symptoms of depression and anxiety. 
Additionally, results with respect to shame and guilt need to be interpreted 
cautiously, since analyses did not separately control for these two self-conscious emotions. 
The overlap between guilt and shame needs to be acknowledged, and future studies should 
consider their use of instruments, as well as research design (partialling shame from guilt, 
and vice versa), to address shame-free guilt, as well as guilt-free shame (adaptive shame).
Future Research
While this thesis has contributed towards a richer understanding of cross-cultural 
differences in the experiences of self-conscious emotions, filial piety and psychological 
distress, it has, inevitably, raised questions for further research. While this thesis was able 
to validate the cultural significance of separation guilt within a collectivistic culture, future 
studies should look into further differentiating the various forms of shame, guilt and pride 
within different cultural settings. This thesis has also uniquely illustrated that the cultural 
differences in the experience of self-conscious emotions described by researchers (Wong & 
Tsai, 2007) are, in fact, due to differences between individualistic and collectivistic 
conceptions of the self, with attitudes towards filial piety playing a significant role in the 
relations between self-conscious emotions and psychological distress. This is a novel 
contribution to the literature, and future studies could further investigate the direction and 
role that the dual-concept of filial piety may play in relation to other self-conscious 
emotions, such as shame, and how they may collectively impact on the individual’s 
psychological well-being. Future studies may also consider extending the inclusion of filial 
piety attitudes to other non-Asian collectivistic cultures, such as the Spanish culture, to 
investigate if filial piety has unique contributions towards a Confucian-based Asian society, 
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or if it extends towards other non-Asian collectivistic cultures as well. In addition, future 
studies could incorporate other cultural factors, besides filial piety, so as to achieve a better 
understanding of the complex cultural variations in emotional experiences.
Although it was the intention of this thesis to investigate cross-cultural differences 
in the experience of self-conscious emotions within the specific life stage of young 
adulthood, future studies should extend the investigation of specific cross-cultural 
differences in the experience of separation guilt and hubristic pride to other life stages, such 
as adolescence, middle adulthood and late adulthood. This would assist in attaining a richer 
and more comprehensive understanding of how and why the experience of culturally 
relevant self-conscious emotions may change over the lifespan. Additionally, it may assist 
in the better understanding of the reasons behind young adulthood being a period of the 
highest incidence of mental disorders of any age cohort (Rowling et al., 2005). 
Future research could extend the cultural findings of this study to include a clinical 
sample, so as to allow for a better understanding of how the cultural experience of self-
conscious emotions may differ between clinical and non-clinical samples. Future research 
could include other measures of psychological distress and mental well-being. Both clinical 
practice and research would benefit from future studies that examine the valuation, eliciting 
events, and the behavioural and emotional consequences of hubristic pride in its 
relationship with psychological distress, especially within collectivistic cultures. 
Additionally, future research could evaluate the effectiveness of clinical interventions that 
specifically apply an understanding of cultural differences in self-conscious emotions’ 
relation to psychological distress.
Given the richness of information that Study 2 was able to glean from the use of a 
qualitative design, future research may consider utilising qualitative methods so as to lend 
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balance to the traditional quantitative investigation of self-conscious emotions, to attain a 
much richer understanding of the complex emotional experiences behind shame, guilt and 
pride across and within cultures. In particular, Study 2 found that while young Singaporean 
adults reported experiencing hubristic pride, this experience was very much an internally 
“hidden” experience that involved a discrepancy between the inward experience and the 
outward expression of hubristic pride. Future studies could qualitatively assess for 
discrepancies between the inward experience and the outward expression of specific self-
conscious emotions, so as to better understand the impact of a culture’s valuation or 
devaluation of certain self-conscious emotions for the individual.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, this thesis has qualitatively and quantitatively investigated cross-
cultural differences in the experiences of shame, adaptive and maladaptive guilt and 
hubristic and authentic pride. It has also contributed to the literature novel findings of how 
self-conscious emotions may relate differently to symptoms of depression and anxiety, 
depending on the collectivistic or individualistic orientation of the individual. In particular, 
young Singaporean adults reported experiencing greater separation guilt, and stronger 
attitudes towards filial piety, than their Australian counterparts. Of interest, hubristically 
proud young Singaporean adults were more likely than young Australian adults to 
experience psychological distress. However, young Australian adults appeared to suffer 
more psychological distress that was related to guilt. Filial piety appears to be an important 
collectivistic cultural factor that may influence the experience of self-conscious emotions 
and their impact on psychological well-being. The qualitative analyses of Study 2 assisted 
in contributing to the literature more in-depth information with regard to the complex 
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inward experience and outward expression of self-conscious emotions, as well as the 
relationship between separation guilt and filial piety. 
In essence, this thesis has answered the call for a more in-depth, cross-cultural 
analysis of the experience of shame, guilt and pride, and has contributed to the current 
literature’s understanding of the complexities of self-conscious emotions. Finally, through 
the course of these analyses, the emotional experiences behind psychological distress for 
young adults were illuminated.  
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